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One of the global security challenges the United States faces is disaster coupled with political 
instability.  The U.S. Military‘s ability to rapidly respond to disasters enhances regional and 
global security and stability. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR), 
increasingly a mission that relies on a significant military component, focuses on the provision of 
goods and services such as health care, supplies necessary for survival, and infrastructure repair, 
with the goal of reducing the immediate human suffering.  
The disaster in this project‘s scenario is catastrophic flooding that occurs in one of Africa‘s most 
populated and wealthiest countries that threatens the stability and development of West Africa. 
This project, employing a systems engineering methodology, focuses on the 60 days after the 
disaster and the requirements to provide this assistance in the form of goods and services. Many 
system-of-systems architectures were developed to investigate the effectiveness of utilizing a 
Seabase for the primary delivery of aid.  Two simulation tools, SimKit and STELLA, were used 
to model and examine these architectures with the former addressing the delivery and throughput 
concerns while the latter focused on the satisfaction of the population and the limitation of 
criminal activity. Based on the results of modeling, the team provided recommendations relative 
to the most effective architectures in influencing the population of this coastal area as well as 
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 Today‘s military forces are charged less with classic armed conflict tasks and more with 
stability based operations throughout the world. This paradigm shift has resulted in increased 
interaction and relationship building with affected populations and their governments. The result 
has been a focus on such missions as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.  The 
SEA-17A student cohort of the Naval Postgraduate School‘s Systems Engineering and Analysis 
curriculum, in conjunction with the Temasek Defense Systems Institute of Singapore, 
subsequently sought to analyze such missions and enhance the efficiency of their execution 
through utilization of the Systems Engineering methodology.  Using principal stakeholder inputs, 
as well as the United States Marine Corps‘ Expeditionary Warrior 2010 (EW 10) Wargame as a 
baseline (which illustrated a post-natural disaster developing nation-state in desperate need of 
foreign humanitarian assistance in 2020), the students conducted research into the needs, 
requirements, and capabilities.  The research was based upon current Department of Defense 
doctrine and practices as well as future assets to develop a system-of-systems architecture 
capable of meeting the requirements and tasking to support stability operations in a near-term 
future setting.   
Foreign Humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief (FHA/DR) missions are becoming a 
common part of standard operating procedures for the military.  The responsibility for regional 
stability in the post conflict environment falls more often to the military.  In addition to post-
conflict nation reconstruction, the military is routinely employed following natural and man-
made disasters.  Disaster relief and foreign humanitarian assistance operations involve 
supporting a nation in their time of need.  Because the U.S. Military has inherent lift and is 
deployable world-wide, its ability is unlike any other organization.  The need for rapid response 
to save lives following a disaster is of utmost importance and the U.S. Military provides the 
surest option.  As mentioned before, these types of operations are different from conventional 
military operations and involve considerable coordination with the Host Nation as well as 
Governmental, and Non-governmental organizations.   
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With 150 million people, this study‘s hypothetical nation in need is one of Africa‘s most 
populated countries, accounting for over one-half of the region‘s inhabitants.  Recent 
catastrophic weather in the region is the foundation of the EW 10 scenario and the underpinning 
of this project to include Seabase usage and military involvement.  In 2022, this nation, suffering 
from an unusually heavy rainy season, experiences 72 hours of continuous, torrential rain.  
Coalition partners and U.S. respond with an international FHA/DR effort, supported by a United 
Nations General Assembly non-binding resolution in order to assist the people in need.  While 
the EW10 scenario itself includes significant additional details, the scoping and bounding 
process, along with stakeholder feedback focuses the project on FHA/DR efforts.   
The primary goal of this research effort was to determine the type and quantity of goods 
and services most relevant for the population‘s consumption in the 60 days following the disaster 
event, and employ the systems engineering methodology to develop and test a supporting 
delivery architecture, both physical and functional, that maximized the military‘s efficiency.  
Efficiency was based upon the delivery and distribution of the required resources to promote the 
relief efforts while minimizing the population‘s degradation into criminality.  This task was 
completed with guidance from subject matter experts, historical case studies, extensive 
humanitarian academic research, and current stakeholders potentially involved with such 
assistance operations.    
 Among the required considerations, the employment of a Seabase was designated a 
principal component in whatever architecture was to be developed due to the nature of the 
disaster.  This particular configuration of ships at sea was seen to best enable the development of 
a sea-borne logistical hub capable of receiving, holding, and distributing humanitarian assistance 
commodities while simultaneously supporting all military ships and aircraft actually charged 
with the follow-on delivery of these resources ashore.  Since no current exclusive functional 
Seabase platform exists in the fleet today, or is currently being conceived by engineering and 
naval architects, the ships and aircraft actively employed in today‘s naval inventory were 
evaluated.  The resultant analysis suggested the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) fully met the 
requirements of the tailored project directive and was selected as the basis of this project‘s 
primary logistical hub and subsequent Seabase. 
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 In addition to the aircraft and vessels already available in the naval inventory, special 
consideration was also given to new craft only recently delivered such as the T-AKE class ship 
and the MV-22 Osprey, or still in the design phase as in the case of the Transformable Craft (T-
Craft) to determine their utility in humanitarian support missions that are becoming a more 
relevant mission for each of the services.  Of particular interest, the T-Craft, a high-speed/high-
volume cargo carrier and prospective government acquisition, was considered throughout the 
course of the research team‘s efforts.  This particular mission set was logically seen to best fit the 
T-Craft‘s reported capabilities, so it was included in the analysis to better illustrate the potential 
future lift capabilities of the Navy. 
 Aside from the analysis of alternatives as they relate to ships and aircraft, a similar level 
of scrutiny was leveraged against the various humanitarian resources that were to be made 
available for distribution in the disaster-affected regions of the host nation.  Minimum thresholds 
of food, water, shelter, and other such supplies were obtained from the State Department‘s 
subordinate organization, USAID.  Armed with a clear baseline of the goods required and the 
mechanisms by which those goods could be delivered, the organization of logistical flow best 
suited to meet the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) generated through the systems engineering 
team‘s research became the paramount concern. 
 The project was separated into three distinct stages of concern.  The purpose of Stage 1 
analysis was to determine the best network of ships and craft to meet the Seabasing requirement 
to maximize the efficient throughput of goods from the Seabase to shore.  The rates of delivery, 
the specific units employed in the transfer of the necessary resources, and the specific priority in 
which the resources were packed into the transport units were all carefully considered.  In 
addition to the throughput analysis, follow-on research was conducted in Stage 1 to determine 
the most efficient rates of ship rotation, maintenance, and re-supply to best enhance the task 
force‘s credible on station time.     
The focus of Stage 2 was centered on the design of the delivery architecture carrying 
forward from the Seabase, specifically the distribution ashore to include the subsequent 
configuration of air and naval assets actually charged with the delivery mission.  The shore-
based distribution centers were divided into two categories:  Forward Logistical Sites (FLS) and 
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Forward Logistical Satellite Sites (FLSS).  Each of these sites represented a shore-based 
infrastructure capable of resource distribution to the associated local populations.  FLS locales 
differ from FLSS in that they are considered to be a higher-echelon distribution point capable of 
serving as a logistical waypoint for goods bound for the associated and subordinate logistical 
satellite sites.  This organization enabled the analysis of various other additional delivery 
schemes, which yielded a more complete and sensitive analysis of all possible organizations, 
options, and configurations.  Each of the delivery asset configurations concerning resource 
transportation from the Seabase along routes terminating at the various distribution centers was 
organized into different Physical Architectures (PAs).  All of the PAs were subsequently grouped 
together and subordinate to the actual Courses of Action (COAs) which would dictate the 
delivery strategy of each PA.  As seen in Figure I, 
 
Figure I: Simplified COA Depiction 
in the first COA, each of the PAs were directed to deliver goods to each FLS, only.  The 
subsequent delivery to satellites would be conducted by some organization other than the U. S. 
Military.  This meant several assets that would have otherwise been employed delivering 
supplies between the FLSs and the FLSSs would now be free to aid the delivery effort elsewhere.  
The impact, of course, came in the subsequent distribution of goods beyond the FLSs.  In COA 
2, all the PAs were charged with direct Seabase-to-site delivery, regardless of whether those sites 
were FLSs or FLSS locations.  In this circumstance, each delivery craft was required to make the 
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complete trip from the Seabase to the distribution point.  Each delivery asset was forced to 
spread thinner geographically to accommodate the longer transits and the population‘s ceaseless 
demand for resources during the 60-day period, but was able to save time loading and unloading 
less frequently as well.  In COAs 3 and 4, the delivery design to which all PAs were directed to 
subscribe dictated that resources would be delivered from Seabase to FLS, and then from FLS to 
FLSS.  This design limited the temporal burden by shortening the trips, but required more 
frequent loading and unloading operations.  In addition to the COAs‘ varying delivery designs, 
the distribution of the ARG‘s deployable Marine security forces was also manipulated to account 
for the management of criminal growth—a key research consideration for this project. 
Using the resource rates of delivery determined in models and simulations employed in 
Stages 1 and 2, Stage 3 carried the effort forward one further iteration to determine the impact of 
the receipt of humanitarian assistance on the affected population and their associated criminal 
element.  The delivery rate results from the two most successful PAs, one including the T-Craft 
and the other not employing the T-Craft, were selected from each COA and fed into Stage 3‘s 
system dynamics model.  The system dynamics model coupled technical research with the more 
qualitative boundaries of social science study by demonstrating the population‘s assumed, but 
fact-based reaction, to receiving sufficient or insufficient supplies.  The determination of 
satisfaction was made by the military‘s ability to meet the total population per person need for 
each type of resource as directed by USAID.  Meeting or exceeding the population‘s need 
maintained or increased public satisfaction, respectively, while insufficient delivery resulted in 
the population‘s tending toward dissatisfaction.  The criminal population was based on a 
percentage of dissatisfied people.  Thus, as the dissatisfied population grows or declines based on 
the military‘s delivery success, the criminal element follows suit up or down.  Additionally, the 
criminal element can be managed by the number and effectiveness of security forces employed at 
each of the resource distribution sites.          
 In addition to logistics flow and population influence, the team also investigated the 
requirement and solution for a Command and Control network capable of supporting 
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations.  Throughout the team‘s historical research, the 
need for better communications and coordination was prevalent.  Information flow and structure 
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mostly appeared as one of the leading causes of Command and Control confusion.  Because each 
organization in the past had its own procedures for conducting this type of mission, the problem 
of duplicative and omitted efforts existed in historical data.  Incorporating a standard system of 
communication for all actors was the team‘s effort to eliminate future FHA/DR C2 issues.   
The purpose of the simulations was to measure the throughput of humanitarian assistance 
over 15 and 60 days, the security impact on sustaining Marines on the ground, the level of 
Command and Control and logistical support provided, and the population influence.  These 
measures combined both the technical and social science aspects of the project.  Additionally, 
evaluations of risk and cost were also conducted to define critical hard stops in the scenario and 
measure relative dollar comparisons among various COAs and physical architectures. 
 After carefully evaluating all relevant inputs, conducting a thorough analysis of 
alternatives, which included all resources alternatives, security considerations, as well as all 
physical architectures, and the overarching delivery design architectures, the final analysis 
yielded some interesting insights.  Based on the repeated run of stochastic inputs associated with 
each mode of transportation and the resulting quantity of supplies delivered through Stages 1 and 
2, the most consistently reliable throughput was delivered using the COA 2 architecture as 
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Figure II: COA 2 Throughput Confidence Analysis 
However, despite COA 2‘s sustained level of throughput across all associated physical 
architectures, the total volume of resources that was so consistently delivered via any physical 
architecture never met the population‘s complete demand, topping out in the mid 90% range. 
 The total volume of throughput resulting from the employment of the COA 3 and 4, 
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Figure III: COA 3 and 4 Throughput Confidence Analysis 
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managed to meet or even exceeded the population‘s total demand for resources.  Despite the 
well-performing PAs organic to COAs 3 and 4, each of these COAs also maintained the worst 
PAs also analyzed.  In those cases, not only were resource delivered in insufficient quantities, 
they were not even close to being competitive with all of the PAs employed in the second COA. 
 From these results, the research team selected the two best-performing PAs per COA, 
with one of those PAs employing T-Craft, and the other PA using only current military 
resources.  When multiple PAs have throughput capabilities greater than 1 (indicating 100% 
capability to deliver supplies) the selection process was expanded beyond overall throughput to 
delineate between PAs.  The selection of PAs was conducted by examining the ability of a PA to 
deliver supplies according to the established prioritization scheme (where security has the 
highest priority, followed by water treatment units, etc.) and the PAs with overall throughput 
capability greater than 1 were ranked based on their ability to deliver the highest priority items.  
The commodity delivery results from each of these architectures were subsequently fed into the 
Stage 3 system dynamics model to determine the impact on the population, its rate of 
satisfaction, and its organic criminal element.  As noted previously, population influence results 
are incalculable for COA 1.  This is a result of the distribution strategy employed in COA 1.  
Specifically, distribution is the responsibility of NGOs and other GOs.   Because DoD is not 
responsible for the entire aid delivery process it is impossible to accurately measure the impact 
of DoD aid delivery.  Table I shows the population‘s final standing between 
 
Table I: Final Satisfied Population Distribution at 60 Day Termination Point 
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satisfied and dissatisfied as well as the total criminal population at the 60 day termination point, 
the systems dynamics model determined that the PAs associated with COAs 3 and 4 
outperformed even the most consistent PAs of COA 2.  This was determined to be the result of 
the COA 3 and 4 architectures‘ capability of delivering more than the just the minimum 
requirements over the 60 day period.  Between COAs 3 and 4, COA 4 was determined to be the 
most effective.  Since COAs 3 and 4 were basically identical except for each COAs employment 
and distribution of security forces, it was subsequently the security factor that proved to be the 
deciding factor in separating the best from the better.  
Of further interest, Day 15 (Figure IV) proved to be an interesting point in the population 
flux, especially with regard to COA 2.  Population flux is the change in percentage of 
satisfied/dissatisfied people.  
 
Figure IV: Satisfied Population Flux between COAs/PAs Over 60 Day Run 
   COA 2 never met the minimum requirement for resource delivery, and was the first day 
supply support for the population had to be sacrificed in small part for the resupply of shore-
based security units across all COAs and PAs.  Since COAs 3 and 4 were able to deliver more 
goods and services than were required, the impact of the security resupply effort was not felt 
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until much later in the run at approximately Day 45, at which point the population‘s resource 
surplus was exhausted.   
 The true success of each of these COAs is based not on arbitrary final population tallies, 
but on how the operation‘s commander chooses to define when success is being met.  While 
COA 2 seems to be critically outperformed, the reality is that each of these COAs could be 
considered successful if the commander‘s metric for success was only that more people are 
satisfied than dissatisfied.  Even in COA 2, 57% of the people in the system approved of the 
military‘s effort.  By taking a longer view, each of these COAs experienced degraded 
performance by the end of the mission.  This is illustrated by the crest and subsequent decline of 
satisfied population prior to the Day 60 termination point.  This suggests that each of these 
options was incapable of providing a steady-state level of satisfaction for the population.  This 
does not mean that the overall mission is a failure.  It means that a Seabase is incapable of 
serving as the sole source of support to provide extremely long term (>60 days) humanitarian aid 
and disaster relief to a population.  The Seabase is best utilized by providing immediate life-
saving support and then establishing an infrastructure which can be used by the Host Nation to 
reestablish control and autonomy.  This assumption of control by the Host Nation is of 




















 The Naval Postgraduate School's Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 17 (SEA-17A) 
conducted a campus-wide Integrated Capstone Project on the subject of Foreign Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (FHA/DR).  With twenty four months of System Engineering 
education and a combined sixty-six years of operational experience, seven U.S. Navy graduate 
students teamed with one Navy civilian student and nine students from the Temasek Defense 
Systems Institute of Singapore (TDSI) to complete the nine-month project.  The SEA-17A cohort 
worked closely with stakeholders and subject matter experts from a variety of disciplines and 
organizations to develop a system-of-systems architecture capable of addressing the FHA/DR 
problem in country Orange (Figure 1.1.1).  The multi-faceted focus of the project included 
operations from a Seabase following a natural disaster, relief material distribution, and the 
population influence amid a social interruption.    
 
Figure 1.1.1: Orange Delta 
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1.2 Tasking Statement 
 OPNAV N8F personnel directed a study of a systems architecture designed to enhance 
the regional stability for a developing nation through FHA/DR efforts.  Set in the future (2020-
2023), a nation would request U.S. assistance following a significant natural disaster to its region 
of the world.  Specifically SEA-17A was asked to:  
Design and assess a system-of-systems that provides continual, multi-year support of a 
coastal host nation‘s efforts to develop security and stability while facing insurgency and 
possible natural disasters.  Develop a ―Regional Stability Systems Architecture‖ that relies 
heavily on Seabasing and Seabasing connectors, and addresses these three capabilities:  
 Thwart social interruption activities and provide humanitarian aid through use of joint 
and coalition naval forces. 
 Understand and address the local population‘s inclination to support a social 
interruption.  
 Understand and address the desire of potential enemy forces to engage in such 
activities. 
 The concept of operations (CONOPS) that served as the context for the development 
of this systems architecture is based on the Expeditionary Warrior 10 Scenario 
(EW10) from February 2010 (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory, 2010). It focused on independent progression through 
steady-state social interruption cooperation efforts, humanitarian assistance, non-
combat evacuation, and low to mid-intensity stability operations throughout country 
Orange in the 2020 – 2023 timeframe. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 In recent years, the U.S. Military, Government, and Coalition Nations have responded to 
numerous FHA/DR operations within multiple theaters.  Throughout these operations, there 
existed policy, functional, and interoperability issues which resulted in various communication 
and execution issues.  Not only did these issues arise within the U.S. Government and U.S. 
Military organizations, but among all agencies involved in the FHA/DR response. 
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 As a result of the aforementioned issues, the EW10 war game refined the capability 
requirements of FHA/DR via a Seabase solution against a low- to mid-threat operational scenario 
following a natural disaster.  The war game, as described in Chapter 2, was to identify specific 
shortfalls across the entire range of operations in an FHA/DR scenario.  The foundation and 
initial background data of EW10 supplied the basis for the SEA-17A team's future research.   
The United States' desire to enhance global partnerships has forced a paradigm shift in 
actions involving military forces.  This paradigm shift affects the entire Range of Military 
Operations (ROMO) to include Major Combat Operations (MCO), but particularly Stability 
Operations (SO).  Stability operations support U.S. Government (USG) plans for stability, 
security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations and likely will be conducted in 
coordination with and in support of Host Nation (HN) authorities, Inter-Governmental 
Organizations (IGO), and/or Non-Government Organizations (NGO), and the private sector 
(Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008).  Furthermore, this shift 
reinforces the requirement for a revised approach and supporting systems architecture that 
efficiently identify appropriate goods and services, associated quantities, and distribution of 
Humanitarian Aid (HA) for SO .  While the overall structure is systematically configured, the 
overall end-state is the ability to support the HN request, stabilize the region, and more important 
help the population.  In SEA-17A team‘s system-of-systems project, a feedback method enables 
the tracking of resources, distribution of those specific resources, and the influence of the 
respective population.  
Primitive Need: The United States desires a means to provide persistent delivery of FHA/DR aid 
and improve stability of the Government of Orange while possibly working with Inter-
Governmental Organizations (IGO) and Non-Government Organizations (NGO). 
1.4 Scenario Overview 
 SEA-17A took an in-depth look at the EW10 scenario and bounded the problem with 
respect to timeframe, geographic location, and the problem tasking.  The scenario time is in June 
2022 and a 1000-year storm hits the country and surrounding areas causing massive regional 
flooding.  Country Orange had already been hit with several storms stressing their emergency 
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response teams to the limit.  The massive storm magnified the situation, placing Country Orange 
in extremis, resulting in a request for UN, and specifically U.S. assistance.  
Following the timeframe scoping, the team concluded the most affected geographically 
flooded location was located in the lower Delta region.  This region encompassed three 
independent states with significant numbers of affected population.  As shown in Figure 1.4.1, 
these three states incurred significant flooding throughout the region as identified by the purple 
area.  Furthermore, State 1, 2, and 3 received considerable damage to their respective seaports 
and airports injecting an additional complexity to the situation.  Therefore, as a result of the 
damage, the three states were particularly isolated, enabling limited options for an alternative 
FHA/DR means other than via a Seabase.  
 
 
Figure 1.4.1: States and Flooding 
Further study of the scenario revealed the three states in the Orange Delta include a 
population with uncertain or hostile intentions toward FHA/DR efforts.  This key condition 
supported the team‘s tasking statement and further permitted an introspective look at a social 
interruption problem as detailed in Chapter 5. 
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1.5 Stages and Courses of Action 
 This section introduces the three stages within the project and the four courses of action 
(COA) by which each physical architecture is applied. 
1.5.1 Project Stages 
The team reviewed multiple, broad options concerning the need to provide for persistent 
delivery of FHA/DR aid.  Specific options, as depicted in Figure 1.5.2 included: advanced 
basing, Airport and Seaport of Debarkation (APOD, SPOD), direct air-drop flights, and 
Seabasing; all of which were capable to FHA/DR operations.  Limited by the tasking statement, 
the EW10 war game scenario, and the future timeline, the team chose to remain with the 
Seabasing option as the most congruent with the directive.  From the Seabasing option, three 
distinct project stages were determined to directly answer the tasking request.  The three stages 
are: 
 Stage 1: Distribution of Humanitarian Aid from the Seabase to the Forward Logistic 
Sites (FLS) (Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, p. 261) 
 Stage 2: Distribution of Humanitarian Aid from the FLS to the Forward Logistic 
Satellite Sites (FLSS) 





Figure 1.5.1: Mission Options 
1.5.1.1 Stage 1 
Stage 1 depicted in Figure 1.5.2 shows the Seabase operating off-shore, and the 
movement of HA from the Seabase to the FLS.  Based on the Government of Orange‘s (GOO) 
need, Department of Defense‘s (DOD) capabilities, and the Navy‘s 2011 Shipbuilding Plan 
(OPNAV N8F, 2010) outlining the 2020 force structure (Appendix C.12), the SEA-17A team 
designed a Seabase in response to the disaster.  Further details and Seabase composition drivers 
are included in Chapter 4, Stage 1.  Measures of effectiveness and performance are presented in 
Chapter 4 and 7, Analysis.  A brief listing of questions from Stage 1 included: 
 What configurations of ships are required?  
 What functions can/cannot be supported via a Seabase? 
 What is the throughput of aid via the Seabase? 




Figure 1.5.2: Stage 1  
1.5.1.2 Stage 2 
  Stage 2 examined the distribution necessary to further support FHA/DR 
operations beyond Stage 1‘s initial centralized logistic sites.  This served to maximize HA efforts 
and further support Stage 3 operations concerning population influence.  In theory, the following 
assumption exists: the wider the HA distribution network expands, the probability of supplying 
relief materials to additional populations increases, resulting in a greater affect on the population 
and Stage 3 analysis.  
A secondary mission of Stage 2 included the Command, Control, and Communication 
between DoD, Department of State (DoS), IGO, and NGO.  As the primary non-Host Nation 
actor, DoS leads U.S. efforts in FHA/DR (United States Agency for International Development, 
2005).  IGO‘s and NGO‘s also support FHA/DR efforts via separate channels.  DoD‘s 
involvement lags awaiting a DoS request for involvement.  Command remains with HN, as the 
others offer a supporting role only.  Since each agency operates via their respective Command 
and Control structure, the SEA-17A team only addressed the communication network. The team 
examined a mobile communication and data network to integrate key assisting organizations to 
manage command and control, and further promote communication and relief efforts.  Questions 
concerning Stage 2 include: 
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 What is the throughput of aid via a distribution system? 
 How much of the population can we reach? 
 How much security is required to protect all assets? 
 What is the best way to develop a Command, Control, and Communication 
architecture under the current scenario? 
 
Figure 1.5.3: Stage 2 
1.5.1.3 Stage 3 
Stage 3 is the systems engineering approach to a social science problem with the 
following objectives: Thwart a social interruption by understanding drivers of that interruption 
and understand why the population would support a social interruption.  Our study led to the 
realization that a model or simulation that produces qualitative data and can address human 
behavior and decision-making, specifically in the population of the Country Orange Delta as a 
whole, would be very useful. Understanding why the people would support social interruption 
was revealed during our research into Human Social Cultural Behavior (HSCB) concerns.  The 
team studied the System Dynamic Process and HSCB agitators to create a technical answer to a 
social science problem.  Questions relating to Stage 3 include: 
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 Using qualitative analysis, what are the resulting effects of aid on the 
population? 
 What social response will the population have to foreign military forces? 
 How effectively will the military and NGO‘s interact? 
1.5.2  Courses of Action 
The SEA-17A team developed four courses of action (COA) in relation to Stage 1 and 2 
in order to support the simulation phase of the systems engineering process.  The COA‘s 
examine the notional distribution network, and Seabase lift requirements necessary for 
humanitarian aid (HA) movement.  Analysis of each COA was applied across each physical 
architecture during the modeling and simulation phase.  Details and specifics of the COAs are 
described in Chapters 4 and 5.  
1.5.3 Integration 
Stage integration, illustrated in Figure 1.5.4, consists of three steps that feed one another.  
The output from Stage 1 feeds Stage 2, and the same applies from Stage 2 to 3.  The feedback 
loop illustrates that each stage is not standalone, or independent of others. The variables within 
each stage affect not only the current stage, but the previous and/or follow-on stage(s). 
 
Figure 1.5.4: Stage Integration 
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1.6  Systems Engineering Design Process 
 There are four phases to our system engineering design process: Initial Research, 
Problem Formulation, Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), and Implementation.  During the initial 
research phase of the project, the team conducted mission needs analysis directly from the EW10 
scenario, then developed requirements from those needs. This phase produced a generalized 
concept of operations and an overall scenario foundation.   
Problem formulation included problem scoping, based on the students‘ graduation 
timeframe.  There were a myriad of ways to attack the problem, but the team ultimately referred 
back to the problem statement of our stakeholders in order to scope and bound the problem 
properly. We asked our stakeholders for inputs or pulled directly from their doctrine and 
organizational documents to get requirements to map to a framework. The framework was built 
from needs to requirements, and requirements to functions. A system-of-systems architecture 
was built, and our operational concept was finalized in the problem formulation phase.  
In the AoA phase, four courses of actions were developed and modeled across nine 
different physical architectures to determine the most effective configuration for a FHA/DR 
operation. Furthermore, in the AoA phase, a cost and risk analysis for Stage 1 and 2 was 
determined.   
1.7 Stakeholders 
 AFRICOM – Briefed March 2011 
 OPNAV 8F – Primary Stakeholder 
 Defense Logistics – Briefed in Dec 2010 
 N81M (Pentagon Seabasing Branch) – Emailed Proposal 
 N81G (Pentagon Seashaping Branch) – Emailed proposal 
 Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance - Briefed Jan 2011  
 Kauffman Institute – Briefed Dec 2010 




2.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
2.1 Country Orange in Perspective 
As of 2010, with 150 million people, Country Orange is one of Africa‘s most populated 
countries, accounting for over one-half of the region‘s population.  It is home to roughly 250 
ethnic groups.  Religion has Orange almost evenly split; there are about 70 million Muslims, 
primarily in the North, and 70 million Christians, primarily in the South. 
The Orange economy is centered primarily on the production and export of oil and, to a 
lesser degree, liquefied natural gas.  In recent years, approximately 80% of federal government 
revenues and almost 90% of export earnings have derived from the oil businesses. Country 
Orange is the 50th-largest export market for U.S. goods and the14th-largest exporter of goods to 
the United States. Oil and, to lesser degree, gas are the major U.S. imports from Country Orange, 
amounting to nearly 46% of Country Orange‘s daily oil production and approximately 11% of 
total U.S. oil imports. 
Based on its size and wealth, Country Orange represents a key factor in the stability and 
development of West Africa. Country Orange is a major player in all of West Africa‘s political, 
economic and military institutions, including regional peacekeeping missions.  However, several 
major obstacles have inhibited Country Orange‘s internal maturation.  First, terrorist activities 
and thievery by insurgent groups and criminal gangs in the South have significantly curtailed 
Country Orange‘s oil production to a level far short of existing capacity.  Second, increased 
activities by external Muslim radicals in Northern Country Orange have exacerbated 
North−South differences and raised fears that Northern Country Orange could become a major 
launch pad for Muslim radicals within and beyond Orange.  In view of Orange‘s critical roles in 
West Africa and its importance as a source of U.S. oil imports, it is appropriate to assess the 




2.1.1 Country Orange Political System 
For the greater part of its existence Orange has been wrought with political corruption in 
nearly every section of government (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory, 2010).   A general consensus within academia and the global community is that as 
long its leaders ―lack the will and commitment to share energy revenues with the Orange River 
Delta states, anti-government insurgencies and gangs will continue to earn popular support and 
expand their sway‖ (Deane & Harlow, 2008, p. 6). 
2.2 Historical Examples FHA/DR Lessons Learned 
 Much like real-world decision makers, the SEA-17A group needed to examine cases of 
FHA/DR in action to enable better decision-making and avoid common mistakes in its analysis. 
The following are a few of those examples and their accompanying lessons learned.  
2.2.1 Indonesia Tsunami 
Summary (UNICEF, 2008) 
On the morning of December 26, 2004 a magnitude 9.3 earthquake struck off the 
Northwest coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The earthquake deformed the ocean floor, 
pushing the overlying water up into a tsunami wave. The tsunami wave devastated nearby areas 
where the wave may have been as high as 25 meters (80 feet) tall and killed nearly 300,000 
people from nations in the region and tourists from around the world. 
Lessons Learned (UNICEF, 2008) 
A lesson repeated in most disasters and one in which Sumatra was no exception was that 
devastation was too widespread to be handled effectively by any one organization.  Militaries are 
generally the best suited and equipped to deal with large-scale crises, but there has always been a 
reluctance to take on an increased share of the responsibility.  There have been effective 
arguments on both sides relative to U.S. Military involvement in FHA/DR. The U.S. Military has 
the most resources and best tools as well as a very large talent pool.  As the military takes on 
increased responsibilities, international organizations and non-governmental organizations 
become increasingly unlikely to perform duties and actions which they had previously 
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performed.  Further, the voluntary nature of humanitarian assistance creates communication and 
leadership problems. 
The tsunami led to many interesting developments in the aid community.  The Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was developed with the mandate to improve the 
interagency processes in FHA/DR. The tsunami also resulted in the implementation of the cluster 
approach to agency management and increased the emphasis on military partnerships.  There was 
also direct attention in the development of contingency plans as groups were not able to apply 
their primary strategies. Simulation and training was also improved.  
Sumatra was ill-prepared for the disaster but one of the goals was to ensure that they 
would be better prepared in the future for disasters.  Similarly, NGOs were also unable to 
immediately deploy effectively. Neither could they fulfill the massive aid requirements. NGOs in 
turn developed better global supply networks and prepackaged supply kits so that unnecessary 
items were excluded.  
2.2.2 Pakistan Floods 
Summary (Sphere Project, 2004) 
In the summer of 2010, an unusually heavy monsoon season inundated Pakistan with 
heavy flooding.  The floods destroyed much of the country‘s infrastructure, including 5,000 
miles of roads and over 1,000 bridges.  Disease, disorder and violence began to spread as people 
became desperate for food, shelter and other necessities.  The Pakistani Taliban and other 
militant groups used the floods as an opportunity to gain power and public support, calling for 
the rejection of western aid and using their own charities and funds to provide aid, further 
lessening support for the Government of Pakistan.  A weak government response caused the 
people to overwhelm foreign aid suppliers who came up short with not enough aid available to 
help everyone.  In August 2010, total aid was about $3 per person, compared to $70 per person 
in the 2005 earthquakes and $495 per person after the Haiti earthquake.  Because of a general 
distrust of the Pakistani government, only about 20% of total aid was sent through government 
organizations, the rest would come from foreign NGOs and local NGOs.  As of August 2010, the 
floods killed about 1600 people.  Ongoing anti-militant campaigns on the border with 
Afghanistan have left the Pakistani government with massive deficits and have crippled the 
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nation‘s economy.  Persistent fighting between the military, the Taliban and other militants 
continues to plague the country‘s progress.  
Lessons Learned (Sphere Project, 2004) 
The primary lesson from the Pakistani flooding was that the national government‘s 
legitimacy is critical to success. Because of the fact that much of the world questioned the 
motives and actions taken by the government during previous recent disaster there was hesitancy 
in the fulfillment of aid that countries had originally pledged to provide. The previous actions of 
the local government are outside the military‘s ability to correct. Although, it may be worthwhile 
to make it policy to make every effort to keep aid from being filtered through the government of 
a state that has previously exhibited corrupt practices in the handling and distribution of aid. As a 
result of the hesitancy to provide aid, insufficient aid was provided to the affected population.  
This led to additional problems because those individuals who did not receive assistance were 
forced to seek the assistance of other groups such as the Taliban. Further the flooding was an 
example of how improperly handled disasters can lead to increases in insurgent activities, 
economic failures, crop loss, and heightened crime rates. Flooding also restricts or eliminates 
access and makes it more difficult to repair infrastructure.  
2.2.3 Haiti Earthquake 2010 
Summary (Bilham, 2010) 
The 2010 Haiti earthquake was a magnitude 7.0 quake, with an epicenter approximately 
25 km (16 miles) west of Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital. The earthquake occurred on Tuesday, 12 
January 2010.  By 24 January, at least 52 aftershocks measuring 4.5 or greater had been recorded 
An estimated three million people were affected by the quake; the Haitian government reported 
that an estimated 230,000 people had died, 300,000 had been injured and 1,000,000 were made 
homeless.  They also estimated that 250,000 residences and 30,000 commercial buildings had 
collapsed or were severely damaged.  
Lessons Learned (Humanitarian Practice Network, 2010) 
A multitude of lessons particularly for the U.S. Military, have come as a result of the 
Haitian earthquake. The implementation and use of a wide range of networking tools to 
communicate and coordinate among military, government and non-governmental organizations 
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was revolutionary. Participants in FHA/DR were required to operate in a highly complex urban 
landscape with high crime rates pre-disaster and somewhat inadequate infrastructure which led to 
difficulties in providing/establishing effective security. Another similarity to the team‘s scenario 
in Orange is the widespread devastation that occurred. Within the aid community it is a widely 
held view that the more widespread the damage or after effects the more difficult it is to be even 
marginally successful. That fact is representative of one of the major problems for the relief 
community and the US Military as it takes on more and more missions of this nature. Disasters 
are of course by nature, widespread. Within Haiti it was necessary to have numerous different 
groups involved to have an impact on the situation. The problem and lesson associated with this 
is that the different groups have different operating procedures and different ways of 
communicating. Even though ―standards‖ are present in certain forms in the community that 
does not be that they are enforced or endorsed by all aid organizations and any aid group can just 
leave a country whenever they see fit. The weakness of government in Haiti also contributed to 
problems of effectiveness in FHA/DR. 
Further problem areas in Haiti included shelter and land management, poor management 
of the relief camps themselves particularly the citizens themselves and cargo capacity. It was 
obvious from the beginning that relief efforts would be hampered by the inadequate airfields and 
limited taxiways. Further ports and port services were damaged or destroyed and even today they 
have not been entirely restored. The point is that the military or a relevant aid agency needs to 
address the circumstances which may hamper reconstruction efforts and the restoration of cargo 
capacity in the affected area.  
 In general there were arenas in which FHA/DR exhibited strong performances including: 
search and rescue, immediate medical care, disease control, provision of food and water, 
emergency education and programs which paid cash for work.  
2.2.4 1972 Nicaraguan Earthquake-Failure of Humanitarian Aid 
Summary  
At 12:29 am, December 23, 1973, the capital city of Nicaragua, Managua was hit with a 
devastating earthquake. This earthquake measured 6.2 on the Richter scale and left misery in its 
wake.  Five thousand were killed, 20,000 were injured and over 250,000 were left homeless. At 
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least 10 percent of the industrial capacity, 50 percent of the commercial property, and 70 percent 
of the governmental facilities were inoperative (Kates et al., 1973, p. 985).  
Fires were active for days after the earthquake because all of the fire-fighting equipment 
available was destroyed. The main hospitals could not provide medical services to the injured 
due to the infrastructure damages. The U.S. and other countries and humanitarian organizations 
came to Nicaragua‘s aid and millions of dollars were donated as well as food and water.  
Lessons Learned  
Despite this outside response, the capital city did not recover. This was due to a number 
of factors. Three principal factors were outlined in ―The Human Impact of The Managua 
Earthquake‖ (Kates et al., 1973, p. 987). First, there was a highly centralized government, thin on 
human and material resources and operating on a delicate political matrix.  This is not unusual in 
developing nations, and Nicaragua followed the norm. The city did not have a police force, the 
National Guard was the only law enforcement in place and their numbers were small. Many of 
the guardsmen left their posts to check on their own families. They did not have the force 
required for an effective response. Also there was only one radio frequency available for 
emergency response.  
Because of these issues, the National Guard as well as agencies such as the Red Cross 
were not given the proper direction in order to function resulting in no support to the city 
inhabitants. Second, as is typical in Latin American countries, Nicaragua basic family unit is the 
extended family. Although Managua is an urban environment this tradition was still very strong. 
An estimated 75 percent of the homeless of Managua found shelter in and around the homes of 
relatives on the fringes of the city or in more distant town (Kates et al., 1973, p. 987).  The 
homes that were run by emergency operations operators were at an advantage because their 
families were given priority. For 3 to 5 days, most of the emergency organizations in Managua 
were denuded of personnel (Kates et al., 1973, p. 987).  And last, a distinctive socioeconomic 
disparity was apparent among the city inhabitants and led to open looting of material products 
available in shops of the middle and upper class. With the National Guard the only law, looting 
was widespread.  
Of the three principle factors listed above, the government was the most problematic. A 
three-person junta, an alliance of parties, at the time of the earthquake, ruled Nicaragua. One of 
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these people was Anastasio Somoza. His father and brother were previous presidents and they 
were one of the wealthiest families.  Somoza, not officially the President anymore, still held 
control as Chief Director of the National Guard. After the earthquake, that control was very 
evident. The junta was disposed of and Somoza ―set up shop‖ at his home.  He commandeered 
an emergency post from there, which gave him substantial powers. Such powers included having 
total control over the means of aid distribution and reconstruction. The Somoza and his party 
members misappropriated food aid and construction materials.  Priority was given to National 
Guardsmen when it came to aid. Somoza directed clean-up efforts to his liking, focusing on areas 
owned by him and the businessmen that supported him. Large sums of international aid money 
and supplies were unaccounted for.  
One case of this was an operation dubbed ―Operation Vampire‖.  The Red Cross 
contributed thousands of liters of plasma, which was more than the medical facilities that were 
available could use. Somoza took the surplus and resold it back to the U.S., making a huge profit.  
He also set up demolition and construction companies to profit from reconstruction aid. Roberto 
Clemente, an American Major League baseball player, learned that the aid packages on the first 
flights that he arranged never made it to earthquake victims due to government diversion. He 
decided to join the next flight in hopes that his presence would aid in getting the help to the 
victims. This flight, plagued with issues including being overloaded, crashed on New Year‘s Eve 
1972. Support from international organizations waned and finally was lost to Somoza and the 
Nicaraguan citizens. Mauricio Solaún, U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua under the less-friendly, 
human-rights oriented administration of Jimmy Carter, stated that he ―found quite broad 
consensus [...] that the [...] earthquake of 1972 was a critical turning point ushering in a ludicrous 
period of exacerbated kleptocracy, wanton National Guard repression, debauchery of the ruler, 
corrupt expansion of his personal business empire and mismanagement scandals in it, and a 
syndrome of normlessness further delegitimizing the Somocista state‖ (Solaún, 2005, p. 79). 
Somozas' plundering of humanitarian aid after this major earthquake contributed to his 
later downfall during the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979 in which he was overthrown. Managua 
never truly recovered from this natural disaster. It wasn‘t until the 1990‘s that reconstruction 
really began, stalled by the misuse of aid, the revolution and the civil war that followed. Today, 
the city, which is still the second largest capital in Central America, is trying to rebuild and 
restore the vitality it once had. 
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2.3 General Flooding Lessons Learned Collected by Non-Governmental Organizations. 
2.3.1 ALNAP -ProVention Flooding Study 
The flooding study is included here to provide a basic view of the needs, requirements 
and lessons of flooding emergencies. Although DoD is not directly involved in the mass 
distribution of aid in such emergencies it is of the utmost importance for DoD to understand the 
lessons learned of the organizations that are on the ground directly meeting the needs of the 
affected population. Included following are descriptions of the two organizations. 
The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Action (ALNAP) was established in 1997, following the multi-agency evaluation of the Rwanda 
genocide. The organization is a collective response by the humanitarian sector, dedicated to 
improving humanitarian performance through increased learning and accountability. ALNAP, as 
a unique sector-wide active learning membership network, is dedicated to improving the quality 
and accountability of humanitarian action, by sharing lessons, identifying common problems 
and, where appropriate, building consensus on approaches (ALNAP, 2011). 
A global coalition of international organizations, governments, the private sector, civil 
society organizations and academic institutions, the ProVention Consortium was dedicated to 
increasing the safety of vulnerable communities and to reducing the impacts of disasters in 
developing countries. It provided a forum for multi-stakeholder dialogue on disaster risk 
reduction and a framework for collective action. 
ProVention aimed to advance disaster risk management in developing countries by 
forging partnerships and linkages; advocating among leaders and decision makers for increased 
policy attention and commitment to reducing natural hazard risks; developing innovative 
approaches to the practical applications of disaster risk management; and sharing knowledge and 
resources for organizations, practitioners and communities active in disaster reduction (Alam, 
Herson, & O‘Donnel, 2008). 
The following section addresses the major lessons learned in flooding disasters by NGOs. 
The relevance of much of this is tangential to the overall efforts of the modeling included in the 
project but it is important to understand how the State Dept in conjunction with DoD can assist 
19 
 
states in need or at risk of flooding disasters. Many of the lessons learned present possible 
avenues of approach which would improve the quality of life of the affected populations. As that 
quality of life improves the population is less likely to turn to criminal, violent, or act in support 
of an insurgency against their own government which is something that the team went over at 
length in Stage 3 efforts.  
2.3.1.1 Flood Risk Reduction 
  One of the most important ideas/lessons is that the state must take action in 
advance of flooding to have the greatest success. This idea is quite simple and yet throughout the 
world action is often not taken in advance of events often due to either a lack of funds or desire 
to direct funds to prevention efforts. 
Risk reduction requires that attention be paid to both improvements in 
infrastructure and in management of disasters. Communities must be involved in the control of 
and have awareness of flood management. Those communities also required support from the 
government that is present prior to a disaster. ALNAP highlights the idea that individuals in 
flood prone areas do not have the personal wealth to invest in any kind of protection (Alam et al., 
2008, p. 3).  Local community preparedness and awareness are in many cases the most important 
non-infrastructure related components of flood risk reduction. A final note is that any kind of 
early warning system can be of tremendous assistance to a population in an environment such as 
country Orange were there lack of access to technology and immediate media sources that could 
distribute warnings.  
2.3.1.2 Building Ownership and Engaging with Local Capacity 
This is one of the arenas in which DoD/State has moderate capabilities to assist 
the GOO or any nation state government. The idea is that flooding response is more likely 
effective in regions that are flood prone and where that response builds upon the existing 
community‘s response. The critical aspect of building ownership is ensuring that the local 
population is involved in the relief effort in a tangible way. DoD/State/ NGOs should employ 
personnel from the affected population to allow them to empower themselves and create an 
environment where those people will succeed on their own in the case of a follow on disaster 
which in the case of Country Orange is more likely than not. A final aspect is to ensure that the 
local population has access to information so that it is able to remain informed on what is going 
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on in its region.  This may be out of reach of DoD for security concerns but the DoS and local 
GOO certainly would be helped by determining the most effective way to ensure the population 
knows where to go for food, water and other required goods (Alam et al., 2008, p. 5). 
2.3.1.3 Needs Assessment 
Relative to the U.S. this is a task accomplished by a Disaster Assistance Response 
Team (DART) most likely immediately after a disaster has occurred or while it is ongoing. 
DARTs should and do focus on the on the ground conditions, but one of the criticisms from the 
Provention is that assessment teams fall victim to the trap of performing less analysis and 
implementing what has worked in previous flooding events for a region. To that point it would 
be necessary especially in a scenario such as this to make the assessment an iterative process.  
  There are several key lessons in flooding disasters relative to assessment. It is of 
great importance for the assessment team to account for the percentage of the population that is 
unable to access the aid or the major distribution sites for aid, as is the case in the scenario that 
this report discusses. Further the assessment can be useful in the period after the flooding has 
ended and the populations begin to attempt returns to their homes. That rebuilding phase can be 
said to have a greater impact on the stability of the population and region in general. This goes 
back to making it an iterative process. As policies are implemented and initial needs are met the 
requirements change and again require an assessment of the situation.  
  Proper assessment can enable better response and can assist in the improvement 
of overall disaster response policies of organizations. In short, assessment is of fundamental 
importance to all FHA/DR efforts (Alam et al., 2008, p. 6). 
2.3.1.4 Targeting and Monitoring 
Targeting is essentially determining who the most vulnerable segment of a 
population is. Monitoring refers to the observation process ongoing in FHA/DR and particularly 
the types of data collected during that observation process. Targeting along the same lines as 
assessment is an evolving process as it is important to target needs regions or population 
segments in need of aid as other‘s needs are met.  Relative to FHA/DR strategy and shaping of 
populations targeting helps ensure that DoS/DoD actions have the ability to change if the 
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strategy leaves one segment of the population at a disadvantage to another (Alam et al., 2008, p. 
7). 
2.3.1.5 Livelihoods Recovery 
Livelihoods recovery refers to the use of how quickly the livelihoods of a 
population are restored and the relationship to the effectiveness of disaster assistance. Measuring 
livelihood recovery is important but if there is not a large presence of the group that assists post 
disaster prior to the disaster then if cannot be as effective.  Although, organizations should have 
an idea of what livelihoods need attention in recovery based on population demographics. As in 
example, in Country Orange it would be necessary that disaster relief included efforts to either 
assist or demonstrate to the local farmers what would be necessary to restore their farming 
capabilities. It may seem obvious to them given that they would have frequently experienced 
flooding.  Of further importance when livelihoods cannot be restored it may be necessary to 
determine what alternatives are available for those segments of the population. The relevance is 
that in directing their efforts to self-sustainment Dos/DoD /NGOs assist in the prevention of 
those people turning to insurgent groups for assistance and income (Alam et al., 2008, p.7). 
2.3.1.6 Local Economy and Market 
Lessons relative to the local economy are an extension of those for the livelihoods 
of individuals. The local economy has both long and short-term importance because the tie to the 
prosperity of individuals (Alam et al., 2008, p. 9).  The importance of the local economy to the 
military is dependent on viewpoint and the responsibilities delegated to the military. An example 
of why the local economy is important is because in the event that the affected population 
becomes saturated with goods the demand for local goods is driven down and actually decreases 
regional stability. Another item of interest is inflation of the population‘s currency as a result of 
cash influxes.  
2.3.1.7 Water, Sanitation and Health 
These are of the utmost importance to immediate relief and assistance of the 
affected population of Orange and any flood-ravaged state. The most obvious takeaway is that a 
source of clean water and sanitation is necessary to prevent widespread disease.  In providing 
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these for the country of Orange there should be a tangible benefit in the arena of stability.  Figure 
2.1.1 below is a selection of lessons collected by the ALNAP-ProVention group.  
 
Figure 2.1.1: Flood Proofing Water and Sanitation Services (Alam et al., 2008, p. 10) 
The actual restoration of sanitation infrastructure is a long-term concern but that 
makes it no less important to the efforts of shaping the population away from negative actions. 
Some of the problems seen relative to water purification and sanitation include inadequate 
education of the population, unanticipated rejection of purification tablets due to the change in 
taste that they create, lack of government preparation for widespread disease even when 
populations receive prior notification, and finally that younger people are the most vulnerable 
group to waterborne diseases (Alam et al., 2008, p.10). 
2.3.1.8 Shelter and Housing 
―Shelter is necessary to provide security and personal safety, protect from the 
climate and enhance resistance to ill health and disease. It is also important for human dignity 
and to sustain family and community life as far as possible in difficult circumstances‖ (Sphere 
Project, 2004).  The group‘s efforts and analysis do address the problem of providing shelter. 
The primary concern is the provision of temporary shelter since that would have immediate 
impact. Long-term stability requires replacement of infrastructure and rebuilding of homes but 
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the population can assist given that they are provided with temporary shelter at the outset. Shelter 
has widespread connections to other aspects of disaster relief. Shelter can help prevent the spread 
of disease as well as promote livelihood recovery.  
2.3.1.9 Managing Nationwide Response and Coordination 
This lesson presented by the ALNAP ProVention work is essentially just that 
efforts must be coordinated between the local and national level.  It really just comes down to the 
importance of communication, command and control which are addressed in this report.  
2.4  EW 2010 Background  
 Much of the following data is drawn directly from the EW2010 document itself and is 
noted as such. The purpose of inclusion in this report is to provide a future historical basis for 
our work. Great effort was taken to include critical information pertaining to the scope of our 
project.   
2.4.1 Summary 
EW10 is a fictional, complex, irregular warfare (IW) scenario in which U.S. and coalition 
partners engage with a West African nation to conduct steady state operations, FHA/DR, Non-
Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and Stability operations. This nation, a partner country 
of the U.S., is unable to effectively deal with the endemic tribal, inter-ethnic / communal, inter-
gang and criminal related violence that has plagued it since the 1990s. The U.S. and coalition 
partners agree to provide Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
support by helping the country‘s police and military forces. In 2022, this nation, suffering from 
an unusually heavy, rainy season, experiences 72 hours of continuous, torrential rain. Coalition 
partners and the U.S. respond with an international FHA/DR effort, supported by a United 
Nations General Assembly non-binding resolution. In 2023, the security situation begins to 
deteriorate, following a fraudulent and violence wracked presidential election. The assassination 
of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Southern States (MESS) candidate, after the 
election, further increases violence throughout the country. A large-scale international non-
combatant evacuation operation (NEO) occurs in August 2023. Heavy fighting rages between the 
MESS, the GOO forces and AQIM until 2025 when the GOO and the MESS negotiate a 
ceasefire. The GOO is fatigued and resource-constrained after fighting a successful 2-year 
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counter-insurgency campaign, and therefore requests assistance from the UN for stability and 
reconstruction operations. The UN Security Council Resolution authorizes a combined multi-
national task force to provide the GOO with SO assistance (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine 
Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010, p. 8). 
2.4.2 Background 2020 
In 2020, Orange still has many ongoing internal problems: a large population, Islamic 
radicalization, deep ethnic/tribal divisions, and lawlessness. It is a large and diverse country with 
a growing population of over 179 million and over 250 ethnic groups. The southern portion has 
large cities, including Wotut - the world‘s third largest megacity, and oil infrastructure located in 
the Orange River Delta area. In the North it has untapped oil reserves and a Muslim majority 
population. The Government of Country Orange (GOO) claims all oil wealth in the country. Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates in the Trans-Sahel region and is active in 
Orange (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010, p. 8). 
Additionally, in 2020, it is the second most powerful economy on the African continent, a 
leading African military power and a demographically diverse nation. Country Orange gets 95% 
of its revenue from oil exports, although industry only consumes 10% of its labor force. Oil 
wealth, a surge of development loans from China; India; and the West, and a concentration of 
political and economic power in a few hands make it one of the world‘s most corrupt nations. 
Country Orange‘s Armed Forces (COAF) are among Africa‘s best equipped and trained troops, 
deployed to multiple United Nations peace-keeping operations. The four main ethnic groups are 
the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo and Ijaw. 
Each of the four main ethnic groups congregates in specific geographical areas, but has 
representation throughout all of the major cities.  The Hausa-Fulani dominate northern Orange and 
control the economic, military and political life.  The Yoruba primarily reside in the southwest. Wotut, the 
most populous city (18 million), is in what Yorubans call Yorubaland. Politically, Yorubans follow the 
political elite in the nearest city.  The Ijaw reside in the Orange River Delta, in southern Orange.  The 
Ijaw are consistently at odds with the GOO over oil revenue distribution, leading to militant attacks 
against the oil industry. Finally, the Igbo primarily live near Enugu and the areas just north of the Orange 
River Delta. During the 1960‘s, Igbo officers of the COAF rebelled against the Hausa-Fulani dominated 
government and military.  These officers started the Biafra Separatist Movement, which the GOO put 
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down by 1970. All four ethnic groups continue to fight amongst themselves and against each other, 
causing levels of violence in Country Orange to remain elevated – even during times of stability.  
Country Orange‘s social situation remains unstable with a growing youth bulge, urban sprawl and 
poor health. There are over 100 million people under the age of 64 and a population density of 150 people 
per square kilometer.  Most Orangineans live in densely populated urban centers along the coast, which is 
low-lying and under constant threat of flooding.  Additionally, urban centers lack economic opportunity; 
regular sewage, electricity and other infrastructure; and security and public health services. Country 
Orange‘s cities are prime locations for criminal, terrorist, and militant recruitment, as well as for gang 
activity and disease outbreaks.  
Although Orange faces multiple challenges from corruption, violence and societal and 
infrastructure dilapidation, the country is stable in 2020.  It is working with the U.S. and other 
countries in security force assistance; maintains diverse economic relations with many countries, 
to include the United States, China, India, South Africa, and the United Kingdom; and is striving 
to consolidate leadership of a Pan-African role on the global stage (USMC Wargaming Division, 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010, pp. 21-22). 
The threat situation is a complex situation that is almost always in flux as groups shift 
allegiances and enter into new disputes with each other.  The total number of armed militants and 
criminals is estimated to be between 60,000 and 100,000 individuals.  The size of these groups 
can range from as few as several hundred up to 4,000 plus militants.  Groups and individuals are 
criminally, politically, ethnically, religiously, tribally and ideologically motivated.  With an 
influx of former military and police personnel, the effectiveness of several of these groups is 
increasing. Many of these groups engage in extortion, intimidation, hostage taking of foreign 
nationals and rich Orangineans and oil bunkering. These groups are responsible for making 
Orange and the Delta region, in particular, a major transshipment point for illegal trafficking 
between Europe, North America and South America.  
Many of these groups represent the local power structures that provide security and services and 
compete for power against other groups and the GOO.  Furthermore, many politicians, particularly in the 
Delta Region, are former militia, confraternity, or cult members.  Politicians routinely use armed groups 
and individuals to intervene in elections. Some politicians, military officers and police engage in oil 
bunkering and other illicit activities.  The Country Orange armed forces (COAF) are among Africa‘s best; 
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however, most personnel receive poor training and pay – making participation in illicit activities for extra 
money alluring to many. Endemic corruption in the government, military and police is a major challenge 
facing the GOO and its ability to stabilize the situation.  
There are three main types of threats to the GOO and multinational forces in EW10: The 
Movement for the Emancipation of Southern States insurgency, which begins in spring 2023; Al Qaeda in 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – an Islamic violent extremist organization (VEO) that increases attacks against 
GOO and foreign nationals and interests in 2020; and the ubiquitous presence of endemic inter-ethnic, 
inter-community, sectarian and criminal violence.  
In addition to criminal, militant, and ethnic-tribal threats, Country Orange again contends 
with a youth bulge; environmental degradation – due to poor sewage infrastructure in the vast 
majority of the country‘s slums; the ever present risk of disease outbreaks; and thousands of 
immigrants crossing into the country via porous borders.  These challenges plus the aspirations 
of the government – to develop into a leading continental power – encouraged the government to 
maintain military and diplomatic ties with western nations.  These ties allowed for civilian – 
military planning and cooperation, from civilian education and infrastructure improvement to 
military exchanges and professionalization. The government also maintains an open invitation to 
its allies and trading partners to cooperate with it in governance, military and civilian 
development (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010, p. 10) 
2.4.3 Status of Forces Agreements  
 The SEA-17A group determined that for the purposes of analysis it would be best to 
examine efforts from only the U.S. perspective in order to simplify the modeling process. The 
following agreements are included in this report in an effort to show additional basis for the 
thought processes of the SEA-17A group and the decisions that were made as seen in this report.  
MOVE 1 (January 2020- May 2022):  
U.S. Security Agreement  
• U.S. forces (USF) operate in support of Country Orange Armed Forces‘ (COAF) 
command  




• USF may not undertake any operations outside those listed  
• USF utilize Country Orange military bases; airfields; ports and may not build own 
facilities without GOO approval  
• Article 98 in effect (Bilateral Immunity Agreement)  
• USF under U.S. legal jurisdiction  
 
Multinational Security Agreement  
• Other multinational forces (OMNF) operate in support of COAF command  
• Authorized Operations: Train COAF and police, and participate in combined 
exercises  
• OMNF may not undertake any operations outside those listed  
• OMNF utilize existing Country Orange bases; airfields; ports and may not build own 
facilities without GOO approval  
• OMN equivalent to Article 98  
• OMNF under OMN legal jurisdiction  
 
MOVE 2 (June - August 2022):  
U.S. Security Agreement  
• U.S. Forces (USF) operate in support of COAF command  
• Authorized Operations : Train COAF and police, and participate in combined 
exercises and conduct FHA/DR  
• USF may not undertake any operations outside those listed  
• USF utilize existing Country Orange military bases; airfields; ports, civilian ports and 
airfields and can construct temporary HA/DR support facilities  
• Article 98 in effect (Bilateral Immunity Agreement)  
• USF under US legal jurisdiction  
 
Multinational Security Agreement  
• Other multinational forces (OMNF) operate in support of COAF command  
• Authorized Operations: Train COAF and police, and participate in combined 
exercises and conduct FHA/Dr 
28 
 
• OMNF may not undertake any operations outside those listed  
• OMNF utilize existing Country Orange military bases; airfields; ports, civilian ports 
and airfields and can construct temporary HA/DR support facilities  
• OMN equivalent to Article 98  
• OMNF under OMN legal jurisdiction (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory, 2010, p. 78). 
2.4.4 State Specific Data 
 Numerous historical and scenario details have been included in the preceding pages with 
regards to the three states that are subject to our analysis efforts. Details on the states needs, 
requirements, status, etc. can be found in the chapters following.  
2.5 Humanitarian Process  
The humanitarian aid process is a complex process that involves many different 
organizations. These organizations consist of IGO, NGO, HN, and USG.  The cultures and 
mandates of these organizations are each different and must be considered into the planning 
process.  The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the organization responsible for 
coordinating the USG response to a foreign disaster.  This authority is granted to them by the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (United States Agency for International Development, 2005, p. 
xix).   
 The OFDA is a department inside of United States Agency International Development 
(USAID) who is subordinate to the U.S. State Department (USD) but not a component of the 
USD. The OFDA‘s mandate consists of three parts; save lives, relieve suffering and reduce 
economic impact of a disaster (United States Agency for International Development, 2005, p. 
xix).  The mandate guides the actions of the organizations.  
 When a disaster occurs three criteria must be met before the OFDA will respond. First the 
magnitude of the disaster must exceed the HN capability to respond.  Second the HN must 
request or be willing to accept USG assistance.  And lastly it must be in the interest of the USG 
(United States Agency for International Development, 2005, p. xix).  If these three criteria are 
met the OFDA will start the process of providing aid.  
29 
 
 The OFDA has many options available to them to provide that aid. First the OFDA will 
wire up to $50,000 to the Chief of Mission or Ambassador to use at his or her discretion.  Next 
the OFDA could provide grants to NGO‘s already operating in the area to provide that 
immediate relief.  Another option available to the OFDA is to send Disaster Assistance Response 
Teams (DART) to assess the situation on the ground and coordinate relief efforts there (United 
States Agency for International Development, 2005).  Once the DART team is deployed the 
OFDA may decide to begin shipping commodities from their warehouses. 
 Once the DART team is on the ground they act as the Command and Control structure for 
OFDA.  They will be responsible for conducting situational assessments and needs assessments.  
It‘s from these assessments that will determine if the Department of Defense (DoD) is required.  
U.S. Military assets will be used when the following three criteria are met: The military provides 
a unique service; Civilian response capacity is overwhelmed; and Civilian authorities request 
assistance. (United States Agency for International Development, 2005) 
 The situation assessment is provided in Expeditionary Warrior 2010 scenario and dictates 
the needs assessment in Chapter 3.  This needs assessment meets the above criteria to use DoD 
assets to aid in the disaster. The situation assessment also provides the magnitude of the problem. 
This is also outlined in Chapter 3 and provides the basis for the requirements analysis.  
 The requirements are generated by analyzing the situation on the ground.  Understanding 
the humanitarian aid and disaster relief process is critical to generating the requirements. A 
further breakdown of these requirements is explained in Chapter 3.  These requirements generate 
the functions necessary to be performed.  With these functions defined a physical architecture 
can be formed to meet these functions.  A further breakdown of functional requirements is 
explained in Chapter 3.  
 Once components are decided upon from the physical architecture different alternatives 
and configurations of these components can be analyzed to aid in the decision process.  This 



















3. FUNCTIONAL AND PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
3.1 Situational Assessment  
 Understanding the situation in the affected area is critically important in order to 
effectively meet the needs of those affected by the disaster.  A Common Needs Assessment 
(CNA) should be completed in an effective and timely manner to ensure that the disaster victims‘ 
needs are addressed properly.  Each situational assessment depends on factors such as type of 
disaster, location, political implications, geography, population density in regards to disaster 
area, and other several others.  In the case of FHA/DR, disaster assessments are completed by 
multiple agencies including the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) (United States 
Agency for International Development, 2005, p. xvii) and Office Coordinating Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) (Garfield et al., 2001, p. 9).  These assessments are critical in determining what 
type and how much aid is required.  
 Developing a common operating picture is important when working with multiple 
organizations and the CNA may be used to develop the COP.  Different organizations apply 
different formats of the needs assessments, highlighting their own priorities (Garfield et al., 
2001).  Minimizing duplication of effort can help to ensure that people who need the aid receive 
it in a timely manner.  Each disaster is almost certain to be different from the last, but a 
development of a baseline CNA will alleviate duplicative efforts.  The baseline, once established, 
may further require tailoring, but provides a fundamental starting point to achieve the 
overarching goal in reducing the time required to develop the assessment.  
 In a report developed for the Overseas Development Institute titled Common Needs 
Assessment and Humanitarian Action, the authors summarize what should be included in an 
effective CNA (Garfield et al., 2011, p. 14).   Factors such as, but not limited to, location and 
geographic identification, response gaps in affected area, and physical hazards and security risks 
need to be addressed in the CNA.  A complete outline of a CNA summary report is included in 





Figure 3.1.1: Characteristics of a Good Assessment (Garfield et al., 2001, p. 5)
 
 Because this scenario is not based on real world events but rather hypothetical events, the 
EW10 scenario has given sufficient data on what needs to be addressed.   Using the time line 
presented in Expeditionary Warrior 2010 as our baseline, this project will focus on Move 2, the 
FHA/DR portion of the scenario.   Figure 3.1.2 below shows the time line of the EW10 war 
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Aug 2025-   Aug 2027 
Steady State Foreign Humanitarian 
Assistance / Disaster Relief 
(FHA/DR) 
Non-Combatant Evacuation Opération 
(NEO) 
Stability Operations 
 Unusually heavy rains cause 
widespread flooding & Cholera 
outbreak, straining GOO 
resources. June 2022 Sever 
Tropical storm devastates 
coastal regions. GOO requests 
international assistance. 
April 2023: Opposition Candidate loses 
GOO presidential election (characterized 
by lack of security, widespread ballot 
stuffing, violence and other electoral 
fraud). Opposition candidate assassinated 
and security situation rapidly deteriorates. 
GOO advises international community to 
evacuate citizens. 
Ceasefire between GOO and 
Opposition. GOO asks UN 
for international stability 
and reconstruction 
assistance. July 2025 UN 
Security council authorizes 
international response. 
SFA/OPC U.S. JTF U.S. JTF & Partner Nation Forces Multinational TF 
 
Low Level Ethnic & Gang Violence: Sporadic Terror Attacks 
Limited Piracy 
Opposition Insurgency Increased Ethnic / 
Communal / Sectarian / Gang Violence Terror 
vs. Foreigners & GOO 
Low Levels Ethnic & Gang 
Violence 
Figure 3.1.2: Time Line (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory, 2010, p. 7)  
 The type of disaster is defined as flooding and has been caused by a tropical storm that 
has hit the region.  The flooding has strained the host nation‘s capability to respond and 
Government of Orange (GOO) has requested assistance. These two factors are important if the 
United States were to provide FHA/DR. This is in part because in order for the U.S. to provide 
aid three key things need to be done. First the Host Nation must request help. Second the extent 
of disaster must put a strain beyond the host nation‘s capability. And lastly, it must be in the 
United States interest to provide such aid.  These three key factors are met with the given 
scenario (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010). 
 Because the Government of Orange (GOO) has asked the United Nations, specifically the 
United States Government for assistance, the United States Government (USG), IGO‘s, and 
NGO‘s will respond with the required aid (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory, 2010). The GOO specifically requested assistance in the following 
areas: evacuate people from affected areas, search and rescue, deliver food, water, medicine, 
clothing, medical services, veterinarian services, repair and open airfields and ports, provide air 
traffic control support and finally repair and engineering support.  Understanding the type of aid 
requested and the amount of people who required different categories of aid has enabled the team 
to generate a functional architecture that would be required to deliver that aid. This functional 
architecture is shown in Section 3.3.  
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 The aid requirements requested by the GOO identify the requirements necessary to 
complete the first step in the Systems Engineering Process. In order to scope the problem, the 
analysis first focused on the Southern States of Country Orange.  Figure 3.1.3 shows the current 
status of those airports and seaports. 
 
Figure 3.1.3: EW10 Civil-Military Airfields and Seaports (USMC Wargaming Division, 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010, p. 128) 
 Identification of airports and seaports capability helps to identify methods of aid delivery. 
A simplifying assumption was made to make the problem more manageable.  If an airport or 
seaport was open in the state it would be utilized to bring aid into the region. Given this 
assumption, there are three states that would not be able to receive aid. These states are State 1, 
State 2, and State 3 and are shown in Figure 3.1.3 above. Additionally this further limits the 
capacity in which IGO‘s and NGO‘s can participate. Because the aid is required to be delivered 
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to via a Seabase the IGO‘s and NGO‘s are not able to transport the aid into the country.  This 
assumption identifies a key capability requirement for the DoD in the scenario, which is the 
transportation of aid into the affected region.  
  These three states also gave the team the most complex operating scenario out of the 
seven. As previously mention in Chapter 1, the states‘ operating environment is either uncertain 
or hostile as Table 3.1.1 represents.   Given the operating environment, these states will have the 




















State 1 4.1  85 750 2000 97,000 243,000 Uncertain 
State 2 1.7 5 150 300 17,000 25,000 Hostile 
State 3 5.2 35 350 600 19,600 34,000 Uncertain 
Table 3.1.1: State Disaster Representation 
 Further guidelines were also given in the EW10 scenario regarding Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDP) camps. These guidelines stated that the Government of Orange, IGO‘s, and 
NGO‘s would be running the IDP camps.  In addition they would also distribute food at the food 
distribution centers and provide security outside of distribution centers.  Given the presented 
needs the next step in the SE process is to identify the requirements necessary to complete the 
overall objective.  
3.2  Requirements Analysis 
 Once the situational assessment is conducted it can be broken down further into a 
requirements assessment. This assessment identifies key resources and services required in order 
to respond effectively to the situation.  In order for the DoD to become involved the 
requirements must be uniquely suited to the DoD (Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2001).  In the case of the EW10 scenario the primary resources required are 
commodities, food, lift capability, security, and logistical support. 
36 
 
 For this analysis the requirements were broken down into five key categories. These 
categories are Supplies, Logistics, Infrastructure Support, Special Missions and Security. Further 
descriptions of these requirements are shown below in Figure 3.1.4.  
 
Figure 3.1.4: Requirements 
 Supply requirements are defined as those supplies required for sustainment in a FHA/DR 
environment.  These items include the commodities that the OFDA stockpiles. These 
commodities are blankets, 10 liter water containers, hygiene kits, water bladder, water treatment 
units and plastic sheeting (United States Agency for International Development, 2005, pp. B-2-
B-4).  Further details regarding OFDA commodities are shown in Appendix C.2.   
 Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDR) are required in order to adequately feed the affected 
population. These HDR‘s are similar to Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) in that they provide 
sufficient calorie requirements as defined by the OFDA.  Each HDR provides 2200 calories and 
is contained in an easy to transport package (MRE Info, 2010, ―Humanitarian Daily Ration,‖ 
para. 1).  Further information about HDRs is shown in Appendix C.2.  
 Other supply requirements include DoD excess property.  These items include additional 
items in the Federal Supply Catalog from including Class I through Class X items.  Historically, 
these items are low in quantity and usually driven by mission essential capabilities. Some 
examples of DoD excess property include heavy forklifts, construction materials for camps and 
medical supplies.  A listing of these items used in this project is shown in Appendix C.3.   A 
simplifying assumption was made that vehicles such as forklifts and trucks would already be 
present in the region.   
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3.2.1 Planning Factors  
 The amount of aid required to be distributed is based on key factors. These factors 
include population demographics, type of disaster, geographical location, and climate. Each of 
these factors plays an important role in determining tonnage of aid. 
 The population of country Orange consists of approximately 149 million people. The 
demographics are broken down in Appendix C.4. Understanding how the population is broken 
down enables aid to be brought in more effectively. An example of this is the different clothing 
requirements for children, women and men. Another example is reflected in the different medical 
requirements between children and adults. Understanding the population distributions is 
important to get a better planning estimate.  
 The climate of the region is also an important attributing cause in determining how much 
aid is required. Specifically the climate impacts water consumption and clothing requirements. In 
the given scenario it is a tropical climate so water consumption will be increased by a 
multiplicative factor of 1.33 (Sullivan, 1995, p. 51).  Clothing requirements are also uniquely 
defined by the tropical mostly rainy climate and are shown in Appendix C.5.  
 Factors such as geographical location impact how the aid gets to the affected population. 
It also plays a direct role in the climate of the region. Additionally, the type of disaster present 
affects infrastructure throughout the region, directly impacting the method of aid delivered. 
Factors as such play a significant role in the model but do so in an indirect manner.  The method 
of delivery is chosen based on the type of disaster and the geographical location and for this 
reason and direction from the tasking statement a Seabase was chosen to deliver the required aid.  
 Planning factors are further defined as the weight of an item in tons per person per day. A 
weighted factor is defined as the percent of population multiplied by the planning factor 
(Sullivan, 1995, p.51).  By determining planning factors and weighted factors we were able to 
determine the amount of aid required per person per day. A complete description of this method 
is explained in Appendix C.5.  
 Logistics requirements are defined as the infrastructure required to transport and 
warehouse these items (Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008).  The 
military is uniquely suited to transport items to the region. This capability can include air lift, sea 
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lift and ground transport. In addition to these items, HA requires a warehouse or sheltered 
storage until the goods are distributed.  
 Infrastructure Support requirements uniquely vary by disaster type.  Making an 
assessment of the damage to the region is critically important to determine what infrastructure 
requirements are necessary.  Historically, structural engineers are required to assess the damage 
on the ground.  Facilities such as airports and seaports are critical to the region to enable aid to 
flow rapidly.  However roads, rail lines, electricity, and sanitation services all play a critical role 
in the distribution of aid. These requirements will not be considered in this scenario because they 
are outside of the scope of this project.  
 Determining security requirements in the region can be a difficult task. The HN and DoD 
Intel will give a good idea of the threat level in the area.  EW10 has broken down the situation on 
the ground to help determine what those security requirements are.  In general HN will typically 
handle as much of the security as it can. However when the security requirements exceed the 
ability of the HN, USF may be required to provide security. For the purposes of this scenario HN 
will provide security outside of the aid distribution centers.   A complete breakdown of these 
security requirements are listed in Appendix C.6. 
 Special Mission requirements are requirements that do not easily fit into on the above 
categories but are still required to be performed.  These requirements include Command and 
Control and Search and Rescue capabilities. They also include Humanitarian Assessment 
Surveillance Teams which assist the DoD in making quick assessments to the region 
(Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001).  Additionally aerial surveillance 
and geospatial intelligence can be provided to help assess the situation on the ground.  These 
requirements have been scoped down to Command and Control.  
3.3  Functional Analysis 
 From the requirements analysis a functional analysis is completed. The functions of the 
systems architecture were generated from, and remain linked to, the requirements.  Analyzing the 
functional requirements can help generate the physical architecture required to complete these 
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functions and thus fulfill the requirements. Traceability from form to function to requirements 
helps to eliminate redundancy and waste and helps identify critical functions in the system.  
 A top level functional hierarchy was first generated from the requirements outlined in the 
previous section as well as Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Humanitarian 
Assistance (JP 3-07.6). Figure 3.3.1 below shows the required functions in order to provide 
regional stability to a nation. 
  
 
Figure 3.3.1: Top Level Functional Hierarchy  
The functional requirements were then scoped down to a humanitarian disaster situation 
and further scoped down to functions that were uniquely suitable to the DoD.  Scoping was 
guided by JP 3-07.6, which stresses that the U.S. Ambassador oversees all U.S. HA activities and 
USAID is the lead federal agency for U.S. FHA/DR.  Accordingly, USAID‘s Field Operations 
Guide (FOG) for Disaster Assessment and Response was used to define the functions the DoD 
must perform in a typical FHA/DR scenario.  The FOG states that the two major roles of the 
DoD are Point-to-Point Logistical Support and Disaster Relief.  Further, the DoD‘s role in 
Disaster Relief is defined as supplementing or complementing the relief efforts of the affected 
country‘s civil authorities or humanitarian relief community.  Military forces typically only 
provide assistance when the DoD can provide a unique capability beyond the capabilities of the 
existing FHA/DR response team.  This assistance includes logistical support, transportation, 
airfield management, communications, medical support, distribution of relief commodities, or 
security.  JP 3-07.6 stresses that distribution of relief supplies is traditionally the domain of the 
UN, NGOs, and IOs, with U.S. Military forces only becoming involved if the relief community 
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is overwhelmed.  Further, JP 3-07.6 highlights that FHA/DR operations are not combat 
operations, and thus the role of the military in security is limited.  The role may be expanded, but 
should focus on security of: Allied forces; USG, NGO, and IO personnel and equipment; HA 
recipients; affected country personnel and assets; humanitarian relief convoys, supplies, and 
main supply routes; relief distribution centers; stocks of FHA supplies; and ports and airfields.  
This guidance resulted in the elimination of several top level functional requirements.  
Rebuilding Infrastructure, Providing Economic Stabilization, Providing Governance, Providing 
for Participation, and Providing Justice and Reconciliation are all functions that will be 
performed by the host government, NGOs, or other government organizations.  Figure 3.3.2 
below shows the remaining top level functions, both of which will be provided by the DoD. 
 
Figure 3.3.2: Top Level Functional Diagram for FHA/DR 
As previously noted, OFDA, GOO, and other agencies will play an integral role in the 
FHA/DR mission.  JP 3-08 defines the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) (Figure 3.3.3), 
which serves as the liaison between military forces and other relief agencies.  The purpose of the 
CMOC is to coordinate and facilitate the United States‘ and any multinational force‘s 
humanitarian operations with those of international and local relief agencies.  The multilateral 
nature of these operations suggests that the combatant commander should strive for unity of 




Figure 3.3.3: Notional Composition of a CMOC (Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2006)  
 The scoping of functions, guided by DoD and USAID policy, has resulted in two major 
functions that military forces must perform in a FHA/DR scenario: Security and FHA/DR.  
These functions are expanded with consideration to the four major requirements for a successful 
operation described previously: Supplies, Logistics, Security, and Special Missions (C2 and 
aerial assessment).   
The first major function, Provide Security, directly satisfies the requirement for Security.  
The need for military forces to provide security is reduced by the assumption that the Host 
Nation will provide security outside of the distribution areas limits.  The Provide Security 
Function, shown in Figure 3.3.4, defines the security functions provided by DoD forces.   These 
functions are generated by requirements listed above, protection of aid distribution areas and 
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Allied force protection measures required to ensure the safety of Allied troops and relief 
distribution centers.  
 
Figure 3.3.4: Provide Security Functional Hierarchy 
 The remaining three requirements, Supplies, Logistics, and Special Missions can be 
combined into one major function, which is Provided FHA/DR.  This function is simplified by 
several assumptions, guided by JP 3-08, JP 3-07.6, and USAID‘s FOG.  First, it is assumed that 
the food, water, medical, and quality of life (ex: blankets) supplies are not provided by the DoD.  
These supplies are drawn from USG, NGO, and IO resources, but the DoD is required to 
provided Point-to-Point Lift as well as in theater Logistical Support.  The next simplifying 
assumption is that HN and NGO‘s will manage and run IDP camps and distribute aid to the 
population (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010).  
Because the DoD is not required to provide these functions, the overall problem is simplified.  
Additionally, medical supplies are not required to be provided; however, medical are required to 
be transported.  This transforms the Supply, Logistics, and Special Mission functions into a 
FHA/DR transportation problem.  The top level FHA/DR functions now performed by the DoD 




Figure 3.3.5: Top Level FHA/DR Functions 
 Each function must be traced back to either a specific requirement or group of 
requirements in order to validate the need for the function.  A complete functional hierarchy is 
shown in Appendix C.7.   The linkage of needs to requirements to functions is shown in 
Appendix C.8.  
 Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) are then generated to determine the functionality of the 
system. These MOE‘s are described further with Measures of Performance (MOP).  The MOE‘s 
and MOP are used to compare the physical architectures. The full breakdown of MOE/MOP and 
their linkage to the functions are shown in Appendix C.11.  
3.4  Physical Architecture 
 The physical architecture is designed based off of the functional requirements. The 
functional requirement to provide security and FHA/DR to country Orange helped define what 
the baseline of the physical architecture would be.  Using this as our guide, the baseline for the 
physical architecture was chosen to be an Expeditionary Strike Group with their complement of 
Marines, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).  
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  The standard configuration for an ESG is one LHD, LPD, and LSD. This is based on the 
Navy Shipbuilding Plan 2020 which is included in Appendix C.12.  Using this information to 
determine which ship types would be available to choose from during 2023 the baseline for the 

















Table 3.4.1: Amphibious Configuration 2020 
 The aircraft chosen to be utilized in the experiment were the MH-53, OV-22 and the SH-
60. These aircraft were chosen because of their lift capacity and their projected availability in 
2023.  The limit of the number of aircraft is based on the amount of deck space on board the 
amphibious platforms. Reducing the number of aircraft would only result in less tonnage and 
numerous configurations. For this reason the airwing composition remained the same throughout 
the experiment. Factors such as reliability, maintainability and availability will be factored into 
the model to reduce the number of aircraft available at any given time.  The standard 
configuration of an airwing is shown below in Table 3.4.2. 
Craft LHD LHD LPD LPD LSD-HF LSD-HF LSD-WD LSD-WD 
MH53 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OV22 10 10 2 2 0 0 0 0 
SH60 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 3.4.2: Seabase Air Connector Configuration 
 The surface connectors that could be varied were based on what the Seabase amphibious 
ships could carry. This resulted in two alternative surface connectors for our analysis, the 
Landing Craft Unit (LCU) and the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC).  The Transformable 
Craft (T-Craft) is not configured to be embarked on any of the current Amphibious ships (Office 
of Naval Research, 2010, p.4); therefore, considered independent from the Seabase amphibious 
ships.  T-Craft will be capable of self-deploying to long ranges (2500 nm) while possessing 
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superior heavy lift amphibious beach landing capabilities than the legacy air cushioned vehicles 
(Beach, 2010).  A detailed description of T-craft is included in Chapter 4.  The surface connector 
configurations, absent T-Craft, are shown below in Table 3.4.3.  
Craft LHD LHD LPD LPD LSD-HF LSD-HF LSD-WD LSD-WD 
LCAC 3 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 
LCU 0 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 
Table 3.4.3: Seabase Surface Connector Configuration 
 Using these parameters of Amphibious Ships, Surface Connectors and Air Connectors the 
experiment resulted in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 matrix.  There were two alternative configurations for 
the LHD and LPD with surface connectors. Additionally the LSD itself has two types of ships 
with two different surface connector configurations for each class.  Finally the T-Craft were 
factored into the experiment, by either having the T-Craft or not having them in the model.  This 
resulted in an original 32 different physical architecture configurations in which to plug into the 
model. These 32 physical architectures are shown in Appendix C.13. 
 In order to reduce the number of physical architectures required, the five dimension 
matrix was analyzed in JMP® to determine the best optimal matrix that covers the entire solution 
space with the lowest number of architectures.   A D-Optimal analysis was conducted on the full 
factorial matrix.  In general, a design that minimizes the variance of the model regression 
coefficients is considered a D-optimal design (Montgomery, 2009, p. 254).  The analysis resulted 
in 16 different physical architecture configurations for further analysis. A diagram of the 
potential solution space is provided in Appendix C.14.  This multi-dimensional matrix was then 
analyzed to help determine the best physical architecture to implement into the model. These 16 




PA LHD LPD LSD TCRAFT 
1 LCAC LCAC LCU HF No 
2 LCAC LCAC LCAC HF No 
3 LCU LCAC LCAC WI No 
4 LCAC LCAC LCU WI Yes 
5 LCU LCAC LCU HF Yes 
6 LCAC LCAC LCAC WI Yes 
7 LCU LCU LCAC HF No 
8 LCAC LCU LCAC WI No 
9 LCAC LCU LCU WI No 
10 LCU LCU LCAC WI Yes 
11 LCU LCAC LCU WI No 
12 LCAC LCU LCU HF Yes 
13 LCU LCU LCU WI Yes 
14 LCU LCU LCU HF No 
15 LCAC LCU LCAC HF Yes 
16 LCU LCAC LCAC HF Yes 
Table 3.4.4: D-Optimal Design 
 These 16 different physical architectures were then analyzed using a simple deterministic 
model in Microsoft Excel that computed tonnage per day at a given distance. The resulting 
tonnage per day, for each of the remaining physical architectures, was compared to determine if 
they were different from one another.  Physical architectures that produced similar tonnage per 
day results, plus or minus 50 tons, were then eliminated retaining the lower tonnage of the 
comparison. The result of this analysis determined the final physical architecture for the model. 
These results are shown in Table 3.4.5 below and Appendix C.13-15 provides justifying 
graphical representations.  
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  LHD LPD LSD TCRAFT 
1 LCAC (3) LCAC (2) LCU HF(1) 0 
2 LCAC (3) LCAC (2) LCAC HF (2) 0 
5 LCAC (3) LCU (1) LCAC WI (4) 0 
6 LCAC (3) LCU (1) LCU WI (2) 0 
9 LCAC (3) LCAC (2) LCU WI (2) 6 
10 LCU (2) LCAC (2) LCU HF (1) 6 
12 LCU (2) LCU (1) LCAC WI (4) 6 
13 LCAC (3) LCU (1) LCU HF (1) 6 
16 LCU (2) LCAC (2) LCAC HF (2) 6 
Table 3.4.5: Final Physical Architecture 
 The nine physical architectures finally were entered into the model to help determine the 
best physical architecture amongst the four courses of action. Further analysis of both cost and 
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4. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF STAGES 1 & 2 
 As mentioned in previous chapters, the project was broken down into three stages.  Stage 1 
modeled the Seabase to the shore. Stage 2 modeled how the aid was delivered to the people. And finally 
Stage 3 modeled the effect on the population of that aid. Figure 4.0.1 is a visual representation of Stage 1 
and 2.  Stage 3 will be elaborated on further in Chapter 5.  
 
Figure 4.0.1: Stage 1 and Stage 2 
4.1 Seabase Description 
 The baseline physical architecture was selected in order meet all desired functions as 
outlined by the functional hierarchy. The resultant selection included an ESG with a T-AKE 
class supply ship for the foundation of the Seabase. The U.S. Navy 2020 shipbuilding was 
reviewed to determine fleet serviceability in the year 2023.  A brief description of the ships 
follows. 
 The Wasp Class LHD (Landing Helicopter Deck) amphibious ship is usually the 
command platform within an ESG (Navy Recruiting Command, 2011). It is has the capability to 
embark, transport, deploy, command and fully support all elements of a Marine Expeditionary 
Unit (MEU) of 2200 Marines (Naval-Technology.com, 2011).  The ability to insert forces ashore 
via helicopters and landing craft gives the ESG a unique capability well suited to the mission 
required in the model.  
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 The second amphibious ship in the ESG is San Antonio Class LPD (Landing Platform 
Dock).  The mission of the San Antonio class is to transport the U.S. Marine Corps "mobility 
triad" – that is, advanced amphibious assault vehicles (AAAVs), air-cushioned landing craft 
(LCAC) and the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft – to trouble spots around the world (Naval-
Technology.com, 2011). 
 The third ship in the ESG group is the Dock Landing Ship (LSD); which can be either the 
Harpers Ferry Class or Whidbey Island Class ship. The Whidbey Island Class ships were built to 
transport and launch air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC). The ships also provide docking and 
repair facilities for LCACs and for a range of conventional military, utility and personnel landing 
craft and also provide landing facilities for helicopters (Naval-Technology.com, 2011).  The 
Harpers Ferry Class provides an increased cargo capacity and reduces the number of air-
cushioned landing craft carried from four to two.  
 The final potential class of ship available in the 2020 force structure is the Transformable 
Craft (T-Craft).  The transformable craft is the proposed prototype that will bridge the gap 
between operational speed, lift capability, operability in sea states up to sea state 4, and landing 
on unimproved beaches. The T-Craft will also enable the conduct of the full range of military 
operations (ROMO) (Bodden, 2010).  
 Finally, in order for the model to be viable, a supply ship would be required to resupply 
the Seabase. A simplifying assumption was made, and a T-AKE class supply ship would be 
available to meet the logistic requirements necessary to remain on station and complete the 
immediate HA/DR mission. The T-AKE class ships provide underway replenishment services 
with logistic lift from sources of supply in port or at sea and the transfer of cargo including 
ammunition, food, fuel, spares, potable water and expendable supplies and materiel to battle 
groups, station ships, shuttle ships and other naval ships at sea (Naval-Technology.com, 2011). 
4.2 Seabase Connector Description 
 Each Seabase brings with it the ability to carry the following surface connectors: LCAC 
and Landing Craft Utility (LCU). These surface connectors provide heavy lift and transport 
capability required to transport large amounts of supplies ashore. The Seabase platforms also 
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supply serviceable air connectors to support transportation of supplies ashore. The following air 
connectors are encoded in the model: Super Sea Stallion (MH-53E), Osprey (MV-22), and 
Seahawk (S-60B) platforms.  
 The LCAC is an air cushioned vehicle used for transporting, ship-to-shore and across the 
beach, personnel, weapons, equipment, and cargo of the assault elements of the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (U.S. NAVY, 2010). The LCU craft are capable of transporting tracked or 
wheeled vehicles and troops from amphibious assault ships to beachheads or piers (Military.com, 
2011). Detailed specifications of surface connectors can be found in Appendix D. 
 The air connectors are used to transport supplies from the Seabase to both the FLS and 
FLSS.  Since the ESG is only equipped with the aircraft mentioned above, only organic aircraft 
were utilized in the model.  Specifications of the air connectors are also found in Appendix D.  
 The MH-53E was derived from the CH-53E Super Stallion, is heavier, and has a greater 
fuel capacity than its ancestor (Military.com, 2011). The MV-22 Osprey is a multi-engine, dual-
piloted, self-deployable, medium-lift, vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) tilt-rotor aircraft 
designed for combat, combat support, combat service support, and Special Operations missions 
worldwide (Military.com, 2011).  Finally, the SH-60B is a twin-engine medium lift utility 
helicopter.  It is equipped with a single 4-bladed rotor and a single 4-bladed tail rotor 
(Military.com, 2011).  
4.3 Forward Logistic Sites 
An overseas location, with port and airfield facilities nearby, which provides 
logistic support to naval forces within the theater of operations during major 
contingency and wartime periods. Naval forward logistic sites may be located in 
close proximity to main battle areas to permit forward staging of services, 
throughput of high priority cargo, advanced maintenance, and battle damage 
repair. Naval forward logistic sites are linked to in-theater naval advanced logistic 
support sites by intra-theater airlift and sealift, but may also serve as 
transshipment points for inter-theater movement of high-priority cargo into areas 
of direct combat. In providing fleet logistic support, naval forward logistic site 
capabilities may range from very austere to near those of a naval advanced 





 The distribution system includes the Seabase, connectors, forward logistic sites (FLS), 
and forward logistic satellite sites (FLSS).  The Seabase connectors transport aid from the 
Seabase to the FLS, as well as from the FLS to FLSS.  Each course of action detailed in section 
4.6 discusses the movement of aid through the distribution system.  Due to the nature of the 
disaster, and the tasking directive to include Seabase operations, the FLS were selected and 
established inland at watercraft approachable entry to points to support humanitarian aid and 
disaster relief operations.   
The number of FLS was originally established based upon the number of states 
determined following the scoping and bounding process.  At first that logic makes geographic 
sense.  However, each HA/DR mission the USG participates in is different from the next; and 
therefore implies the number and position of the FLS are mission specific.  As in this case, the 
number of FLS were driven by the population HA requirements and centralization of the 
population.  The number of FLS determined was three, and the location of each was paired to the 
top three major cities HA needs and population density across the region.  Figure 4.3.1 shows the 
location of each FLS, and illustrates not every state includes a FLS. 
 
Figure 4.3.1: Forward Logistic Sites 
Much like the FLS, the FLSS locations and number of FLSS were also determined on 
population data in relation to the major cities; however, the required detail necessary to support 
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sound decision making was assumed as it was scarce in the founding documentation.  The nation 
in question was researched for population distribution data, tailored for the three states selected, 
and combined with the EW10 aid requirements suggested.  Combined with geographical map, 
this data led to the decision to radially disperse the population distribution from the major cities 
resulting in a notional, complex distribution network for further input in the model and planned 
analysis in the overall project.  
 
Figure 4.3.2: Forward Logistic Satellite Sites 
While the FLS and FLSS are the end point for military HA/DR operations, they are not 
final destination of HA supplies. At these sites occurs the entrusting of goods from the military 
to NGOs for further transport to the population in need. NGO are responsible for delivery and 
hand-off to the population without military assistance.  While all of the FLS and some of the 
FLSS are located among the population in need, other FLSS feed remote population areas. 
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4.4 Modeling and Simulation (M&S) for System Analysis  
4.4.1 Overview 
 Modeling is a simplified representation of the true, full-scale system of design.  Models 
are designed to represent a system under study, by an idealized example of reality, to explain the 
essential relationships involved (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006).  A good model applies sensible 
tradeoffs between realism and simplicity in order to accurately represent system characteristics. 
For the purpose of this project, a combination of a schematic and mathematical model was 
developed, through the use of diagrams and computer technology, to represent the system of 
systems described in chapter three.       
In conjunction with the modeling, simulation is the process of experimenting with the 
overall performance and behavior of the system.  The primary use of simulation in systems 
engineering is to explore the effects of alternative system characteristics on system performance 
without actually producing and testing each actual candidate system (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 
2006).   Simulation is used before an existing system is altered or a new system built, to reduce 
the chances of failure to meet specifications, to eliminate unforeseen bottlenecks, to prevent 
under or over-utilization of resources, or to optimize system performance.  
 The purpose of this project‘s model is to enable the analyst to predict the effects of 
change to the system and evaluate the performance of the proposed system over a 60-day period, 
against four different COAs, and across nine different physical architectures.  Once the model is 
designed, analysis is required to determine model verification.  Further analysis is conducted to 
select the best physical architectures prior to transfer to Stage 3 for impact on the population.  
 The relationship between Stage 1 and Stage 2 is extremely important in the model. A 
general model of the relationship between the Seabase and the FLS and FLSS is shown in Figure 
4.4.1. The Seabase model is broken into three distinct components, the Seabase, FLS and FLSS. 
The staging area in the model is not a factor because the assumption was made that it had infinite 
supplies. The system model was built using the Simkit Discrete Event Simulation Software as 




Figure 4.4.1: Simulation Overview 
 The impact of the Seabase, FLS and FLSS is determined by the COA chosen. The 
different COA‘s each distribute the aid differently. COA 1 distributes aid directly to the FLS 
only.  Figure 4.4.2 shows this distribution system.  
 
Figure 4.4.2: COA 1 Distribution Overview 
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 Another difference in the model is illustrated in that COA 2 uses a different distribution 
system. This distribution system takes the aid from the Seabase and sends it directly to the FLS 
and FLSS. Figure 4.4.3 illustrates COA 2 distribution system.    
 
Figure 4.4.3: COA 2 Distribution Overview 
 The remaining COAs, COA 3 and 4, each use a distribution network to deliver aid. The 
only difference between these COA is the amount of security. COA 3 does not deliver security to 
the satellite sites while COA 4 does. Figure 4.4.4 illustrates the basic distribution system for both 
COA 3 and COA 4.  Each of the Courses of Action are elaborated on further in Section 4.6 of 





Figure 4.4.4: COA 3 and COA 4 Distribution Overview 
4.4.2 M&S Demand Parameters 
 As was first discussed in Section 3.2, there are two types of demand parameters required 
to effectively provide Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. The first demand parameter 
is simply humanitarian aid. HA requirements are generated based primarily on the population 
distribution in the affected area.  The second demand parameter is the element of security. Given 
the limited number of personnel aboard, the ESG‘s level of security was limited to the capability 
of the MEU.  
 The humanitarian aid demand is directly related to the population need.  A detailed 
analysis was conducted to determine the planning factors required for each category of supply. 
Appendix C outlines these requirements, and addresses the planning factors applied in the model.  
Furthermore, these planning factors are used in Stage 3 in order measure the effects of the 
humanitarian aid.  
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 Humanitarian aid requirements are characterized into five categories; Food, Water, 
Shelter, Miscellaneous, and Security. The food category consists of food required by the 
population and is satisfied in the model by Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDR).  The water 
category consists of all humanitarian aid requirements related to providing water. These include 
the Water Treatment Units, Water Bladder Kits, 10-Liter Collapsible containers and bottled 
water.  WTUs are delivered by units, not tonnage.  Once a unit is received by the population, 
tonnage for daily demand items are dropped to stable levels.  The assumptions made with this 
category are further explained below in Section 4.4.3.  Shelter requirements consist of Class IV 
items, blankets, and multi-purpose plastic sheeting. Finally, the miscellaneous category consists 
of Class VIII supplies, Preventative Medicine supplies, Class II supplies and Hygiene Kits. 
Hygiene items are required every two weeks, but are modeled as daily demand.  Additional 
details on each of the items in these categories are contained in Appendix C. 
 The last category addressed in the model relates to security demand parameters.  This 
category refers to the supplies necessary to sustain the MEU in Stages 1 and 2 of the project.  
Table 4.4.1 below outlines the daily supply requirements of the troops ashore. The MEU carries 
enough supplies to sustain the force structure for a period of 15 days during the employment 










Food   5.58 0.00279 
Water 7 58.2232 0.0291116 
Fuel 64.21 389.9473 0.1949737 
Ammo    3.88 0.00194 
*Figures are for per troop  
Total MEU Troops 2200  
Table 4.4.1: MEU Requirements  
59 
 
 Because the mission of the task force is to provide humanitarian aid, the MEU will utilize 
half the air and surface connector assets during the first four days. This was calculated based on 
the requirement of a Seabase to deliver 1/3 of the MEU ashore within one period of darkness or 
nine hours (Department of Defense, 2005).  The remaining 2/3 of MEU are to be brought ashore 
during following two days. Because only 50% of the transport assets are available to complete 
this mission the total time to transport the Marines ashore will be four days in the model.  This is 
important because during that time only 50% of the connector assets will be available for 
humanitarian supplies. After that four day period the Marines will be self-sufficient until day 15 
in the model. On the 15
th
 day, the Marines will require supplies at the rate shown in the table 
above.  
4.4.3 Simulation Assumptions 
 Assume 70% connector availability on a daily basis.  This accounts for reliability and 
availability of the connectors. 
 A Random Triangle Distribution of +/-10% of the connectors mean for the Seabase 
refueling and travel times.  During refueling or replenishing of aid, the connectors 
linked to Seabase are unavailable.  The triangle distribution was chosen to allow for 
restriction of the minimum and maximum values to a realistic range while still 
introducing variation around the mean. 
 During the loading, all connectors are loaded to maximum payload before leaving.  
 Similar to the refueling and travel time for the Seabase, a Random Triangle 
Distribution of +/-10% was applied in the loading and unloading times for the 
connectors.  
 There are no restrictions on the cargo type for each connector to load.  
 The selection of FLS / FLSS for aid delivery is based on the demand levels. 
 The demand levels for computation are updated once a delivery takes off and before 
the craft has arrived at its destination.  
 The algorithm for choosing where to send a ship, with what payload, is not 
necessarily optimal. It only takes into account the highest priority.  The distance is not 
taken into account when choosing a destination.  
 Each connector goes to only one location, and then returns to the Seabase.  
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 Demands are prioritized.  Lower priority demands are not addressed until higher 
priority demands are satisfied, with slight variations due to availability of resources. 
 To model a delivery rate reduction resulting from reduced security early in the 
scenario, for the first 4 days only 50% of the connectors are available. 
 After 15 days, security supplies will be delivered and the availability of the 
connectors will be reset to 100%.  
4.4.4 Simkit Overview 
Simkit (Buss, 2009) Discrete Event Simulation (DES) is written in Java, downloadable 
from the world-wide web, and runs on any Java 2 platform and modern web browser.  It is an 
application programming interface (API) package used to easily create DES models with a small 
execution footprint. Simkit is the simulation engine for Combat XXI, the Army‘s next-generation 
premier ground combat simulation. 
Simkit is capable of modeling wide range of situations. One advantage of using Simkit is 
that it is based on Event Graph Methodology, the simplest and most flexible formalism for DES 
modeling.  
Figure 4.4.1 below illustrates the model event graph. At the start of each day the demand 
requested at each site is determined. Factors such as weather, availability, fuel state are all 
factored into the model. The factors are shown in the graph below.  Each connector is assumed to 
be fully loaded and ready to deliver the aid to the FLS or FLSS. Once the connector delivers the 
load it returns to its origin to be replenished. Replenishment of a connector is done by priority 
queue methodology. Items are placed in the queue by priority and loaded in that same order.  
During the replenishment stage, the connector is delayed by its load time factor. Once loaded, the 
connector then proceeds to the next delivery site.  This cycle continues until either the 
connector‘s operational hours have been reached or it needs to refuel. Once either of these events 
occur, the connector returns to the Seabase.  Security plays into the model by restricting the 
number of connectors during the first four days to 50% capacity. Once that initial load period is 
over, the next security interaction in the model occurs at day 15. Once day 15 occurs, security 




Figure 4.4.1: Model Event graph for Seabase 
4.4.5 Simulation Parameters 
 All models take input arguments, operate on these arguments, and eventually produce the 
desired output. The model used in this study takes input arguments (or parameters) based on a 
given physical architecture. The ESG was chosen as the baseline of this model‘s physical 
architecture. Input parameters for the Seabase are described below.  
 Two main types of user-defined input parameters were created in the model as 
characteristics of the Seabase and the connectors mentioned above. Table 4.4.2 and Table 4.4.3 
show the parameters for Seabase and connectors respectively. 
Parameter  Remarks  Units 
Payload  By Weight U.S. tons 
Fuel Capacity  JP5 – Aircraft and LCAC, F-76 – Negligible  Gallons 
Refuel Threshold  Lower Limit – 30%, Upper Limit – 95%   
Refuel  Rate  At Sea Gallons/Hour 
Replenishment Rate  At Sea  U.S. tons/Hour 




Parameter  Remarks  Units 
Payload  By Weight  U.S. tons 
Fuel Capacity  JP5 – Aircraft and LCAC, F-76 – Negligible  Gallons 
Refuel Threshold  By Range Nautical Miles 
Refuel  Rate  At Seabase Gallons/Hour 
Loading & Unloading Times  Based on Max Payload Hour 
Velocity  Stable at Sea State 5 and below  Miles/Hour 
Distance  to Hub/Satellites  By Sea and Air Nautical Miles 
Availability  70%,  Hrs / day – 16 (ships), 8(a/c)   
Table 4.4.3: Model Parameters for Connectors. 
 Supply types were ranked according to the priority they were needed and each was 
modeled at different frequencies as shown in Table 4.4.4. These priorities were determined based 
on historical surveys done during the Pakistani Earthquake. Appendix D explains how the 
priorities were determined.  
Priority  Supply Type  Frequency  
1  Security (Food, Water, Fuel, ammo)  Daily  
2  Water Treatment Unit  Once  
3  10-Litre Container  Once  
4  Water Bladder Kit  Once 
5  Humanitarian Rations  Daily  
6  Class 4 (Construction Materials)  Once  
7  Water (when WTU is not available)  Daily  
8  Blankets  Once  
9  Plastic Sheeting  Once  
10  Preventive Medicine  Once  
11  Class 8 (Medicine)  Daily  
12  Hygiene Kits  2-Weeks 
13  Class 2 (Clothing/Personal)  Daily  
Table 4.4.4: Demand of supply types 
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Refer to Appendix D for details of the references for the above mentioned input parameters.  
4.5 Experimental Design 
A total of nine physical architectures (PA), as described in Section 3.4, were proposed for 
the purpose of evaluation. These PAs consist of different configurations of vessels and aircrafts 
that would serve as Seabase and connectors, see Table 4.5.1.  A detailed explanation of the how 
these PAs were chosen is described in Appendix C. 
 
Table 4.5.1: Physical Architectures 
4.6 Courses of Action  
 Each of the PAs was put through four courses of actions (COA) in the model in order to 
determine the best configuration of PA and COA. See Table 4.6.1 for COA options. These 
COA‘s provide the ability to model the effectiveness of aid delivery strategy as well as the 








COA Stage 1 Connectors Stage 2 Connectors 
1 Air + Surface + Security NGO 
2 Air + Surface + Security 
3 Surface + Security Air 
4 Surface + Security Air + Security 
Table 4.6.1: Courses of Action Options. 
 COA 1 is the simplest COA because it simply utilizes all connectors to deliver aid to the 
three FLS.  Security is provided at the FLS to enable relief supplies to be effectively distributed. 
Because U.S. Forces are dispersed only to the FLS the amount of available security is evenly 
divided among the three distribution sites.  
 COA 2 is designed to test the Seabase‘s ability to distribute aid directly to both the FLS 
and FLSS. Using the surface connectors to distribute aid directly to the FLS and air connectors to 
deliver aid to the FLSS, the Seabase becomes stressed to the maximum capability. A simplifying 
assumption was made that aid supplies would be effectively organized at the Seabase to ease in 
the distribution of the aid. This assumption enables the model to effectively execute similarly 
among all COA. Further study is necessary to analyze if this capability exists at the Seabase or 
whether it must be further developed.  
 COA 3 and 4 utilize a distribution network to distribute the aid. COA 3 and COA 4 
utilize surface connectors to deliver aid to the FLS and air connectors to deliver aid from the FLS 
to the FLSS. There is an assumption that air assets are required due to the devastated road 
infrastructure. The difference between COA 3 and COA 4 is the amount of security provided at 
the distribution sites. COA 3 provides security only at the FLS while COA 4 provides security at 
the FLS and FLSS. The difference is designed into the COAs in order to determine the effects of 
security on the population. Because security ultimately affects throughput the effectiveness of 
the aid will be measured in Stage 3.  
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4.7 Model Output 
 The measures of effectiveness in this model are linked to the functions in order to 
determine how well the functions are performing. With regards to Stage 1 and Stage 2 the 
following outputs were expected from the modeling and simulation: 
1. Type and amount of Supply delivered to each site every day by category. 
2. Type and amount of Demand at each site every day by category. 
These outputs would substantiate the MOE/MOPs set out initially and provide an input for Stage 
3 modeling. The MOE and MOPs utilized to evaluate the model are listed below in Table 4.7.1.  
 
Table 4.7.1: MOEs and MOPs 
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 These MOEs were derived to measure critical time frames in the model, and are all 
traceable back to the functional hierarchy. The first MOE measures the outcome of the model on 
the last day of the scenario and is essentially throughput. MOE 2 was derived because of the 
demand requirement of security that takes place on day 15 by the MEU which we describe in 
chapter 7 as the fixed demand MOE. MOE 3 measures the effectiveness of throughput to the 
Marines over the course of the scenario.  MOE 4, Effectiveness of Essential Functions, are 
required to analyze once the humanitarian Seabased system is put into place. They are not 
measured in the model and can only be measured in real world implantation. MOE 5 is applied in 
stage 3 only and will not be measured in the Simkit model.  
 In addition to stage 1 and stage 2 model output requirements, stage 3 has additional 
model output requirements. These requirements include the average supply throughput and 
demand requirement for each COA at each FLS and FLSS. These numbers are used as input 
parameters to the STELLA model and explained in Chapter 5 of this report. 
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5. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF STAGE 3 
5.1 Introduction 
 Stage 3 is focused on the combination of non-technical, but fact-based socio-economic 
assessments and assumptions concerning a developing nation-state and the detailed and technical 
calculations of the U.S. Military‘s presumed force structure and lift capability in 2020, as 
described in Stages 1 and 2.  It is in this stage that all information is coupled together via a 
system dynamics model and considered over the duration of an U.S. Military HA/DR mission.  
This system dynamics model enables the development of a technical, measurable, and 
comprehensive systems engineering methodology-based evaluation for, what is in large part, an 
intangible social science problem. 
 The output of Stage 3 enables the research team to gain useful insights into the public‘s 
level of satisfaction as well as the potentially disenfranchised population‘s inclination toward 
engaging in criminal activity as a means to mitigate its own desperation in the post-natural 
disaster environment.  Of particular note, the consideration of the last point–a population‘s 
inclination towards criminal action–was dictated to the research team as a fundamental question 
and point of research and analysis in this study.   
5.2 System Dynamics 
 Many texts and open-source resources are available describing system dynamics.  
According to ISEE Systems, the developer of the STELLA modeling software, system dynamics 
is ―a disciplined way of understanding the dynamic relationships between things so that you can 
make better choices and avoid unintended consequences‖ 
(http://www.iseesystems.com/community/support/FAQs.aspx, n.d). In other words, thinking in 
terms of system dynamics can yield deterministic models that enable the consideration and 
analysis of results based on the interactions of the system‘s multiple inputs simultaneously.  Such 
an analysis can lead to conclusions not easily obtainable from other methods.  
 In essentially all system dynamics models, some form of the model‘s output is fed back 
into the model as another input.   This explicit use of feedback loops as a modeling construct is 
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perhaps the most distinguishing feature of a system dynamics model.  Another distinguishing 
feature is that system dynamics models can usually be represented mathematically as a coupled 
system of ordinary differential equations.  A simple example of a system dynamics model is a 
Lanchester system (Washburn & Kress, 2009).  In these models, the rate of change of one side‘s 
force levels is a known function of the two force levels.  So for two opponents with forces levels 
at time t of x(t) and y(t), the general Lanchester model is (Figure 5.2.1): 
  
Figure 5.2.1: Lanchester Equations 
Assuming initial force levels at time 0 of x(0) and y(0), this set of first-order, ordinary 
differential equations can be solved numerically for x(t) and y(t) for any future time t ≥ 0.  The 
same idea can be applied to the humanitarian assistance scenario considered in Stage 3, where  
a single population is divided into two separate groups—one group representing those 
responding favorably to the humanitarian assistance effort, while the other represents those 
dissatisfied with the operation‘s effectiveness.  
5.3 STELLA Model Overview 
 System dynamics and systems thinking can become technically complex very quickly.   
The STELLA software enables users to graphically develop a complex differential equation 
model, and then numerically solve it.  A description of the STELLA model used in this report,  
appears in Appendix E. 
5.4 Research Direction, Material, and Inputs 
 After deciding on a system dynamics approach to Stage 3 modeling, the critical research 
questions became what factors affect a population‘s opinions about security and well-being, and 
how to model these effects.  The 2011 Human Social Cultural Behavior (HSCB) Focus 
conference provided several leads.  The conference itself offered an interface point for 
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professionals and academics involved with the cutting-edge integration of social science theory 
and analytic methods for operational users.  Members of the research team attended this 
conference so as to gain some practical experience with solving problems of a social science 
nature. 
 The most useful presentation was given by Professor John A. Sokolowski of the Virginia 
Modeling and Simulation Center.  The model was entitled, A Comprehensive HSCB Modeling 
Approach to Stability and Reconstruction Operations. While this model was based on system 
dynamics and systems thinking, there was one key difference:  The model focused exclusively 
on the containment and elimination of an insurgency.  In contrast, Stage 3 is principally 
concerned with the description of the population‘s tendency towards supporting or resisting an 
insurgency based on the success of the humanitarian effort in the immediate aftermath of a 
natural disaster.  The important nugget taken away from this presentation was the idea of 
managing a population by influencing its initial development rather than waiting until a criminal 
element develops and then reacting to it.  In other words, Professor Sokolowski‘s model 
described the effort of stopping a situation before it becomes problem.  The same issue was 
addressed in Stage 3 when  the study‘s stakeholders directed the project‘s focus away from the 
elimination of an insurgency and towards a HA/DR mission dedicated, in part, to discouraging 
the rise of a criminal element. 
 Another important source of input came from the United States State Department via 
Professor Ronald Fricker of the Naval Postgraduate School‘s Operations Research Department.  
After conducting preliminary research into this topic, the SEA team determined that the thoughts 
and opinions of the local populations as the hypothetical victims in this disaster must be 
considered in some fashion.  Further research led the team to Professor Fricker as the keeper of 
previous State Department social surveys conducted in and around coastal Africa.  The survey, 
which was conducted in 2009, was of critical value as it provided the only true insight into the 
population‘s feeling concerning matters of socioeconomic stability and national security albeit 
prior to a cataclysmic natural disaster.  The manner in which the survey data was used will be 
described in greater detail in Section 5.6 of this chapter.         
 While some members of SEA-17A research team were attending the HSCB conference, 
another portion of the team attended a briefing provided by USAID, an organization under the 
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direction of the United States‘ Department of State as described previously in this work.  This 
interaction provided valuable clarification and insight as to how the military and relevant non-
governmental organizations would interact and provide mutual support for the supposed natural 
disaster upon which this project is based.  It was this meeting that provided the research team 
with metrics used in the real world to assess whether adequate goods and services were being 
delivered and made available to the afflicted population to support recovery.  Since these 
delivery metrics were seen to be the general measures of success or failure agreed upon by those 
usually involved in the business, the goods and services they consider were subsequently 
employed as the primary inputs the group selected for inclusion into the system dynamics model.               
 Since the rendering of medical care was assumed to fall under the exclusive authority of 
entrenched non-governmental organizations, the only remaining untapped functionality the 
military maintains in this scenario is its ability to provide forces to bolster that of the host nation 
to enhance security and policing efforts.  With that said, the security of the people—and the 
associated non-governmental organizations to a general extent—was therefore additionally 
assumed to fall under the sole jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.  Quantifying the 
security needs of a given population over time is incredibly difficult.  After a brief 
correspondence with Professors Kalev Sepp and Hy Rothstein, both faculty members of the 
Naval Postgraduate School‘s Department of Defense Analysis, the research team was able to 
identify some useful information on the subject.  According sources associated with the United 
States Army professional writing archive and the RAND Corporation, the state-of-the-art in 
assessing troop requirements involved in a counterinsurgency should be based not on the 
suspected number of insurgents, but rather on the estimated local population.  The relevance of 
this information would be described further in the following section (Goode, 2010; Quinlivan, 
1995). 
5.5  Goods and Services 
 The principal resources as described in Stages 1, 2, and  in the previous section of this 
chapter include food, potable water, basic shelter construction materials, as well as a 
miscellaneous category called Other.  This category encompasses all remaining useful, but less 
critical materials including medical supplies, fuel, and other items as noted in previous chapters.  
Since medical supplies are of great importance but would not be employed or administered by 
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Defense Department personnel, the medical supply relevance to the military‘s mission was 
considered to be of a third-order concern.  Consequently, this organization and breakdown of 
commodities seemed most appropriate based on the goals of this project.   
Based on USAID‘s Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response, the 
minimum required food for an individual person in a post-disaster scenario is defined to be 2,100 
calories per day.  With respect to potable water, the average person requires 15 liters daily.  The 
shelter requirement is also explicitly given as 3.5 square meters per person per day.  While these 
numbers changed little, they required some adjustment as noted in earlier chapters as, in the case 
of water for example, 15 liters may be required for drinking, but additional potable water would 
be required for additional purposes including laundry services and food preparation.  The final 
tallies were calculated in the previous stages and the results were provided in terms of tons of 
supplies per person per day as illustrated in Table 5.5.1.  From this list, similar resources such as 
potable water and water treatment units (WTUs) were condensed again to further refine the 
categories so as to derive the grand total delivery requirements for each commodity in total tons 
per person per day.  Each resource, provided in these established quantities, was considered to be 
of equal utility for the purposes of the population.  Since medical care is assumed to fall under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of non-governmental organizations, it follows that the security of the 
people and including those organizations to a general extent is assumed to fall under the sole 




Table 5.5.1: Resource Needs in Tons / Person / Day 
 Unlike tangible commodities such as food and water, quantifying the security needs of a 
given population over time is incredibly difficult.  As noted in the conclusion of the previous 
section, the current practice dictates that troop deployments are based on the attainment of a 
desired ratio between available forces and local population.  This deployment ratio and troop 
utilization rationale is grounded in the conflict intensity level surrounding an active 
counterinsurgency operation, which presented an interesting problem.  Stakeholder inputs 
dictated that a 60-day gestation window for either the development or defeat of a capable 
terrorist cell was highly impractical.  Subsequently, for the purposes of this project, the threat of 
terrorism was dismissed in favor of a rising disenfranchised and organic criminal element made 
up of the afflicted local population.  Technically the threat shifted somewhat, potentially 
eliminating the research material‘s utility.  However, the research obtained on this topic further 
demonstrates that while this strategy is based on force levels in support of a counterinsurgency, 
the ratio between deployed forces and local populations is not fixed and has been used to 
determine required force levels for police as well, which makes the use of this particular 
approach perfectly valid (McGrath, 2006).  Subsequently, the ratio of forces required only to 
perform security functions for local populations can simply be rescaled based on historical 
deployment data involving similar missions, risks, circumstances and coupling that information 
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with the perceived threats and risks in the current operating area in question (Goode, 2009).  
Ultimately, the research team decided to adopt a ratio of 160 soldiers per 1,000 citizens as the 
security requirement based on the Russian military‘s force concentration during their operations 
in Chechnya in 2003 (Goode, 2009).  This security ratio requirement was selected because of its 
recent and historical authenticity, and also because it better stresses the ARG‘s ability to provide 
security ashore.   
5.6 Population, Criminality, and Insurgency 
 While the overarching goal of Stage 3 is to describe the population‘s reception of and 
reaction to military-delivered humanitarian aid over a 60-day disaster relief window, there are 
some implied and assumed understandings about the population‘s dynamics.  Since these 
assumptions detail how the population as individuals transition between being satisfied or 
dissatisfied with the effort, the particulars must be thoroughly discussed. 
 As noted in Section 5.4, the population‘s initial distribution is important and cannot be 
generated out of fantasy.  The reason for this is that the transition of individuals‘ opinions takes 
time.  If the population‘s opinions are based on pure guesswork, the time required to reach some 
potential greater rate of satisfaction could be badly skewed, which would render the 
unsubstantiated output as totally useless.  To solve this problem, the research team utilized the 
aforementioned State Department survey data, which explicitly made inquiries into the public‘s 
current (as of 2009) satisfaction with socioeconomic and humanitarian issues such as food cost 
and availability, current security concerns, water availability, cost and maintenance of living 
space, and so on.  After those surveyed responded with their greatest concerns, the survey 
repeated the same inquiry to gain further insight into potential second-order concerns or issues.   
Originally, it was thought that this data could be used to identify a priority for resource 
consumption, which would enable the development of a mathematical ranking system.  This 
system would be used to better describe the population‘s satisfaction based on the rank and 
availability of each type of resource.  This idea was however later dismissed since the data was 
collected and based on normal day-to-day social function and not on the population‘s 
hypothesized problems resulting in a post-disaster scenario.  Concerning simple survival from a 
logical standpoint, in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster, people polled would likely 
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prefer access to potable water as opposed to being able to maintain a strong basis of 
manufacturing or enhance the tourism industry.  The later options are clear not of first-order 
priority if people are starving.  Unfortunately for the purposes of this study, since the supposed 
disaster has not occurred, most people, with water readily available, were eager to note that the 
lack of jobs and an a sense of economic stability were of more critical concern to them.  Seeing 
that the data would not be of much use describing anything in the post-disaster scenario, this data 
was instead complied and normalized to provide a research-based assessment of how the 
population would be distributed prior to any disaster.  While the survey still represents input 
based on incomplete information, this method of determining the initial population‘s distribution 
heavily mitigated the error that would have been involved by merely guessing.  
 Of the answers made available to the population, the research team separated all people 
responding to problems directly related to the cost or availability of the commodities which 
military forces are charged with delivering in this scenario.  The rationale was that the 
population‘s satisfaction with regard to the supporting military forces should be based only on 
the forces‘ success concerning the delivery rate of the commodities necessary for a humanitarian 
assistance mission.  In other words, the military‘s rate of food, water, shelter, and other resource 
delivery could impact the population‘s outlook on the humanitarian assistance effort, while the 
military‘s management of host nation governmental corruption, its ability to enhancing tourism 
and trade should,  in this case, not be considered relevant.  When all responses were broken out, 
those voicing a first or second order concern for of the military‘s focus items were combined into 
one group and all others were combined into another.  Each group total was then divided by the 
total number of people polled.  The resulting percentages, 64.5% and 35.5% dictated the initial 
distribution percentage of satisfied and dissatisfied people, respectively, in immediate vicinity of 
each forward logistic site and logistic satellite site.  Of note, the number of people could 
potentially be different from site to site in the STELLA model as directed in Stages 1 and 2.  
 The next issue already eluded to was the shift away from a proposed active prosecution 
of an insurgency in favor of managing the development of a criminal element.  Since the demand 
for limited materials is based not on luxury, but on survival in a post-disaster scenario, the 
possibility of a resource black market coming into being is not unimaginable.  If goods bound for 
remote population centers are intercepted, there are two effects:  First, the law-abiding 
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population will become restless if they do not receive support because their very survival is on 
the line.  Second, if criminal elements were to reliably prosper in this racketeering operation 
without fear of legal retribution, any incentive to remain honest and await humanitarian service 
and support is lost.  This possibility is described in the model by taking the current number of 
legally imprisoned personnel from research obtained and using that value as the input to a 
separate stock representing a criminal population.  The assumption was made that the percentage 
of people engaged in criminal activity prior to the natural disaster would remain constant (Roy, 
2010).  This percentage will be coupled with the disenfranchised population stock as a separate 
flow and used as the input parameter to the criminal stock.  The criminal stock‘s feedback loop is 
connected to all of the commodities other than security since the theft of security was deemed to 
be completely illogical, and because the treatment of security components as an additional 
commodity was avoided as noted in the previous section.  This technical construction represents 
the criminal‘s ability to intercept goods prior to their delivery, which will complicate what 
should be a straight trend concerning the population‘s toward satisfaction.  Those lost to the 
satisfied stock will, as a result, fuel the dissatisfied stock and subsequently the criminal stock as 
well.  The criminal element‘s sale of contraband is not considered in this model. Instead, their 
consumption is based on their own needs and requirements as individuals.  
5.7  Model Construction and Employment Methodology 
 The STELLA model developed and used for output in Stage 3 is a complex, 
comprehensive, and research-based product that includes discussion points from all preceding 
sections in this chapter.  With that stated, and respect paid to the information and explanations 
already provided, the remaining discussion concerning the methodology employed in the 
construction of this model is straightforward. 
 In the simplest sense, this model takes rates of resource delivery in tons per day (as 
calculated in Stage 1 and 2) and uses those delivery rates as the principal input in satisfying the 
population‘s demand for resources.  If there is a surplus of a desired commodity then satisfaction 
would increase.  Conversely, if there is a deficit between what is needed and what was delivered, 
satisfaction would decrease. 
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 The STELLA model used in Stage 3 is a compilation of several identical sub-models.  
Much like Stages 1 and 2, the landscape for the Stage 3 effort is divided into separate forward 
logistical sites and/or forward logistical satellite sites to accurately reflect the rate data collected 
in the previous stages.  Building a system dynamics model that utilizes different delivery 
architectures would render the Stage 1 and 2 outputs as useless.  Thus, the same architecture and 
the specific data representing delivery rates obtained from each associated COA run in Stages 1 
and 2 is used as the initial Stage 3 model input.  From those rates, a site-specific satisfaction flux 
is generated for each sub-population.  These resulting population flows are representative of 
public sentiment in the immediate vicinity of the logistical sites and satellite sites, respectively, 
and can be interpreted as the increase or decrease in public satisfaction with the military‘s 
humanitarian assistance mission.  As noted earlier, these fluxes drive the flow of people between 
satisfied and dissatisfied, which also impact the growth of the criminal stocks.  Those revised 
population stocks are then used as the principal feedback inputs and therefore influence the 
output of the model over time.  Figure 5.7.1 represents the architecture associated with just one 
commodity.  In this case, it is the food delivery and consumption of a generic FLSS: 
 
Figure 5.7.1: Example STELLA Model Commodity Graphic 
The food-specific satisfaction or dissatisfaction values are coupled together with the resulting 
values of the other site‘s commodities.  A wider and more comprehensive view of the complete 
FLS architecture is illustrated in Figure 5.7.2, along with the architecture supporting population 




Figure 5.7.2: Example FLSS STELLA Model Graphic 
 As in all quantitative models, careful attention must be paid to the units used.  As an 
example, the foodstuff delivery rate is specified in  calories delivered per day, as opposed to 
some other unit of substance per a given time period.  Since each commodity can be broken 
down into a need per person, each commodity can subsequently be normalized and compared 
evenly to one another.  For example, according to USAID, an individual in a post-disaster 
scenario requires 2,100 calories of energy from food sustenance per day.  USAID further 
recommends a disaster survivor should have access to 15 liters of potable water per day as well.   
Therefore, a member of this affected society is equally satisfied when they receive 2,100 calories 
of energy from food or they receive 15 liters of potable water.  Though the units of food and 
water differ just as their required daily quantities, each commodity‘s minimum threshold can be 
identified and its required quantity per person per day can be converted into tons.  This 
normalization method allows the delivery and consumption of various commodities to be 
described together as units of satisfaction, which is the most basic and fundamental unit involved 
78 
 
in this system.  As previously noted, each commodity is listed by type and quantity in Table 
5.5.1 of this chapter. 
 Normalized units of satisfaction (minimum threshold supplies of each commodity as 
determined through the group‘s research) enable the free flow of satisfied and dissatisfied 
personnel between each respective flavor of associated stocks in the model.  Specifically, this is 
mathematically done by summing the total rates of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, multiplying 
those values by the dissatisfied and satisfied population stocks, respectively (so as to ensure the 
appropriate flow of newly satisfied people leaving the dissatisfied population stock, and vice 
versa), and then dividing each of those values by the total population to normalize the results in 
the associated convertor blocks.  Graphically, these convertors are located immediately above 
and below each site and satellite site‘s population stocks and are coupled with each population 
stock‘s outflows via an action connector.  Because this conversion takes place at each forward 
logistical site and logistical satellite site, the output of each locale can be simply described in 
units of satisfaction.  The results of each sub site can therefore be added or subtracted together at 
each hub or FLS to reflect the population‘s psychological standing with respect to the 
humanitarian assistance mission.  These responses are aggregated to form an overall population 
distribution between satisfied, dissatisfied, and criminal stocks.  In STELLA, the Euler method 
was selected by default to integrate the changes at intervals of 0.25 days.  In other words, the 
value of each stock and the quantity of supplies delivered and services rendered is recalculated 
four times per day throughout the 60-day run time, or 240 times throughout the course of the 
model run. 
 The overall STELLA model architecture, as depicted in Figure 5.7.2, lists each satellite 
site and corresponding forward logistical site.  An expanded view is located in Appendix E.  The 
rates of delivery of each commodity as well as each location‘s particular population were 
manually entered into the model.  As the model runs, the site-specific levels of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction are continuously recalculated and summed together with other associated sites‘ 
values to formulate a complete sense of population flux between satisfaction and dissatisfaction 
throughout each forward logistical site and their subordinate satellites first before summing those 
final three values together to determine the ultimate flow throughout the area of operation.  This 
architecture is unique because each location is able to receive goods, distribute them, allow for 
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independent population flux, and even grow and police their own criminal elements without 
affecting any other site until the results are added together echelon by echelon.  Subsequently, it 
is possible for one site to prosper while another falters.  Such an eventuality is of interest because 
follow-on analysis as to what made one site successful or another site unsuccessful is possible.  
Before and sometimes during the model runs, any one of the 12 site specific, 528 physical 
architecture specific, or over 6,300 variables organic to the six total courses of action can be 
assessed, changed, or constantly manipulated to better analyze and determine how one or several 




Figure 5.7.2: Complete STELLA Node Architecture 
5.8 Output Description  
 The STELLA model‘s output for each PA and COA was based on Stage 3‘s overriding 
measure of effectiveness:  The number of satisfied people at the conclusion of the military‘s 60- 
day humanitarian assistance mission.  In addition to the final populations in each satisfied, 
dissatisfied, and criminal stock, the subsequent population‘s trend in growth or decline was also 
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considered.  The complete results and supporting analysis of the Stage 3 output will be described 
in Chapter 7 of this work.   
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6. COMMAND & CONTROL 
6.1 Background 
In the FHA/DR mission to Country Orange, a command and control system is required to 
coordinate the relief efforts among the USF and other non-government organizations from 
various countries. The humanitarian assistance efforts involve the movement of aid supplies 
from the offshore Seabase to the Forward Logistic Sites (FLS) and from the Forward Logistic 
Sites to the Forward Logistic Satellite Sites (FLSS) for distribution inland. The coordination and 
collaboration efforts between various organizations require a communications network with good 
command and control capabilities.  The team, therefore, proposes a Command & Control System 
(C2S) to enable effective collaboration between the agencies to support the FHA/DR mission in 
the distribution of aid to from the FLS and FLSS. 
6.2 Problem Definition 
It is critical that government and non-government organizations are able to collaborate in 
an effective manner. However, this task is made difficult by the different systems and protocols 
of the various organizations involved in the mission.  The harsh environment where the mission 
is carried out makes the collaboration effort even more difficult.   Support infrastructures may be 
destroyed in the disaster, and relief efforts will have to rely on systems that can be quickly 
deployed and setup in an ad-hoc manner.  The situation will reasonably require a command and 
control system that is flexible enough to be used in different scenarios and can be deployed in 
minimal time.  The objective of this study is to propose an effective and robust Command and 
Control (C2) architecture to enable collaboration between the different agencies and to allow 
effective synergy between them. The architecture shall be versatile enough to allow additional 
organizations to make use of the system and must allow the system to be quickly deployed into 
the field with minimal supporting infrastructure required. The C2 system will serve as a platform 
for the sharing of information and intelligence among the different agencies. 
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6.2.1 Principal Considerations 
In the design of the C2 architecture for supporting the FHA/DR mission, several key 
considerations were noted in order to propose an effective system to provide command and 
control (C2) operations for both the government and non-government organizations. 
Reliable communications are critical for any C2 operations and this is especially 
important when operating in the hostile environment of the FHA/DR mission. Without reliable 
communication channels, the C2 system will not be able to operate in an effective manner to 
support the operations of the relief teams on the ground. Besides securing the system from a 
technical point of view, the physical security of the communication channels‘ access points and 
command posts is also crucial for the reliability of the system. 
The availability of the services provided by the C2 system and the integrity of the data of 
the system are important in order to facilitate effective coordination and collaboration among the 
various organizations. The functions of the system must be available when required and the data 
has to be accurate; otherwise, the relief mission will be put into jeopardy, and the relief teams 
will be in danger. 
Another key consideration is the security awareness of the users and the training provided 
to them. As the FHA/DR operation requires the users to be operationally ready on short notice, 
the system must be simple to setup and the users must be able to operate the system with 
minimal training.  Appropriate security awareness programs must be taught to the users for them 
to be aware of the threats to the system that could possibly jeopardize the mission. 
The final objective is to perform a threat risk assessment on the proposed design, using 
the Risk Management Methodology detailed in the Risk Management Guide for Information 
Technology Systems (Stoneburner, 2002).  This will help to ensure the integrity and availability 
of information and services that are critical to support the FHA/DR operation. 
6.2.2 Design Approach 
The C2S architecture is guided by the Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
(DoDAF) as the reference model due to the scale of the system and the complex integration and 
interoperability challenges involved.  Accordingly a comprehensive framework was developed 
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and described with an operations view, systems view and technical standards view (U.S. 
Department of Defense, Chief Information Officer, 2009). 
In the technical solution for the proposed C2 architecture, different concepts for 
transmission of voice and data were explored. Due the distance between the Seabase and the 
Forward Logistic Site (FLS) as well as the distance between the FLS and its Forward Logistic 
Satellite Sites (FLSS), the proposed solution will make use of long range wireless 
communication technologies such as satellite communication (SATCOM) and high frequency 
(HF) radio communication. Intermediate FLSS can act as a relay station for FLSS that are 
beyond the range of the FLS. Due to the limited bandwidth, voice communications will be used 




Figure 6.2.1: Communications Requirement 
  
Combat net radio (Figure 6.2.2) is proposed as the communications means for voice 
communication due to its long range and secure transmission channel 
(http://www.thalesgroup.com/Pages/PressRelease.aspx?id=6558, n.d.) .  The man-pack or vehicle-
mounted sets can be rapidly deployed and are proven to be effective in adverse conditions. 
Military personnel are familiar with its operations and can quickly assist the non-government 




Figure 6.2.2: Combat Net Radio 
The data communication links consist of 2 components – the backhaul component from 
the Seabase to the FLS and the edge networks from the FLS to the FLSS. Satellite 
communication is a suitable option for the backhaul network as it provides point-to-point 
capability. However, this point-to-point capability makes satellite communication unsuitable for 
use in the edge network as it does not scale to multiple users in a disaster relief mission.  
WiMax (World-wide Interoperability for Microwave Access) is proposed as an 
appropriate technology for the setting up of the access point in the FLS. With up to a maximum 
range of 31 miles (50 kilometers), WiMax is a suitable technology to be used for data 
communications between the FLS and FLSSs. The technology was used during the disaster relief 
efforts for Hurricane Katrina and the tsunami disaster in Aceh, Indonesia, and is proven effective 
for rapid deployment to provide broadband access (Steckler, 2005).  
6.3 SYSTEM CHARACTERIZATION 
6.3.1 Concept of Operations 
C2S is designed to facilitate command & control, as well as to support the 
dissemination and exchange of information between the Seabase, FLS, and FLSS as 
depicted in Figure 6.3.1. Due to the nature of the operating environment and lack of 
physical infrastructure support, wireless communications will be primarily adopted to 
link up and connect the various deployment sites and users. The C2 system will operate 




 Wired Mode. Users from the Seabase will login to the C2S via wired terminals on the 
ships. The connected environment allows maximum data throughput to support real-
time information exchange and timely flow of status updates (e.g. situation updates, 
forces deployment, supply status, etc.). 
 
 Wireless Mode. These users are mainly the mobile ground forces who are deployed 
island-wide at various FLS and FLSS that are physically less secured. They will be 
issued with portable deployment kits (Donahoo, 2005) that include laptops, portable 
VSAT system, WiMAX Antenna, backup battery, satellite phones, WiFi VoIP phones 
handsets and FRS Radios. These will allow NGOs to connect wirelessly to data 
access points located at the satellite distribution locations to upload or download the 
necessary situation information, requests and updates from the back-end servers in the 
FLS for offline transaction and subsequently synchronize the updated information 
back to their respective FLS. One of the FLS will be configured as the Mobile 
Command Post to consolidate information from the other FLSs before sending 
periodic updates to the Seabase. 
 
 
Figure 6.3.1: Architecture View (Operations) 
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6.3.2 Overview of Command & Control System (C2S) Functions 
Table 6.3.1 below shows the list of main C2 functions identified to support the Stage 2 
operational requirements at the various levels. 
 
Level Identified Main C2 Functions 
Seabase - Consolidation and monitoring of FLS supply and manpower 
status 
- Approval and management of replenishment and other 
support requests 
- Redistribution of supplies within FLS  
- Dissemination of information and updates 
FLS - Consolidation, updating and monitoring of FLSS supply 
status 
- Request for replenishment to FLS Command HQ 
- Redistribution of supplies within FLSS 
- Consolidated manpower status updates to FLS Command HQ 
- Other support requests (e.g. Transport, Medical) 
- Dissemination of information and updates 
FLSS - Monitoring and updating of FLSS supply status 
- Request for replenishment to FLS 
- General manpower status updates to FLS 
- Other support requests (e.g. Transport, Medical) 
- Dissemination of information and updates 
Table 6.3.1: Main C2 Functions 
Using the identified C2 functions as inputs, the system view of the C2S architecture is 
represented in Figure 6.3.2. The C2S is modularized to receive inputs from ground units, allow 
different users to perform different functions, perform analysis, monitoring, as well as to 





Figure 6.3.2: Architecture View (System) 
C2S Module Function 
Information 
Source 
The information source comprises data feed gathered from 
various user inputs. All the information gathered from various 
sites will be fused and optimized before processing. 
Data 
Management 
Meta-data will be appended to make data more readily searchable 
and understandable. An intelligent search engine will then allow 
the existing databases of all the C2S to be properly indexed to 
allow more efficient and effective searches. Data fusion will be 
applied on relevant data to create new knowledge. Information 
can either be pushed to or pulled from the end-users after 
matching the user's interest through keyword search. 
Monitoring This module comprises GIS engine and tools that provide the 
situational picture. All spatial data can be integrated and 
referenced using a common grid while non-spatial data can also 
be easily linked. Relevant information can be classified into 
layers and the appropriate security access can be applied based 
on users' requirements. 
Analysis This module processes and analyzes the data consolidated and 
sends the results to the decision support module. 
Decision 
Support 
This module facilitates the user in making operational decisions 
by recommending suitable courses of action based on results 
gathered from the analysis module. 
Collaboration This module facilitates user interaction and sharing through video 
conferencing and chat functions. 
Dissemination This module provides information dissemination to various levels 
and users. 
User C3 Applications developed to facilitate user data entry and viewing 
of information and status updates. 
Table 6.3.2: C2S Modules 
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6.3.3 Information Exchanges 
Figure 6.3.3 shows the Use Case Diagram and Application Access Profile for the C2S. 
 
Figure 6.3.3: Use Case Diagram and Application Access Profile 
6.4 System Technologies 
6.4.1 Communications (Data) 
Figure 6.4.1 shows the proposed network infrastructure using suitable communication 
technologies to link up the various sites. Various communication technologies were selected in 
consideration of the lack of physical supporting infrastructure after a disaster, surrounding 
terrain, data throughput requirements and distance constraints between the various sites. 
SATCOM provides long haul connectivity back between the Seabase and the FLS while use of 
801.11 (WiFi) and 801.16 (WiMax) technologies provides adequate bandwidth support and 
facilitates rapid deployment between the FLSs and FLSSs. This concept is similar to what has 






Figure 6.4.1: Data Communications Infrastructure 
6.4.2 Communications (Voice) 
Voice communications will be primarily based on the DoD‘s combat net radios for 
communications within the DoD forces and satellite phones for communications between the 
DoD forces and the Non-Government Organizations due to security reasons and lack of 
supporting infrastructure at the disaster sites. VOIP technologies that make use of the data 
communications are proposed as secondary means due to the limited bandwidth available.  
6.4.3 Collaboration 
Collaboration between the various users could be achieved using Microsoft Sharepoint 
Workspace that supports offline access, automatic synchronisation of latest documents as well as 
bandwidth usage optimization.  
6.4.4 Geographical Information Systems (GIS) 
GIS provides users (especially Command HQs) with a visual representation of the current 




6.4.5 C2S Technologies 
The different types of hardware and software deployed for C2S will be based on 
Commercial-of-the-Shelf (COTS) products for ease of deployment and configuration. These are 
depicted in Figure 6.4.2. 
 
Figure 6.4.2: Architecture View (Technology Standards) 
6.5 Measures of Effectiveness/Performance 
MOP 
1.1 




Percentage of stable connection between Distribution Hubs and Satellite 
Distribution Centre in 28 days 
MOP 
1.3 
Percentage of Internal connection within each Distribution Hubs and Satellite 
Distribution Centre in 28 days 
MOP 
1.4 
Percentage of IOs and NGOs in theatre subscribed to the service in 28 days 







Percentage of days that network is available after full system deployment 
MOP 
2.2 




Percentage of successful status reports submission and consolidation vs. failed 
submission and consolidation 
MOP 
2.4 




Percentage of successful deterrence of attacks on the system 
Table 6.5.2: MOE 2: Measure of System Stability and Security Robustness 
6.6 Assumptions 
The assumptions on the deployment of the system are as listed: 
6.6.1 Environmental Assumptions 
 Stable power source for basic equipment is available. 
 Interferences / masking caused by terrain or weather are kept to minimum. 
 Satellite communications subscriptions for the Seabase are in place. 
6.6.2 Technological Assumptions 
 There will be minimum integration issues among various systems types, since 
portable deployment kits will be issued to NGOs. 
 Antennas deployed outdoors are weather proofed. 
6.6.3 Threats Assumptions 
 Potential enemy on the ground are not IT-savvy. 
 There will not be state and large extremists group-sponsored activities. 
6.6.4 Assumptions on Administrative Procedures and Policies 
 All the ground equipment can be deployed legally for the mission. 
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 All users are able to communicate in the English language, all systems configurations 
and menu will be coded in English. 
 All users are required to undergo one hour of training on use of equipment and 
network. 
 Security measures are implemented based on risk rating prioritization (i.e. only 
controls for high and medium risk threats are implemented). 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
The humanitarian aid operation is a complex process that involves many different 
organizations both Government Organizations from various countries, IGOs and also the NGOs. 
The proposed system is intended to serve as a key enabler to facilitate a well coordinated and 
effective operation among all the various agencies.  The objective is to instill an efficient 
collaboration process and allow a minimum level of secure communication between all the 
various organizations situated at geographically separated locations. 
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7.  DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF MODELING 
7.1 Overview 
 This chapter presents the results of the team‘s modeling efforts including both the 
Seabase model and the STELLA Model.  The Seabase model specifically sought to allow for a 
better understanding of Seabasing and specific platform capabilities within the Humanitarian 
Assistance/ Disaster Relief mission area.  The STELLA (systems dynamics) model was designed 
to better understand the interdependencies, relationships, and effects of relief efforts on the 
affected population.  This chapter is split into two sections: analysis of Seabase model and 
analysis of the STELLA model.   
7.2 Seabase Model Analysis 
 Initially, the model output in its raw form was a group of 1,080 excel spreadsheets with 
combined total of over 11 million cells of data.  The spreadsheets contained Simkit discrete event 
simulation output data generated as follows: first the model simulated four specified courses of 
action (COAs); second, within each CAO nine separate physical architectures (PAs) were 
examined; and third, there were then 30 separate stochastic replications within each PA to allow 
examination of variability. As stated in Chapter 4, the variability was generated in the model by 
the following random factors: maintenance times, refueling times, loading and unloading times, 
and travel times.  
 The data were split into categories based on the team‘s previously defined measures of 
effectiveness.  The first MOE, Throughput (MOE 1 from Table 4.7.2), measured the amount of 
good and services transferred during the 60 day period.  The total throughput encompassed five 
categories: security throughput, HDR, water and water producing equipment, shelter, and 
miscellaneous.  For each of these categories, the percentage of delivered goods over the amount 
of goods demanded was the calculated. The second MOE, Fixed Demand (MOE 2 from Table 
4.7.2), measured the number of days required to deliver the fixed good items. Fixed demand 
items are items that only have to be delivered one time.  The MOE was designed to test a PA‘s 
time to reach a stable state given a specified COA. These MOEs and MOPs are linked to their 
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perspective functions as shown in Appendix C.11. Finally, the daily throughput of individual 
platforms was examined.  
7.2.1 Comparison of PAs and COAs  
 Before conducting a complete PA analysis, a preliminary proof of concept was done to 
ensure that the introduction of the T-Craft (and the introduction of risk associated with a new 
acquisition program) seemed reasonable.  Preliminary throughput examination indicated the T-
Craft was bringing a large portion of the overall cargo across all COAs and PAs.  These results 
indicated the T-Craft might increase the performance of the over all PAs.  
Figures 7.2.1 thru 7.2.8 shown below were created to examine how the introduction of 
the T-Craft changed the behavior of the architecture as a whole.  Of specific interest is the  
difference between COA 2 and the remaining COAs. This is part because the T-Craft cannot 
deliver items to the FLSS and is therefore limited to delivering items to the FLS. The distribution 
strategies of COA 1, 3 and 4 exploit the T-Craft‘s large cargo capacity and fast speed, and result 
in the T-Craft delivering a large volume of goods. Because the LHD platform has the most 























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7.2.8: COA 4 Physical Architecture (5-9) Proportions 
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 A quick comparison of COA‘s was conducted to compare which COA‘s distribution 
system performed the best using all nine PAs.  This analysis provides insight to the Task Force 
Commander on the relative effectiveness of each COA‘s distribution system across multiple 
measures of effectiveness. While the ultimate goal is not to choose a COA this analysis 
demonstrates that not all COAs are equal across all MOEs.  
  As stated in Chapter 4, the COA 1 distribution system delivers aid only to the FLS.  
COA 2 utilizes the Seabase as the central distribution point and delivers aid to the FLS and FLSS 
directly with no intermediate stops. COA 3 and 4 use the same network distribution system with 
aid being delivered to the FLS first before proceeding to the FLSS.  The ultimate choice of which 
COA to use would be made by the Task Force commander.  
 This comparison was first conducted by averaging across the nine PAs.   To compare the 
COAs, the COA averages and 95% confidence intervals were computed for each MOE and 
MOP.  The results of MOE (Throughput, Fixed Demand) and MOP (Security Throughput) are 


























Interval Plot Across COA (Throughput Analysis)
95% CI for the Mean
 
































95% CI for the Mean
Interval Plot Across All COA (Fixed Demand Analysis)
 



























95% CI for the Mean
Interval Plot Across All COA (Security Throughput)
 
Figure 7.2.11: COA Security Throughput Comparison 
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 These figures give insight into each COA, independent of which PA is chosen.  The take-
away from this depends on which MOE you are observing. Throughput analysis shows that COA 
2 has the least variability in the mean results. This is because of the implementation strategy of 
COA 2 has the connectors traveling a large distance. The result is a slightly smaller amount of 
goods delivered but far more consistent results.  Fixed demand analysis shows that COA 1 and 2 
perform significantly better than COA 3 and 4 due to the network distribution system in COA 3 
and 4. The network distribution system allows fixed goods to be delivered to the FLS but await 
transport to the FLSS based on their priority. Because there are fewer air connectors than FLSS, 
the items can wait at the FLS until the higher priority items are delivered.   Security analysis 
shows that the four COAs are essentially equivalent. This is because of the high priority placed 
on security items results in these items being delivered first. There is very little wait time on 
security items.  
 A similar comparison analysis was done for the PAs‘ performance averaged across all the 
COAs.   For each PA, mean MOE and MOP values with 95% confidence intervals were 


























Interval Plot of Physical Architecture (Throughput Analysis)
95% CI for the Mean
 






























95% CI for the Mean
Interval Plot of Average of Physical Architectures (Fixed Demand Analysis)
 



















95% CI for the Mean
Interval Plot of Average of Physical Architecures (Security Analysis)
 




 The take away from these figures are that the PAs on average have essentually the same 
performance.  A further discussion of each of the PAs performance is outlined in the next 
section.  
7.2.2 Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 
 The two MOEs for the SeaBase model are Throughput and Fixed Demand MOEs.  The 
Throughput MOE is measured as a percentage of throughput at 60 days, while the Fixed Demand 
MOE is measures as by number of Days to deliver Fixed Demand items. The Security 
Throughput MOP is measured as a percentage of security items delivered at 60 day. This 
analysis was conducted because security had the highest priority. Because the Seabase model 
prioritized categories of goods the percentage of a specific category would be impacted by their 
priority.  The analysis evaluating these two MOEs and one MOP is shown below.  
7.2.2.1 Throughput Analysis 
  The throughput MOE is concerned with determining the COA and PA that allows 
for the greatest average throughput, as originally discussed in Section 4.7. Throughput includes 
both the fixed and daily demands of the population. It also included the security throughput.  It is 
important to note that the demands are all defined based on the population.  Therefore, it does 
not necessarily mean that a PA with the greater number of platforms would perform the best. 
With respect to the Throughput MOE, excess capacity does not improve performance. However 
this excess capacity is taken into consideration in the STELLA Model and is explained in 
Section 7.3 of this chapter.  Also, mean Throughput MOE values with 95% confidence intervals 
were computed for each COA and PA.  
  The mean COA 1 results showed considerable variability across the PAs.  A 
paired T-Test was conducted to determine if these differences across the  PAs were statistically 
significant.  Figure 7.2.15 below shows that some of the 95% confidence intervals do not 
overlap, indicating a statistical difference between the PAs.  Clearly, PAs 2 and 3 perform 
significantly worse than PAs 1, 5, 6, 8 and 9.  Because of the differences in surface connectors as 





























Throughput Analysis COA 1
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 7.2.15: COA 1 Throughput Analysis 
  COA 2 results for throughput consistently showed no significant difference 
between architectures. This is due to the distribution strategy employed in COA 2. Because all 
supplies are delivered directly to the FLSS and FLS, and surface connectors cannot reach the 
FLSS, there is an over reliance on aircraft for delivery and the aircraft are constant throughout all 
PAs. As seen in Figure 7.2.28, there are two extreme outliers for PA 5 throughput. This could be 
contributed to numerous factors, possibly a failure in the simulation. Further analysis is 












Throughput Analysis COA 2
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 7.2.16: COA 2 Throughput Analysis 
  COAs 3 and 4 throughput analyses showed a wide range of throughput values. 






























Throughput Analysis COA 3
95% CI for the Mean
 



























Throughput Analysis COA 4
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 7.2.18: COA 4 Throughput Analysis 
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7.2.2.2 Fixed Demand Analysis 
The fixed demand category addresses the delivery of goods which were not daily 
needs of the population but instead had one specified delivery date.  For example, it was desired 
to have the water treatment units delivered by day 15.  Of particular interest in this category was 
the number of days required to fulfill the fixed demands.  
The following figures contain interval plots for the mean delivery times with 95% 
confidence intervals. They are based on the 30 stochastic runs for each PA. 
The results from COA 1 show that PAs 2, 3 and 4 may be of particular interest 
and warrant further investigation. It is important to note that PAs 1, 5,6,7,8 and 9 are roughly 
equivalent.  Additionally the variance in PAs 5 through 9 is a result of the T-Craft. Variance is 
introduced in the model through availability, load time, refueling time and travel time. Therefore 




















COA 1 Fixed Demand Delivery
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 7.2.19: COA 1 Fixed Demand Analysis 
The results from COA 2 exhibited the least amount of variability.  In addition, 
CIA 2 consistently achieved deliveries more quickly than other COAs. Initially, it seems that 
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COA 2 would be a logical recommendation, although that will be discussed later in the paper.  




















COA 2 Fixed Demand Delivery
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 7.1.20: COA 2 Fixed Demand Analysis 
COA 3 and 4 results show significant differences in completion of the fixed 
demands with statistically similar results for a large number of the PAs. In both COAs the 
primary difference from COA 2 was that air connectors were not available to move goods from 
the Seabase to the FLS, only from the FLS to FLSS.  Further analysis is required to explain the 
differences results of the PAs. Figure 7.2.21 and 7.2.22 show the graphical representation of the 





















COA 3 Fixed Demand Delivery
95% CI for the Mean
 



















COA 4 Fixed Demand Delivery
95% CI for the Mean
 




7.2.2.3 Security Analysis 
  The security category calculates the amount of security items delivered over the 
period of 60 days. Delivery of security items such as food, water, ammunition and fuel is 
required to maintain security functions ashore. This MOP was chosen because it had the highest 
priority based on operational concerns.   
The following figure shows the results for COA 1.    The take-away from this 
analysis can be seen when examining PAs 1, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. These results appear essentially 
equivalent and with a small amount of variability.  The results illustrate that there is not a 
significant difference between PAs with T-Craft (PAs 5 through 9) compared to PA 1, which 
does not have a T-Craft.   Because of the T-Craft has a large cargo capacity and fast speed, it is 
very useful in delivering items ashore. The additional T-Craft in PAs 5 through 9 enable them to 
perform slightly better than their counterparts, PAs 1 through 4. One note however is that among 
those PAs with T-Craft, PA5 has the most LCACs (5) compared to PA6 (2), PA7 (4), PA8 (3) 
and PA9 (4). Additionally, the LCU's have less contribution to the delivery due their low speed 
(8 knots vs. 40 knots for LCAC), which might contribute to the variability. Further analysis is 




































Security Throughput COA 1
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 7.2.23: COA 1 Security Analysis 
  A similar analysis was conducted on COA 2 with the results shown below in 
Figure 7.2.24.  The results show the PAs all have essentially equivalent performance with this 
COA.  Similar to the Throughput MOE, the appearance of a larger variance in PA 5 can be 


























Security Throughput COA 2
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 7.2.24: COA 2 Security Analysis 
 
  The results for COA 3 and COA 4 show a wide range of delivery rates amongst 
the PAs. Because the PAs all vary the surface connectors and Seabases, further analysis is 




























Security Throughput COA 3
95% CI for the Mean
 


























Security Throughput COA 4
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 7.2.26: COA 4 Security Analysis 
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7.2.3 Analysis of Outliers 
 In an effort to determine which COA and PA performed best, Boxplots were constructed 
to identify outliers in the results. Outliers are not identifiable in the 95% Confidence plots for the 
mean. Identification of outliers can help the commander mitigate the causes of outliers or decide 
to avoid them all together by choosing options without them. A set of Boxplots for each MOE 
are shown below.  
7.2.3.1  Throughput Outliers 
  Boxplot analysis on throughput revealed that on some runs, the demand 
requirements were exceeded. This occurred because the surface connectors delivered large 
amounts of water while a water treatment unit was also being delivered.  The result was a surplus 
of water at the FLS or FLSS.  This usually took place in the PAs containing T-Craft.  Some of 
the PAs contained outliers below the 25% quartile. This was because of surface connectors that 
were unusually slow or when a bottleneck occurred during loading.  The following figures show 












































































































Figure 7.2.30: COA 4 Throughput Boxplot 
 
7.2.3.2  Fixed Demand Analysis of Outliers 
  A similar analysis was conducted on the Fixed Demand MOE.  Outliers in the 
model might be explained by the slow connectors (e.g., LCU). These connectors led to 
bottlenecks, based on the assumed delivery algorithm. This results in periods in which the model 
is ineffective, and in some cases might not meet the requirements, thus exceeding 60 days for 
delivery. Additionally, items delivered with a lower priority might spend time waiting 
transportation to the FLSS. This phenomenon occurs in COA 3 and 4 and results in higher fixed 







































































































7.2.3.3  Security Analysis of Outliers 
 A similar analysis was conducted on the security MOE to evaluate outliers in the 
results. These outliers are of particular interest because they directly affect Marines on the 
ground.  Security throughput that drop below a commander‘s threshold may be deemed an 
unacceptable risk and should be looked at further to mitigate the cause. Factors such as connector 
types, Seabase platforms and delivery strategy can all account for outliers in the results. Further 
analysis is required to explain these outliers.  The figures shown below illustrate the results from 
















Boxplot For COA 1
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Boxplot For COA 2
Security Throughput
 
















Boxplot For COA 3
Security Throughput
 






















Boxplot For COA 4
Security Throughput
 
Figure 7.2.38: COA 4 Security Boxplot 
7.2.4 Future Work 
In the process of analyzing the results, there were a number of variables that came to 
mind which could significant affect the delivery timeline, volume of aid delivered and PA 
resources required. Future studies may examine how to improve the Seabase architecture.  A few 
ideas for this future work are listed below. 
7.2.4.1 Deployment of Seabases 
Due to the different velocities and operational hours for Seabase connectors (Both 
Ships and Aircraft), the position of the supporting Seabases with respect to the Forward Logistic 
Sites (FLS) and Forward Logistic Satellite Sites (FLSS) is a critical factor in affecting the 
delivery times. Centralization vs Decentralization of the Seabases (e.g. LPD, LSD, T-Craft) can 
be a consideration, which will need to take into account the resources available for refueling / 
resupply, versus the time savings for positioning them closer to respective Hubs and Satellites. 
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7.2.4.2 Deployment of Hubs and Hub Connectors 
 There is currently no known best number or type of connectors to be made 
available at each FLS to service their respective satellites.  The model tested here is based on the 
population of each FLS and surrounding satellites. However, because the distances affect the 
delivery times as well, the number and types in each FLS might need to be adjusted to maximize 
throughput. The number and positioning of the hubs are another set of criteria which affect the 
delivery times. 
7.2.4.3 Delivery Period and Operational Hours per day 
 It might be worthwhile to consider adjusting the delivery period by shortening or 
lengthening it, depending on our required delivery target (e.g., 90%).  Instead of a total demand 
target, we could partitioned the delivery targets to be based on Supply type, FLS, or FLSS, since 
a 10% lack for different supply types, hubs, or satellites may have significantly different impacts. 
The operational hours for each connector per day can also be varied (e.g., by including shifts) 
based on the demand levels or phases in the entire delivery operation. Delivery times conducted 
at day and night periods will likely be different too. 
7.2.4.4 Adaptive Delivery Priority 
 For COA3 and COA4, where supplies need to be delivered to FLS before 
reaching the FLSS, some fixed demands are not delivered even after the end of the 60-day 
operation.  This is due to the prioritized delivery algorithm based on demand levels and supply 
type.  It might be useful to compensate for the unfulfilled demands of key supply types by 
upgrading their priorities after a period of non-delivery.  Another aspect is the delivery of the 
Water Treatment Units (WTU), which will lower the demand levels of water-related supplies 
(e.g., drinking water and clothing).  Resources could be allocated to deliver them directly to both 
Hubs and Satellites before the rest of the supplies are delivered according to the COAs (This 
would be a mixture of COA2 and COA3 / COA4). 
7.2.4.5 Selection of Destination FLS / FLSS for Delivery 
 As each connector services a number of FLS or FLSS, the list and sequence of 
destinations for the connectors can have a large influence on the delivery times. The current 
allocation based on priority and proportional demand (prioritized demand type, followed by 
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demand level/population) may not be sufficient. The LCU is an example where being a slower 
craft, it may not suitable compared to LCAC to service far destinations, since it might take 
longer to meet required demands. Fuel range and refueling/unloading/loading rates which vary 
for different connectors also impact delivery times, depending on their choice of destination. 
Therefore time and distance factors could also be included in the FLS/FLSS selection algorithm. 
7.2.4.6 FLS Connector Sources 
 Due to the limited number of aircraft (12) servicing a large number of satellite 
sites (41), and the higher fuel consumption for aircraft, it may be more effective to consider a 
combination of both air and land-based vehicles for delivery. Costs may also be compared with 
the use of aircraft and ground vehicles from the host government, coalition forces and NGOs. 
7.2.4.7 Seabase and Connector Logistics 
 Logistics issues that are connector type-specific may impact delivery times and 
costs. Some of them that can be varied are fuel capacity and RAM (reliability, availability and 
maintainability). 
7.2.4.8 Environmental Effects on Delivery Route 
 Currently, routes to FLS and FLSS are direct distances based on sea and air 
channels. Weather and sea state conditions may influence the delivery time and create an 
alternative choice of routes for the connectors.  The impact of flooding can also cause some 
routes to be unsuitable (e.g. beaching facilities for ships, landing sites for aircraft, roads for 
ground vehicles). Alternative combination of routes and connectors may be required. 
7.2.4.9 Security Factors 
 The effect of a social interruption, looting by civilians or mobs rushing to get 
supplies, may affect the delivery times at Seabase connector landing sites, FLS, and FLSS, and 
along the actual delivery routes. Security personnel stationed at these locations include another 
variable to mitigate against the hindrance on delivery, at the expense of additional security 
supplies to be delivered.  Dynamic delivery route planning may be another factor to consider. 
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7.2.4.10 Number of Simulation Runs 
 Having 30 runs meets the usual statistical requirements to appeal to the Central 
Limit Theorem, but in the case of multi-modal peaks and troughs, additional runs may be 
required.  Curve inflections for delivery improvements / tradeoffs might also be observed with 
more simulation runs.  Also more run would result in tighter 95% confidence intervals for MOE 
and MOP mean values. 
7.2.5 Summary of Seabase Model 
The recommendations from the Seabase model are analyzed only on the first two MOE‘s, 
Throughput and Fixed Demand. In order to give a recommendation, the MOE‘s must first be 
normalized. The throughput analysis was already normalized by making it a percentage of 
demand delivered.  Fixed demand was normalized by dividing the results, measured in days, by 
the required number of days to deliver.  For the fixed demand MOE, a lower number was 
preferred.   So the normalized result was subtracted from 1 to make it more easily comparable to 
the throughput MOE. Then the two MOEs were averaged to give the final percentage. The 
results of this analysis are shown below in Table 7.2.13 below.  
  PA 1 PA 2 PA 3 PA 4 PA 5 PA 6 PA 7 PA 8 PA 9 Average 
COA 1 86% 84% 82% 87% 81% 89% 83% 88% 91% 86% 
COA 2 90% 93% 92% 90% 92% 91% 92% 89% 93% 91% 
COA 3 55% 62% 74% 58% 77% 79% 70% 77% 78% 70% 
COA 4 50% 57% 74% 57% 69% 72% 63% 66% 71% 64% 
Average 70% 74% 81% 73% 80% 83% 77% 80% 83% 












LHD LPD LSD T-Craft 
Conn No Conn No Conn No Conn No 
1  LCAC 3 LCAC 2 LCU (HF) 1 T-Craft 0 
2 LCAC 3 LCAC 2 LCAC (HF) 2 T-Craft 0 
3 LCAC 3 LCU 1 LCAC (WI) 4 T-Craft 0 
4 LCAC 3 LCU 1 LCU (WI) 2 T-Craft 0 
5 LCAC 3 LCAC 2 LCU (WI) 2 T-Craft 6 
6 LCU 2 LCAC 2 LCU (HF) 1 T-Craft 6 
7 LCU 2 LCU 1 LCAC (WI) 4 T-Craft 6 
8 LCAC 3 LCU 1 LCU (HF) 1 T-Craft 6 
9 LCU 2 LCAC 2 LCAC (HF) 2 T-Craft 6 
Aircraft for all 
PA 
MH53 8 MH53 0 MH53 0 MH53 0 
MV22 10 MV22 2 MV22 0 OV22 0 
SH60 4 SH60 0 SH60 0 SH60 0  
Table 7.2.2: Physical Architectures 
The Seabased model gives insight into both the preferred COA and the PA. Based on the 
results of the model, the team recommends COA 2 based on the combination of throughput and 
fixed demand MOEs. While COA 2 never meets 100% as shown in Table 7.2.13, it maximizes 
throughput performance and minimizes variability across all PAs. This COA delivers items 
directly from the Seabase to the FLS and FLSS.  With respect to the PA decision, if T-Craft is 
not available the team recommends PA 3 because it performs best across all COAs. If T-Craft is 
available the team recommends PA 6 or 9 for the same reason. Note, these are not the PAs that 
perform best for COA 2.  Because the Task Force Commander may be limited in the distribution 
strategy available, the decision was based on the best results for all possible COA. The PAs for 
each of these COAs is shown above in Figure 7.2.39. However, the actual recommendations are 
included in the concluding portion of this report because of the necessity to incorporate the 
results of the STELLA model.  
7.3 STELLA Model Results 
7.3.1  STELLA Results Overview 
STELLA system dynamics models were constructed and run to determine differences 
between the two best PAs for each of four possible COAs.  The PAs were selected as the best in 
their given COA because they produced the largest average throughput of emergency supplies.  
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Two PAs were selected to allow a comparative analysis between those employing the T-Craft as 
a means for delivery, and those not doing so.  The primary inputs to each of the STELLA models 
were the average daily delivery rates for each of the given resources, which were unique to each 
COA and PA.  The impacts of the COA 1 PAs were impossible to calculate since   
7.3.2 STELLA Model COA/PA Conclusions 
 According to the STELLA models, the greatest influence on the public‘s rate of 
satisfaction is the military‘s ability to quickly deliver the necessary goods and services in 
appropriate quantities to the afflicted people.  A primary assumption driving the STELLA 
models was that people would share available resources, meaning if there was a quantity of food 
sufficient to provide each member of the population with the minimum caloric value per day, the 
population would trend toward satisfied.  Conversely, if there was an insufficient quantity of 
goods, the population would share that which was available, accept a reduced per-person 
percentage of their daily quota, and collectively trend towards dissatisfaction at a rate dependent 
on the resource deficit.  Subsequently, the military‘s ability to establish and maintain a resource 
surplus via the available PAs was key in defining the best available option as seen in Table 7.3.1: 
 
Table 7.3.1:  Final Satisfied Populations Given COA / PA 
Despite the consistently high average of resource throughput in the PAs associated with COA 2 
(determined by the Simkit discrete event simulation analysis), Table 7.3.1 clearly indicates the 
less-consistent PAs of COAs 3 and 4 yielded superior satisfied populations at the day 60 
termination point.  This is due to the contrasting variability in throughput between the available 
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COAs.  While the PAs in COA 2 deliver approximately 95% of the required goods on average, 
the PAs in COA 3 and 4 deliver, on average, approximately 105% despite their greater 
variability.  Subsequently a surplus was formed in COAs 3 and 4 and not in COA 2.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 7.3.1: 
 
Figure 7.3.1:  Population Satisfaction Flux Over 60 Days 
From this figure, the initial population trend toward satisfaction can be seen in each of the PAs.  
Initially, the COA 2 PAs yield a greater number of satisfied people, but the satisfaction later 
falters after day 15 and drops consistently afterward.  The other PAs of COAs 3 and 4 continue 
to yield satisfied people until approximately day 45, after which those satisfied populations also 
drop off.  This day 15 drop-off  with COA 2 is due to the need to resupply shore-deployed 
security forces.  Regardless of the delivery consistency, since no substantial surplus was built up 
via the COA 2 PAs prior to day 15, the additional requirement of resupplying the security forces 
meant an even less capable delivery architecture was available to support the population.  In 
COAs 3 and 4, a surplus of resources was built up prior to day 15, and although the needs of the 
security forces and the population outmatched those PAs as well, it took more time to show since 
the resource surplus was available to alleviate some of the stress on the delivery architecture. 
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 As noted and illustrated in Table 7.3.1, the COA and PA yielding the largest population 
of satisfied citizens at the 60 day termination point is COA 4 and PA 7, which included the use 
of the T-Craft.  Overall, each of the PAs under consideration yielded over a 50% population 
satisfaction rate.  However, despite this apparent success, it must be noted that the variability 
associated with delivery rates between each of the PAs was not captured in the STELLA model, 
since the inputs were based only on the average daily delivery values.   
This lack of stochastic inputs in the STELLA model illustrates an important difference 
between the system dynamics approach and that of discrete event simulation.  The two modeling 
approaches are complementary, and both were necessary and useful in this research, which 
successfully provides insight into the problem of assessing the satisfaction of a population that is 
receiving humanitarian aid and serves as an excellent framework for future research.               
7.3.3 STELLA Model Security Conclusions 
 While the model results clearly indicate that on-site security should be of second-order 
consideration when matched against the effort of delivering goods to the people, the value of 
security is still critical to fostering the best possible outcome.  This was clearly demonstrated in 
the COA 3, and 4.  These COAs were identical except for the number and distribution of security 
forces.  Recall that COA 3 mandated security forces be deployed only to the three FLSs, while 
COA 4 required security force deployment to all 44 FLS and FLSSs.  Therefore, the difference in 
final population distribution between the two was based completely on the use of security forces  
 Of additional interest, while more security would be generally be more useful on the 
ground, the greater numbers will frustrate the general delivery mission after day 15 for all COAs.  
Commanders must therefore must consider where security forces are employed, and how many 
should be available for duty. 
 With regard to the actual prosecution of criminality, the initial overwhelming presence of 
security forces helped to manage the comparatively small initial criminal populations and their 
subsequent growth.  Since 1,200 Marines were presumed to be available for security duty over 
44 total logistical sites, a uniform distribution yielded 27.27 Marines and just 2.2 initial criminals 
per site.  Despite choosing the most historically stringent troop-to-citizen policing ratio of 160 
Marines per 1,000 citizens (based on Russian troop concentrations during their operations in 
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Chechnya in 2003), the Marines still clearly outmatch their initial criminal counterparts, quickly 
policing the criminals down to nothing, with the exception of COA 3 (Goode, 2006; Quinlivan, 
1995).  Criminal growth was permitted in the COA 3 PAs since no security was deployed to any 
FLSS.  However, aside from the specific COA 3 exception, it is important to note that in these 
models the population can grow more dissatisfied without a subsequent growth in criminal 
populations.   A totally dissatisfied population could–in reality–transition to criminality not 
gradually over the course of many days, but instead all at once in the form of a coup or revolt. 
For clarity, the STELLA models had no revolt threshold.  The security forces in the model purely 
manage the criminal populations. 
7.3.4 Overarching STELLA Conclusions 
 Each of the STELLA models would benefit from validation since the real-world 
information required for STELLA model construction is not reasonably available for different 
disaster scenarios.  It is therefore perfectly reasonable to argue that criminal populations may 
grow faster, start larger, or even be capable of stealing more goods than these models enable.  
Initial populations may be dispersed differently, and each population may consume more or less 
goods than forecasted in this study.  Further, the security detachments may be considerably 
under-strength for the security tasks under their charge, or their presence alone may negatively 
impact the attitude of the general population in some fashion worthy of measurement.  Therefore, 
prior to making changes to policy or plans, these models should be validated with real-world data 
by analyzing and comparing the model‘s output with the known historical outcome of the 
associated disaster relief mission.        
 Lastly, concrete technical solutions concerning fluid social science problems are moving 
targets.  The primary measure of effectiveness for this effort was based on the final total of 
satisfied people at the mission termination point.  In the case of COAs 2, 3, and 4, one could 
argue that each was successful because all the results yield greater than 50% of the population 
being satisfied at day 60, despite those number trending downward.  Since operational 
commanders define operational thresholds of success in these types of situations, deciding upon 
those values is a critical action since all of the options can meet with success depending on how 









8. COST ESTIMATION & RISK MANAGEMENT   
8.1 Cost Overview        
 Cost analysis is an analytic effort directed at projecting the future cost of programs; 
an integral step in selecting alternatives; a tool for evaluating resource requirements at key 
milestones and decision points in the acquisition process.  
             The purpose of a cost estimate is determined by its intended use, and its intended use 
determines its scope and detail. Cost estimates have two general purposes: (1) to help managers 
evaluate affordability and performance against plans, as well as the selection of alternative 
systems and solutions; and (2) to support the budget process by providing estimates of the 
funding required to efficiently execute a program (Government Accounting Office, 2009).  The 
intent for this cost estimate is to provide the decision makers a projected case for this project as 
well as provide a cost comparison among alternatives. 
 Life Cycle Costs (LCC) is the method used to quantify the relative costs to acquire and 
operate each alternative.  Using the LCCE to determine the budget helps to ensure that all costs 
are fully accounted for so that resources are adequate to support the program.  For a defense 
acquisition program, life-cycle cost consists of research and development costs, procurement and 
investment costs, operating and support costs, and disposal costs over the entire life cycle shown 
in Figure 8.1.1.  These four costs are described below (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2009, 




Figure 8.1.1: Life Cycle Cost Composition (Defense Acquisition University, 2011)  
Research and Development consists of development costs (both contractor and 
Government) incurred from the beginning of the materiel solution analysis phase through the end 
of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase (excluding costs associated 
with Low-Rate Initial Production).  This typically includes costs of materiel solution trade 
studies and advanced technology development; system design and integration; development, 
fabrication, assembly, and test of hardware and software for prototypes and/or engineering 
development models; system test and evaluation; systems engineering and program management; 
and product support elements associated with prototypes and/or engineering development 
models. 
Investment consists of production and deployment costs incurred from the beginning of 
low rate initial production through completion of deployment.  This typically includes 
procurement costs associated with producing and deploying the primary hardware; systems 
engineering and program management; product support elements associated with production 




Operations and Support (O&S) consists of sustainment costs incurred from the initial 
system deployment through the end of system operations.  This includes all costs of operating, 
maintaining, and supporting a fielded system.  Specifically, this consists of the costs (organic and 
contractor) of manpower, equipment, supplies, software, and services associated with operating, 
modifying, maintaining, supplying, training, and supporting a system in the DoD inventory.  This 
includes costs directly and indirectly attributable to the system (i.e., costs that would not occur if 
the system did not exist), regardless of funding source or management control.  Direct costs refer 
to the resources immediately associated with the system or its operating unit.  Indirect costs refer 
to the resources that provide indirect support to the system (including its manpower or facilities).  
For example, the pay and allowances for a unit-level maintenance technician would be treated as 
a direct cost, but the cost of medical support for the same technician would be an indirect cost. 
Disposal consists of costs associated with demilitarization and disposal of a military 
system at the end of its useful life. It is important to consider demilitarization and disposal early 
in the life cycle of a system because these costs can be significant, depending on the 
characteristics of the system. Costs associated with demilitarization and disposal may include 
disassembly, materials processing, and decontamination, collection/storage/disposal of hazardous 
materials and/or waste, safety precautions, and transportation of the system to and from the 
disposal site. Systems may be given credit in the cost estimate for resource recovery and 
recycling considerations 
Operation and Support Costs make up the largest percentage of the life cycle as shown in 
Figure 8.1.2 (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2009, Sept) while disposal comprises the least 




Figure 8.1.2: Program Life-cycle (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2009, Sept) 
 Assumptions were made in order to develop the cost estimate.  The first assumption 
limits the project to O&S costs.  R&D costs are non-applicable as almost all the platforms in the 
architecture are pre-existing.  Procurement costs are also non-applicable due to the project 
doctrine of forming a Seabase with assets already procured by the DoD/DoN.  Disposal costs are 
ignored as the Seabase will redeploy for additional and alternative use following the 60 FHA/DR 
operations.  Secondly, scoping and bounding of the project focuses O&S costs to conducting 
FHA/DR operations and not other functional elements as discussed in Chapter 3.  Finally, open 
source data is assumed to be complete and accurate. 
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8.2 Cost Estimation Methodology 
Along with stating the assumptions, identifying the constraints and ground rules, defining 
the system, and the method used for estimation is required to continue the cost estimation 
process.  Data collection is also an important step to conduct the actual cost estimation.  
8.2.1 Definition and Planning 
The system was defined by its various components and assigned its respective O&S 
costs. The following are assumption, constraints and ground rules used: 
 Government budgetary data is assumed to be accurate 
 Base year 2012$ used and costs normalized to FY2020$ for projections 
 Physical Architecture is based on official DoD 2020 force projection 
 Organic C2 costs assumed to be included in platform O&S cost 
The methods used for cost estimation are analogy, build-up, parametric and extrapolation. 
Each method has its own strength and weaknesses.  The analogy method was chosen because it 
is based on actual data, easily audited and can be accomplished rapidly. (Government 
Accounting Office, 2009). 
8.2.2 Analogy Method 
The analogy method compares a new or proposed system with one analogous system that 
was typically acquired in the recent past, for which there is accurate cost and technical data 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2010, Feb 2).  The analogy method takes into account that no 
―new‖ project is entirely new.  A project usually builds on previous projects or takes aspects of 
past projects and combines them with new ones. Therefore much of the data that is required can 
be taken from prior estimates. The analogy method allows you to do this while accounting for 
the differences between the current and previous estimates. 
8.2.3 Data Collection 
This step is vital to the cost estimation process because our method requires accurate data 
to formulate our costs. The Operation & Support Costs were pulled from the Visibility and 
Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) program. This program started in the 
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1970s based on a Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendation, subsequently 
mandated by Congress, that the Department of Defense (DoD) should accurately determine 
weapon system operating and support (O&S) costs. The Naval VAMOSC program collects data 
from over 130 data sources and organizes the data into nine distinct cost element structures 
(Naval Visibility Management of Operating and Support Costs, Detailed Ships User Manual, 
2006, Sept, p. 1).  Also used were prior theses from Naval Postgraduates students and fact files. 
8.2.4 Cost Estimation Calculation 
Each COA has 9 architectures. In these architectures are various components whose 60-
day costs were estimated. These components are the Seabase, Surface Connectors, Surface 
Connector Fuel, Air Connectors, Security, and C2.  Breaking down the component costs into 
categories such as personnel, organizational costs, maintenance costs, etc. the annual average per 
unit cost for fiscal year 2012 were found for each platform.  During the cost estimation process, a 
continuous review of estimates was done to ensure accuracy and applicability. 
8.3 2020 FHA/DR Seabase Architecture 
 Table 8.3.1 details the Seabase and connectors involved in the FHA/DR O &S cost 
estimation. 
Conn No Conn No Conn No Conn No
1 LCAC 3 LCAC 2 LCU 1 T-Craft 0
2 LCAC 3 LCAC 2 LCAC 2 T-Craft 0
3 LCAC 3 LCU 1 LCAC 4 T-Craft 0
4 LCAC 3 LCU 1 LCU 2 T-Craft 0
5 LCAC 3 LCAC 2 LCU 2 T-Craft 6
6 LCU 2 LCAC 2 LCU 1 T-Craft 6
7 LCU 2 LCU 1 LCAC 4 T-Craft 6
8 LCAC 3 LCU 1 LCU 1 T-Craft 6
9 LCU 2 LCAC 2 LCAC 2 T-Craft 6
MH53 8 MH53 0 MH53 0 MH53 0
MV22 10 MV22 2 MV22 0 OV22 0
SH60 4 SH60 0 SH60 0 SH60 0
Aircraft for all PA
Physical Architectures (SB to FLS)
LHD LPD LSD T-Craft
 
Table 8.3.1: Seabase and Seabase Connectors 
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8.4 Cost Estimation 
 As previously stated, the cost estimation is summarized by the Seabase, Surface 
Connectors, Surface Connector Fuel, Air Connectors, Security, and C2 components. 
8.4.1 Seabase 
The estimate for the Seabase is a composite of historical data obtained from Navy and 
Marine Corps VAMOSC.  Detailed cost data was compiled for LHD-1, LPD-17, and LSD-41 
class ships using class averages per ship.  The detailed costs were then averaged across all 
operational years for each ship, normalized to FY12$, and simplified into seven Operations and 
Support categories: Personnel, Unit Level Consumption, Services, Maintenance - Intermediate, 
Maintenance and Modernization – Depot, Other Operations and Support, and Total Annual O&S 
Cost Per Unit.  The annual costs were divided into expected cost per month and then used to 
determine a 60-day Operation and Support estimate.  Table 8.4.1 below summarizes the 60-day 
costs per Seabase platform. 
Platform 





Table 8.4.1: Expected 60-Day O&S Cost (FY12$M) 
8.4.2 Air Connectors 
The air connector cost estimate was calculated using the same method as for the Seabase; 
however the addition of fuel burn data from the team‘s computer model was used for more 
accurate fuel costs.  The detailed cost data obtained from Navy and Marine Corps VAMOSC was 
averaged across all operational years, per aircraft, normalized to FY12$, and combined into eight 
summary categories: Organizational Costs, Intermediate Costs, Depot Support Costs, Training 
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Support Costs, Recurring Investment Costs, Other Functions Costs, Contractor Logistics Support 
Costs, and Total O&S cost per year, per aircraft.  To obtain a cost estimate for a 60-day 
humanitarian operation, the historical fuel cost was subtracted from the total annual, per aircraft 
estimate.  Then the fuel cost per flight hour was calculated using the total cost of fuel per aircraft 
in CY2010 (FY12$) and divided by the flight hours per aircraft in 2010.  In the simulation, each 
aircraft was operated for eight hours per day.  The expected fuel cost per aircraft type is shown in 
the tables below. 
Avg Fuel Cost/ flt hour (FY12$) 
MH-60R MV-22 MH-53 
$268 $1,106 $1,495 
Simulation Flight Hours/day/aircraft 
MH-60R MV-22 MH-53 
8 8 8 
Daily Fuel Cost/aircraft (FY12$) 
MH-60R MV-22 MH-53 
$2,140 $8,844 $11,959 
Table 8.4.2: Daily Fuel Cost / Aircraft 
The next table shows the total expected O&S cost per aircraft for a 60-day humanitarian 
operation in FY12$M. 




Table 8.4.3: Expected 60-Day O&S Cost/ Aircraft 
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8.4.3 Surface Connectors 
The surface connector estimates were a mix of previous estimates by Naval Postgraduate 
School students with the exception of fuel cost.  For fuel cost, the outputs from the team‘s Simkit 
were analyzed.  Each of the nine architectures was run 30 times over a simulated 60-day period 
and the fuel burn per surface connector craft was recorded in gallons.  The expected value of fuel 
consumption (gallons) for each craft in each COA and architecture combination was calculated.  
The ―per gallon‖ cost of fuel (JP-5) was based upon the CY2010 fuel costs obtained from Navy 
VAMOSC and normalized to FY12$.  The cost per gallon used was $3.46. The final fuel cost per 
COA and architecture combination was simply the sum of the gallons burned multiplied by 
$3.46.  These fuel costs are listed separately from the Surface Connector O&S costs in order to 
better understand their effect on the overall cost of the various architectures and COAs.  
8.4.4 LCAC and LCU 
The LCAC and LCU cost estimates were obtained from the Mechanical Engineering 
Master‘s Thesis by Mr. Justin A. Dowd titled ―Cost-Benefit and Capability Analysis of Seabase 
Connectors.‖  Mr. Dowd‘s estimate for the LCAC was based on historical O&S data obtained 
from Assault Craft Unit-4.  The estimate for the LCU was calculated using data from the LCU 
Program Office.  Both estimates were average, per unit, annual O&S costs over the years that 
both craft have been operational.  In FY12$ the LCAC is estimated to run $134,000 in 
Operations and Support costs during a 60-day humanitarian aid operation.  The LCU is estimated 
to run $180,000, in FY12$, for Operations and Support over the course of a 60-day humanitarian 
aid operation. 
8.4.5 T-Craft 
The estimate for the T-Craft was obtained from Major Chi Yon Ting‘s Operations 
Research Master‘s Thesis titled, ―Life Cycle Cost Estimate of the Transformable Craft.‖  In his 
thesis, Major Ting used a parametric technique where he compared major characteristics of 
existing platforms, which perform similar missions to the T-Craft‘s proposed mission.  These 
characteristics included draft, speed, and endurance.  He then assigned parameters or weights to 
each characteristic and created a model to predict the cost of the T-Craft.  Being as this project is 
140 
 
only concerned with Operations and Support costs, only Major Ting‘s O&S estimate was used.  
In FY12$ the T-Craft is expected to cost $1.71 million over the course of a 60-day humanitarian 
aid operation. 
8.4.6 Security 
The security cost estimate is defined as the Operations and Support costs for a notional 
Marine Expeditionary Unit with standard vehicles over a 60-day period.  All cost data for 
personnel and equipment was obtained from Marine Corps VAMOSC and normalized to FY12$.  
The total estimated 60-day security O&S cost, in FY12$, is $22.33 million. Table 8.4.4 below 
summarizes the expected personnel costs. 
Total Marines 1196 
Total Officers 44 
Total Enlisted 1152 
Annual Officer Cost per Marine (FY12$) $165,497 
Annual Enlisted Cost per Marine (FY12$) $108,435 
Total 60-Day MEU Personnel Cost (FY12$) $22,033,161 
Table 8.4.4: Personnel Cost Summary 
The ground equipment is based on a standard MEU loadout in an Amphibious Ready 
Group consisting of an LHD, LPD, and LSD.  The ground equipment used in this estimate is 
considered as the MEU equipment most likely to be used in a humanitarian aid operation and is 
listed below. 
 5 Ton Truck  
 LVS  
 HMMWV  
 4K lb. Forklift  
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 10K Lb. Forklift  
 Reverse Osmosis Unit  
 LMT 3000 Water Purification Unit  
 Dump Truck  
 500 Gal. Water Container 
The total estimated O&S cost, in FY12$, for ground equipment over the course of a 60-
day humanitarian aid operation is $294,000. 
8.4.7 Command and Control Equipment 
The final element of the cost estimate is the Command and Control element.  This 
element is defined as any Command and Control equipment and personnel that are not organic to 
the Seabase, Surface or Air Connectors, or the Security Forces and therefore will incur additional 
cost to the DoD.  The command and control cost was divided into ―One-Time Capital‖ costs and 
―Quarterly Recurring Costs.‖  The ―One-Time Capital‖ costs are the procurement costs for the 
additional equipment required to support command and control needs in the team‘s scenario.  
The ―Quarterly Recurring Costs‖ are those costs, which are incurred in the operations, 
maintenance and user training for the C-2 equipment.  The total C-2 cost for a 60-day 
humanitarian aid operation, in FY12$, is expected to be $4.25 million with one-time costs 
(Procurement) accounting for 95% of the total and recurring costs (Operations and Support) only 
accounting for 5% of the total. 
8.4.8 Total Cost Estimation 
The following chart displays the total estimated cost.  The first four COAs are configured 
without the T-Craft while COAs five through nine include the T-Craft.  The T-Craft has the most 
significant impact on the overall cost at a 10% increase in spending.  Specifically the 60-day 




Figure 8.4.1: COA/Architecture Combo Cost  
8.5 Risk & Sensitivity Analysis 
  Risk Analysis is a process that uses qualitative and quantitative techniques for analyzing, 
quantifying and reducing uncertainty associated with cost goals. Uncertainty can be defined as a 
situation in which the outcome is subject to an uncontrollable random event stemming from an 
unknown probability distribution. If the uncertainty inherent in a predictive cost estimate can be 
reduced or effectively addressed, the quality of the cost estimate should be improved (Yoe, 
2000).   
Sensitivity Analysis highlights the factors that have the strongest impact on the overall 
cost estimate by narrowing down the number of lower level cost elements that should be 
examined using risk analysis techniques. 
Performing these analyses improves accuracy of estimates and decisions made from them. The 
most common technique for this analysis is Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation‘s output 
illustrates (1) the likelihood of achieving the program‘s cost objectives, given the current plan 
and risks as they are known and quantified; (2) the likelihood of other possible outcomes, which 
can be a way to determine the cost value that has an acceptable probability of being exceeded; 
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and (3) by sensitivity, the high-priority risks or WBS elements as a guide to effective risk 
mitigation (Government Accounting Office, 2009, Mar, Page 172). 
8.6 Risk Management Overview 
The purpose of Risk Management is to identify, analyze, treat and monitor risks 
continuously (SE Handbook, 2010, p. 213).  Risk is characterized by the consequences 
associated with negative events occurring within a system.  Mitigation of risk is an iterative 
process involving four essential tasks: risk planning, risk identification, risk assessment and 
analysis, and risk handling.  Completion of these tasks is a multi-faceted problem, which can be 
divided into four categories: technical risk, cost risk, schedule risk, and programmatic risk.  The 
relationships between these categories are illustrated in Figure 8.6.1 (SE Handbook, 2010, p. 
220).   
 
 
Figure 8.6.1: Typical Relationships among the Risk Categories 
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It is evident that programmatic risk is characterized by decisions and events beyond the 
control of the mission commander, such as imposed budgets and mission changes.  Therefore, 
programmatic risk is often the cause of risk in all of the other three risk categories and is 
necessarily addressed by decisions in those categories.  Further, because cost was addressed 
previously, this analysis will focus on technical and schedule risk.   
8.7 Risk Description 
8.7.1 Risk Planning 
Risk is inherent in every system, and must therefore be considered during the system 
design.  This is accomplished through a Risk Management Process.  The Risk Management 
Process used in this analysis was adapted from the INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook.  
The objective of developing a Risk Management Process is to define a repeatable process to 
achieve a proper balance between risk and opportunity as well as maximize the benefit of risk 
mitigation efforts.  The Risk Management Process is used to identify, assess, and handle both 
schedule and technical risks. 
8.7.2 Risk Identification 
Risk Identification is the first step in the Risk Management Process.  Correct risk 
identification is required for successful risk assessment and analysis as well as risk handling.  
Risks were identified with a focus on objectives based risks (those that endanger completion of 
mission objectives) using several methods, such as: lessons learned from past studies, 
forecasting, lists of known operational risks, etc.  After a list of risks was compiled, they were 
grouped into two categories for analysis: technical risks and schedule risks.  Because natural 
disaster response operations are sensitive to ambient risks such as weather changes that may 
rapidly alter the scenario and impact mission completion time, scenario specific risks were 




Table 8.7.1: Summary of Identified Risks 
8.8 Command and Control Risk 
8.8.1 Threat Risk Assessment and Proposed Controls 
Table 8.8.1 lists the key threats and the corresponding risk rating for the individual 
modules of the Command and Control System (C2S).  Each risk is defined with respect to 
consequence (High/Medium/Low) and Likelihood (Likely, Unlikely). Furthermore this is rated 
based on the principle security considerations, application access profile and the value of each 
information asset.  These classifications are used to rate the risks identified in Table 8.8.2, which 
also shows the recommended mitigation strategies to help address the identified risks. The risk 
ratings can subsequently be used for prioritizing of different security control implementations.  
Note that the risks presented in Table 8.8.2 are unique to C2S and not representative of the total 
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Data 
Management 
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Collaboratio
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Disseminati
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Table 8.8.1: Risk Rating 
 
Threats Risk Mitigation Strategies 
Information Leakage High 
Controls: 
1. Data utilized by the ground troops must be of 
UNCLASSIFIED level. 
2. Encryption for all mobile terminals. 
3. Implement database hardening. 
Countermeasures: 
1. Access for data synchronization shall be 
encrypted and tunneled via SSL-VPN connection 
between AO and VPN gateway at the Mobile 
Command Post. 
2. Encryption will be put in place to protect data 
residing on mobile terminals. 
3. Database hardening shall be applied, such that 
sensitive data is encrypted or hashed. 
 
Unauthorized Access High 
Controls: 
1. Use of firewall for traffic access controls. 
2. Only data synchronization application is 
published for mobile and ground units. 
3. User authentication and host checking to be put 
in place prior to granting access to mobile terminals. 
4. Develop standard operating procedures. 
 




1. Router access control list and firewalls to allow 
only approved network traffic. 
2. Only authorized data synchronization 
application shall be published for mobile/ground 
troops‘ access. There will be application filters in place 
to block unauthorized application. 
3. SSLVPN with host checking mechanism shall 
be adopted prior to mobile terminals connecting to the 
Mobile Command Post to prevent unauthorized access. 
4. Standard operating procedures shall be 
developed for the provisioning and de-provisioning of 




1. Change management. 
 
Countermeasures: 
1. There shall be proper workflows and processes 
to govern the administration and operations of the C2 
network. Any configuration changes will need to be 





 Tampering  of OS 
files and privilege 





1. Use of malware protection software. 
2. Implement OS hardening on host. 
Countermeasures: 
1. Each workstation in the deployment kit shall be 
pre-imaged with a hardened Operating System, 
installed with malware protection software and 
updated signatures. 
2. All forms of unused switches and ports (e.g. 
infra-red, ethernet, USB, etc.) shall be disabled. 
Repudiation Medium 
Controls: 
1. Enable system logging and audit trails. 
Countermeasures: 
1. All system and application transaction logs 
shall be enabled and protected against tampering or 
unauthorized alterations.  
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Denial of Service High 
Controls: 
1. Business Continuity Process. 
Countermeasures: 
1. Mobile devices will be in-built with 
decentralized C2 functionalities to enable NGOs to 
perform off-line logistics administration when 
connectivity to the Mobile Command Post is 
unavailable during operations. 
2. Voice communications via satellite phones 
shall serve as a backup form of communications. 
  
Table 8.8.2: Threat Risk Controls 
8.8.2  Residual Risk Assessment and Recommendation 
After all the controls and mitigations are in place, the system will still be vulnerable in 


























Medium - The data stored in the 
devices will be 
encrypted. 
- User training and 
awareness 
- Information 
survivability of < 1 
week of ops 
- Backup terminals will 














Low - The current sets of data 
will continue to allow 
operations for at least 
next 48 hours. 
- The subsequent request 
and approval will be 
processed through 
voice communications 
and standalone logging 
of data. 
- Re-synchronization of 
data will be performed 
once connection is 
available. 
Low 
Table 8.8.3: Residual Risk 
8.9 Risk Mitigation 
8.9.1 Risk Assessment and Analysis 
The objective of risk analysis is to determine ―How big is the risk‖ (OUSD, 2008, p. 11).  
In order to effectively measure the impact of each risk, Risk Reporting Matrices were created for 
each of the Course of Action-Physical Architecture combinations (Appendix I.1).  The objective 
of these matrices is to determine the likelihood and consequence of each risk faced by the 
program.  The likelihood and the consequence of each risk were defined according to the Risk 
Management Guide for DoD Acquisition (Appendix I.3).  The preliminary risk assessment, using 
the risk reporting matrices, indicates that there are no individual risks that fall into the ―high 
risk‖ category.  In order to perform a comprehensive analysis of the system as a whole, rather 
than individual risk items, a detailed analysis of the probabilities and consequences of the risks 
was conducted.  Risk factors were calculated for each risk item within a Course of Action-
Physical Architecture combination.  The formula used for calculating the risk factors is taken 
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from Systems Engineering Management, published by Benjamin S. Blanchard, and is expressed 
as: 
 
As noted by Blanchard on page 328, this model is just a general approach to the 
quantification of risk, and ―one needs to develop a model tailored to the system and program in 
question.‖  The equation was used for this analysis based on successful implementation and 
presentation ―in the 1986 edition of the System Engineering Management Guide, published by 
the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC), Fort Belvoir, VA‖ (Blanchard, 2004, p. 
328).   Full risk factor calculation for each Course of Action is included as Appendix I.2.  Table 
8.9.1 summarizes the results. 
 
Table 8.9.1: Summary of Risk Factor Calculations 
Blanchard develops a Risk Analysis and Reporting Procedure (Figure 8.9.1) that defines 
High Risk as a total risk factor greater than 0.7 and medium risk as a total risk factor greater than 
0.3.  As Table 8.9.1 indicates, the risk factors for all of the Course of Action-Physical 
Architecture combinations fall into the medium risk category.  This is a result of several low 
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likelihood, high consequence risks, such as mission termination by either the host government or 
the United States government, that result in major mission failures or delays.  These risks, 
considered schedule risks for the purpose of this analysis, are largely beyond the control of the 
mission commander, as they will result only from political tensions or worsening of a natural 
disaster.  However, these risks have a major impact on mission success.  Accordingly, a detailed 
risk plan for any scenario must be developed, since uncontrollable risks have a major impact in 
natural disasters and politically sensitive environments. 
 
Figure 8.9.1: Risk Analysis and Reporting Procedure with Generic Threshold Values 
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8.9.2 Risk Handling 
Risk planning strategies typically fall into one of four categories: transference, avoidance, 
acceptance, and taking action (SE Handbook 2010).  Several options within each category exist 
within the context of this scenario.   
Examples of transference are: assigning duties to the Host Nation, NGOs, or GOs rather 
than DoD assets, training replacements to accomplish various DoD missions.  Note than 
transference is not an acceptable solution if the agency assuming control is incapable of handling 
the risk.  If that agency cannot handle the risk it will most likely magnify the problem.   
Examples of avoidance are: removal of DoD assets from the scenario, reduction of DoD 
performance requirements.  Avoidance should never be the strategy when attempting to handle 
mission critical risks.  Avoidance can only be employed after a detailed requirement analysis has 
been completed to ensure that critical risks are not being ignored. 
Examples of acceptance are: budget reserves to account for unexpected risks, schedule 
flexibility to allow for program overrun.  The introduction of these reserves increases flexibility 
for the mission commander, but may introduce risk into other areas if used excessively. 
Examples of taking action are: terminating an operation and introducing new assets to 
perform the function, concurrent operations to achieve the same goal.  Taking action requires a 
comprehensive understanding of the mission requirements to ensure that assets are not being 
used unnecessarily. 
These examples do not constitute a complete list; the specific details of each risk scenario 
will drive the handling strategy.  However, all risk handling attempts must be monitored and a 
risk abatement plan must be developed in accordance with the Risk Analysis and Reporting 





 The mission of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief is not one that has 
emerged in the past decade but has maintained a place within the minds of U.S. Navy 
policymakers and operational planners since the days of the Great White Fleet.  The team 
undertook a project which sought to better understand and possibly improve upon the tactics and 
methods of delivery associated with FHA/DR.  Further, considerable time and analysis was 
dedicated to interpreting exactly how the mission impacts the affected populace.  
The team examined the assigned research and analysis project from multiple 
perspectives. First and foremost the team used the skills acquired in the Systems Engineering and 
Analysis curriculum to execute the systems engineering process. Secondly, we chose to analyze 
the results from a commander‘s perspective.  Between these two, the major focal points for 
understanding the results include aid throughput, overall cost, and satisfied population drivers. 
The use of multiple perspectives allowed order to be applied to this highly complex problem and 
enabled the relation of human social and cultural behavior modeling to the SE process.  The 
results are enlightening, related to basic human needs, and what is truly important in an extreme 
situation.     
9.2 Systems Engineering and Analysis Perspective 
Expeditionary Warrior 2010 served as the factual basis of our scenario for the FHA/DR 
mission with the necessity to conduct military operations from a Seabase. The team conducted 
considerable analysis of the situation, determined system needs and requirements, an overarching 
concept of operations, and executed modeling and simulation practices. Our efforts lead to the 
development of four courses of action and nine possible physical architectures to serve as the 
system of systems.  Modeling tools including Simkit and STELLA were employed to determine 
the utility of the architectures.  In concert with these efforts a similar process was undertaken in 
the development of possible command and control systems that could be deployed for the benefit 
of the FHA/DR mission.  This was a focus as a result of previous research conclusions. 
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From a systems engineering perspective, there are two recommendations required to make an 
operational decision.  The first involves the selection of a PA, the second involves selection of a 
COA.  Two PAs were selected, one that incorporates T-Craft, and one that does not.  These PAs 
were selected based upon throughput.  The recommended PAs are: PA 3 (no T-Craft) and PA7 
(with T-Craft).  PA 3 is defined by: 3 LCACs on the LHD, 1 LCU on the LPD, and 4 LCACs on 
the LSD.  PA 7 is defined by: 2 LCUs on the LHD, 1 LCU on the LPD, and 4 LCACs on the 
LSD, as well as 6 T-Craft.  These PA recommendations are based on COA selection.  Selection 
of COA 4 resulted in the greatest satisfied population at the conclusion of the 60 day operational 
timeframe.  Accordingly, COA 4 is the recommended course of action, and PA 3 (if T-Craft is 
not available) or PA 7 (if T-Craft is available) are the final recommendations.   
 These architectures allow for the greatest positive effect on the population and at 
the conclusion of the 60-day mission timeframe result in the highest satisfied population. Of 
note, it was COA-2, not COA-4 that resulted in the least variability and greatest overall 
throughput. When the throughput results of COA-2 were incorporated into the STELLA 
behavioral model they actually resulted in the highest dissatisfied population.  This was shown to 
be a result of the fact that COA-2 was not consistently meeting the 100% needs of the population 
even though it enabled the greatest delivery of tonnage.  This simple conclusion is that the 
population should be the highest priority for the speedy delivery of goods.   
9.3 Commander’s Perspective 
 The commander is driven by the requirements of the National Security Strategy and FHA 
of developing nations and has incurred an increasingly publicized role.  Commanders tend to 
heavily focus on the swift and proper accomplishment of objectives. The modeling outputs of the 
COAs which mirrored these were time, throughput, and positive influence on the population 
based on stage 3 results.  The team‘s recommendation was derived from the integration of data 
from chapters 7 and 8. The team‘s physical architectures were based on the idea that a 
commander would have to operate with the tools that would typically be available on the region 
on short notice.  In our case the makeup of the ESG mirrored those on a regular operational 
deployment; no additional tailored organic assets.  
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 As previously mentioned in Chapter 7, all four of the COAs examined for the project 
were successful after 60 days based on key metrics.  An important aspect of the commander‘s 
decision-making in FHA/DR is the amount of time necessary to achieve a steady state, which is 
defined as delivery of Fixed Goods.  The COA that achieved a steady state most rapidly with the 
least amount variability was COA 2.  Throughput analysis additionally showed COA 2 with the 
least amount of variance, but COA 2 never achieved a throughput greater than 100 percent. This 
is a result of the non centralized distribution strategy defined by COA 2.  By delivering all of the 
supplies directly to the population (rather than centralizing at distribution centers) COA 2 
maximizes the ability to provide supplies to the population rapidly (thus achieving a steady state 
very quickly), however it slows down the feedback loops and information flow back to the 
Seabase, thereby slowing down the total aid distribution.  Finally, a choice can be made with the 
knowledge that the presence of security does in fact have a positive impact on the population. As 
seen in the results of the STELLA model the increase in the feeling of safety among the people 
was directly related to their satisfaction.  
9.4 Additional Points of Interest 
 As a result of the analysis of the simulation outputs the team discovered three major 
issues that warrant discussion. They include the following: T-craft availability, the LCU as a 
chokepoint, and the employment of a strategic timeline for exit.  
 The T-craft concern is rooted in the potential operational tempo of ships in the fleet and 
the maintenance required by those ships. Within the delivery model we assumed that six T-craft 
would be available based on the Navy‘s procurement of 13 of the platform and a distribution 
between PACFLT and LANTFLT. In the event that the ships follow the typical operational 
tempo of today‘s fleets then the T-craft related results of the model would be altered 
significantly. Alterations in the T-craft assumptions do not result in mission failure as shown in 
the data since the greatest difference in physical architectures with and without T-craft is 15000 
tons over the 60 day timeline.   
 The LCU as a connector was a severe chokepoint in the delivery process as a result of 
slow speed and in turn increased delivery times. We had a modest delivery distance of 50 nm 
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inland. Based on the LCU‘s SOA of five knots there was a ten hour turnaround time.  This 
excluded the load/unload times. The LCU inhibits the rapid achievement of a steady state and 
was consistently detrimental to PA‘s which employed it. In this type of scenario, where the 
commander is forced to choose between utilization of an LCAC or an LCU, and the delivery 
distance is within the unrefueled range of the LCAC (<50 nm), the LCAC is the preferred 
alternative to the LCU. 
  The team‘s research on previous FHA/DR missions lead to the conclusion that it is 
important for the military to exit the situation while the population remains satisfied and 
welcoming of its presence.  The conclusion, although somewhat obvious, was validated in the 
results of the STELLA model output.  Even though the satisfied population increases over the 
course of 60 days, at or slightly before the 60-day mark the satisfied population was actually 
starting to decrease.  Therefore, even though we are supplying all basic needs, other interactions 
are decreasing satisfaction.  Those interactions should be investigated further within future 
research efforts.  The exit strategy should involve the host nation, NGO/IGOs, and executed in a 
swift but balanced means. The conclusion is that it is necessary to avoid leading the affected 
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Acronym  Definition 
 
AAAV Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
AFRICOM Africa Command  
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and 
 Performance in Humanitarian Action  
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
API Application Programming Interface 
APOD Air Point-of-Debarkation 
 AQIM Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
 C2S Command and Control System 
 CNA Common Needs Assessment 
 COA Course of Action 
 COAF Country Orange Armed Forces 
 COCOM  Combatant Commander 
 CONOPS  Concept of Operations 
 CONUS  Continental United States 
 COP Common Operating Picture 
 COTS Commercial-of-the-Shelf  
 DART Disaster Assistance Response Team 
 DES Discrete Event Simulation 
 DoD Department of Defense 
 DoDAF Department of Defense Architecture Framework  
 DoN Department of the Navy 
 DoS Department of State 
 DOTMLPF  Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Logistics, 
Personnel, Facilities 
 EMD Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development 
 ESG Expeditionary Strike Group 
 EW10 Expeditionary Warfare 2010 
 FHA Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 
 FHA/DR Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
 FID Foreign Internal Defense 
 FNA Functional Needs Analysis 
 FP Force Protection 
 GAO Government Accounting Office 
 GIS Graphical Information System 
 GOO Government of Orange 
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 HSCB Human Social Cultural Behavior 
 JCD  Joint Capabilities Document 
 FLS Forward Logistics Site 
 FLSS Forward Logistics Satellite Site 
 HA Humanitarian Assistance 
 HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
 HDR Humanitarian Daily Rations  
 HF High Frequency  
 HSCB Human Social Cultural Behavior  
 IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
 IDP Internally Displaced Persons 
 IGO Inter-Governmental Organization 
 IW Irregular Warfare 
 JCD Joint Capabilities Document 
 LCAC Air-Cushioned Landing Craft 
 LCU Landing Craft Utility  
 LHD Landing Helicopter Deck  
 LPD Landing Platform Dock 
 LSD Dock Landing Ship  
 MCO Major Combat Operations 
 MDA Milestone Decision Authority 
 MEORD Movement for the Emancipation of the Orange River Delta 
 MESS Movement for the Emancipation of Southern States 
 MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit 
 MOE Measures of Effectiveness 
 MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War 
 MOP  Measures of Performance 
 MRE Meals Ready to Eat 
 MSC Military Sealift Command 
 M&S Modeling and Simulation 
 MVF MESS Vigilante Force 
 NEO Non-Combative Evacuation Operations 
 NGO Non-Governmental Organizations 
 O&S Operation and Support 
 OCHA Office Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs 
 OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
 OMNF Other Multinational Forces 
 PA Physical Architecture 
 R&D Research and Development 
 ROMO Range-of-Military Operations 
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 SATCOM Satellite Communications 
 SBC SeaBase Connector 
 SBCS SeaBase Connector System 
 SEA System Engineering Analysis 
 SFA Security Force Assistance 
 SO Stability Operations 
 SS  Sea State 
 TDSI Temasek Defense Systems Institute 
 UNICEF United Nations Children‘s Fund 
 USAID United States Agency International Development  
 USF United States Forces 
 USG United States Government 
 USMC United States Marine Corp 
 VEO Violent Extremist Organization 
 VOIP Voice Over Internet Protocol 
 VSAT Very Small Aperture Terminal 
 VTOL Vertical Take-Off and Landing 
 WiFi Wireless Fidelity 
 WIMAX World-wide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
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APPENDIX C: ARCHITECTURE SPECIFICATIONS 
C.1 CNA Summary Report Outline (Garfield et al., 2011) 
 






C.2 OFDA Commodities (USAID, 2005)  


















Blankets 25 Bale  25 73 22 28 31 11.1 
10 liter collapsible water 
container 50 box 12 600 290 48 40 50 56 
Hygiene Kits
1 
6 Box 30 180 1150 48.5 30 85 72 
Water Bladder Kit 1 Crate  1 450 37 42 42 37.8 
Water Treatment Unit
2 
1 Unit  1 4520 128 84 83 516 
Plastic Sheeting
3 
1 roll 10 10 1275 48 42 83 97 
OFDA Field Kit 1 kit  1 23 18 18 12 2.3 
Humanitarian Daily 
Rations (HDR)    1 1.875     
Table C.2.1: OFDA Commodities 
Notes: 
1. Hygiene Kits supply enough for a family of 5 people for two weeks.  
2. Water Treatment Units supply enough water for 10000 people per day.  
3. A family typically uses a 12ft X 12ft piece of plastic sheeting for shelter. Each roll is 24 by     
100 ft 
Item Description: 
Blankets – These are wool blankets used for basic needs.   
10 liter Collapsible Water Container - These containers are used for disaster victims and relief 
workers for moving and storing potable water.  
Hygiene Kits – This kit is intended to supply disaster victims with basic hygiene commodities. 




Figure C.2.1: HA Specifications (USAID, 2005) 
Water Bladder Kit, 10,000-Liter – The water bladder kit is suitable for drinking water storage. 
It is totally sealed and lies flat on the ground like a pillow. It comes with the necessary tools for 
set up and repair (USAID, 2005). 
Water Treatment Units – Each unit is mounted on a trailer designed for off road application, 
and can be towed by a four wheel drive vehicle. It provides pumping, purification, storage and 
distribution. It contains extra air filters, chlorine kit, pH, and turbidity analysis (USAID, 2005). 
 
Plastic Sheeting – The sheeting is designed for shelter can be used to replace damage or 
destroyed walls or roofing or to construct temporary shelter for people. This sheeting should only 
be used to meet temporary human shelter requirements because of its high cost and unique 
qualities. It should last more than 1 year under normal field conditions and functions well in hot 
climates (USAID, 2005). 
  
OFDA Field Kit – The purpose of the field pack is to provide the necessary items to allow 
OFDA personnel to support themselves for 48 to 72 hours.  It is not intended to complement 
personal items that the DART members bring on deployment.  Figure C.2.2 below shows the 












Humanitarian Daily Ration – This provides a minimum of 2200 calories, which meets the 
minimum requirement set by USAID of 2100 calories. (Other U.S. Rations; Current U.S. 
Rations; HDR- Humanitarian Daily Ration) (USAID, 2005) 
 
C.3 Excess Property (Sullivan, 1995) 
Class IV Items Construction Materials 
Required Materials Pounds Per Person 
Barrier Supplies 5.6 
Heating Supplies 2.92 
Restroom Supplies 10.4 
Shower Supplies 3 
Kitchen Supplies 6 
Table C.3.1: Class IV Items 
 




GP, Medium/Liner 545 








House Keeping Requirements 
Laundry  Policy Lbs of detergent Per Day 
1 load per week 0.071 
2 loads per week 0.143 
Trash Bags 
Number Issued Planning Factor 
1 per day 0.0625 
1 every other day 0.0313 
1 every 3 days 0.0208 




Males Females Children Infant 
Item Weight (lbs) 
shirts 0.500 0.400 0.300 0.100 
shorts 0.500 0.450 0.400 0.000 
underwear 0.125 0.100 0.070 0.000 
bras 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.000 
socks 0.180 0.150 0.080 0.001 
sneakers 2.000 1.750 1.500 0.017 
flip-flops 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.003 






 Adults/Children Infants 
Item Weight (lbs) 
cot 10 10 
sheets 1 0.5 
pillow 1 0 
pillowcase 0.2 0 
bucket 0.8 2 
towel 0.5 0.4 
washcloth 0.063 0.05 
rain poncho 0.6 0 
Table C.3.5: Class II Personal Equipment 
C.4 Population Demographics (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011) 
Age Range Total Percents Females Males 
0-1 3% 1% 2% 
2-14 39% 19% 20% 
15+ 58% 28% 29% 




C.5 Planning & Weighted Factors (Sullivan, 1995) 
 
Table C.5.1: Planning & Weighted Factors 
Humanitarian Daily Rations: per person per day item. They weigh 1.875lbs.  
Water – Water will be provided by WTU‘s once they have been brought in. Until that time 
water must be brought in by containers. The amount of water required is dependent on several 
factors such as; drinking, hygiene, laundry, food preparation, medical, waste. The total amount 
of water required is 49.958 gallons per person per day. That converts to 416.919 lbs/per/day.   
Class II Items 
These items fall into three groups; personal equipment, clothing, house keeping requirements. 
Personnel equipment includes housekeeping items such as laundry detergent and trash bags. 
Laundry detergent will increase as conditions improve (WTU in place) and garbage bags 
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decrease as conditions improve.  Additional items such as personal equipment are dependent on 
adults and infants. The weight of each item was computed and then compared against the 
population demographics such as .96 adults/.04 infants/children).  Clothing is also computed in 
this class and the replacement time of clothing is computed into this factor. In addition women, 
men and children all require different clothing items. The population demographics were then 
multiplied across the weight factor to give the overall factor.  
Class IV Items are a Construction Materials. These items are brought in one time and then the 
requirement is met.   
Class VIII items are medical equipment such as beds and supplies. These items depend on the 
level of service provided. If Full Services are provided then the weighted factor of these items is 
considered 2.32 lbs /person. If no services are provided (i.e. no surgery) then the weighted factor 
is lowered to .09 lbs/person.  In our scenario, the full services are provided at all times even 
though military doctors are not providing it. We are providing the supplies for it.  So the 2.32 
lbs/person is used.  These items are also not a replacement item so we can reuse these items.  
The UN supplies additional Medical supplies that are required for preventative measures from 
disease. Since the UN cannot enter the country, the Seabase will bring in the equipment.  These 
items are brought in on per person per day quantity.  
Commodities - OFDA will bring in commodities of items. The items include blankets, 10 liter 
collapsible containers, water bladders, hygiene kits, WTU, and Plastic sheeting.  The hygiene 
kits are good for a family of 5 for 2 weeks. These will have to be brought in every two weeks. 
The Water Treatment unit only has to be brought once.  And the remaining items also are only 
brought once.  
177 
 
C.6 Requirements Section 
 


























C.7 Functional Hierarchy 
 
Figure C.7.1: Top Level Functional Hierarchy 
 




Figure C.7.3: Provide Security for Humanitarian Assistance Goods 
 














Figure C.7.7: Provide FHA/DR Functional Breakdown 
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Evacuation Capability x x x x x x x       x x 
S&R x       x   x       x x 
Deliver Food x           x x     x x 
Deliver Water x         x x x     x x 
Deliver Medicine             x x     x x 
Deliver Clothing   x         x x     x x 
Deliver Medical Services         x   x x     x x 
Deliver Vet Services         x   x x     x x 
Repair Airfields             x       x x 
Open Airfields             x       x x 
ATC             x       x x 
Engineering Support             x       x x 
Force Protection Measures             x x x x x x 
FLS/FLSS Site Security             x x x   x x 
Table C.8.1: Needs to Requirements
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C.9 Map Requirements to Function 
Functions 
1.5  Provide 
Security for HA 
"Goods" 1.8 Force Protection  1.9 C2 1.10 Employ & Sustain Forces 

































Class I                         
Class II                         
Class IV                         
Class VI                         
Class VIII                         
Commodities                         
C4ISR                         
Supply 
Distribution 
  x x x                 
Deployment & 
Distribution 
        x x x x x       
Logistics Services 
                  x   x 
Security for 
FHA/DR goods 
x       x x x x x x x x 
Security for 
Personnel (USF) 
  x x x x x x x x x x x 














































Class I x x           x   x x 
Class II     x         x   x x 
Class IV         x x x x   x x 
Class VI                       
Class VIII                   x x 
Commodities       x           x x 
C4ISR                   x x 
Supply Distribution               x   x x 
Deployment & 
Distribution                   x x 
Logistics Services   x     x x       x x 
Security for FHA/DR 
goods                   x x 
Security for Personnel 
(USF)   x             x x x 
Table C.9.2: Requirements to Functions II
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C.10 Map Functions to Physical Architecture 





Provide Security at Distribution Sites (1.5.1) No Yes No 
Provide Air Asset FP (1.8.1) Yes Yes No 
Provide Ground FP (1.8.2) No Yes No 
Provide Maritime FP (1.8.3) Yes Yes No 
Provide Command & Control (1.9) Yes Yes No 
Transport Diesel/Gas (2.4.2.3.1) No Yes Yes 
Transport Chemicals (2.4.2.3.2) No Yes Yes 
Transport POL (2.4.2.3.3) No Yes Yes 
Transport Class V Yes Yes Yes 
Transport VI Yes Yes Yes 
Transport VII Yes Yes Yes 
Transport MRE Yes Yes Yes 
Transport HDR (2.3.2.1.1.) Yes Yes Yes 
Transport Water Treatment Items (2.3.2.1.2) Yes Yes Yes 
Transport Class II (2.4.2) Yes Yes Yes 
Transport OFDA Commodities (2.4.1) Yes Yes Yes 
Transport Construction Materials (2.4.2.1.1) Yes Yes Yes 
Transport Storage Materials (2.4.2.1.2) Yes Yes Yes 
Transport Medical Supplies (2.4.2.1.3) Yes Yes Yes 
Provide Warehousing Yes Yes Yes 
Provide For Liquid Storage Capability Yes Yes Yes 
Provide POD Yes Yes Yes 
Provide Inventory Tracking Yes Yes Yes 
 





















































































































































































































































































































































































Transport HDR (2.3.2.1.1.)   x   x                     
Transport Water Treatment 
Items (2.3.2.1.2) 
x x x       x x x           
Transport Class II (2.4.2)           x                 
Transport OFDA 
Commodities (2.4.1) 
        x x x x x x         
Transport Construction 
Materials (2.4.2.1.1) 
        x         x         
Transport Storage Materials 
(2.4.2.1.2) 
          x       x         
Transport Medical Supplies 
(2.4.2.1.3) 
                            
Provide Warehousing 
(2.13.2.1) 
                          x 
Provide For Liquid Storage 
Capability (2.13.2.2) 
                          x 
Provide POD (2.13.2.3)                           x 
Provide Inventory Tracking 
(2.13.2.4) 
                          x 
Provide Security at 
Distribution Sites (1.5.1) 
                        x   
Provide Air Asset FP 
(1.8.1) 
                      x     
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Provide Ground FP (1.8.2)                       x     
Provide Maritime FP (1.8.3)                       x     
Provide Command & 
Control (1.9) 
                    x       
Transport Diesel/Gas 
(2.4.2.3.1) 
x                           
Transport Chemicals 
(2.4.2.3.2) 
x                           
Transport POL (2.4.2.3.3) x                           
Transport Class V 
(1.10.3.3) 
x                           
Transport VI (1.10.3.4) x                           
Transport VII (1.10.3.5) x                           
Transport MRE/Class I 
(1.10.3.1) 
x                           











































































































































































































































































































































Percentage of stable 
connection between Seabase 
and Distribution Hubs in 28 
days 
X X X X X       X     X     
3.1.2 
Percentage of stable 
connection between 
Distribution Hubs and 
Satellite Distribution Centre 
in 28 days 
X X X X X       X     X     
3.1.3 
Percentage of Internal 
connection within each 
Distribution Hubs and 
Satellite Distribution Centre 
in 28 days 




Percentage of IOs and NGOs 
in theatre subscribed to the 
service in 28 days 
X X                         
3.2.1 
Percentage of days that 
network is available after full 
system deployment 
X   X X X       X     X     
3.2.2 
Percentage of successful 
requests and authorization vs. 
failed requests and 
authorization 
X       X   X X X   X       
3.2.3 
Percentage of successful 
status reports submission and 
consolidation vs. failed 
submission and consolidation 
X         X       X         
3.2.4 
Percentage of successful 
dissemination of information 
vs. non successful 
dissemination 
X                     X X X 
3.2.5 
Percentage of successful 
deterrence of attacks on the 
system 
X                           
Table C.11.2: C2 MOP to Function
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CVN 11 30 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
LSC 
DDG(51) 73 30 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
CG(47) 22 30 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
SSC 
FFG 2 29 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
LCS Freedom 13 40  0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
LCS 
Independence 
12 40  0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
MCM 14 14 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
SSN 
SSN - Virginia 28 25 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
SSN - Seawolf 3 25 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
SSN - Los 
Angeles 
17 25 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
SSGN 
SSGN 4 20 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
SSBN 
SSBN 14 20 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Large Deck 
LHA(R) 1 20 160000 3 2 N/A N/A N/A 




11 22 0 2 1 N/A N/A N/A 
LSD Harpers 
Ferry 
4 20 0 2 0 N/A N/A N/A 
LSD Whidbey 
Island 
8 20 0 4 0 N/A N/A N/A 
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LCU 30 8 1785 0 0 170 N/A 1200 
LCAC 72 40 1800 0 0 60 N/A 200 
T-Craft 11 23 7144 0 0 450 N/A 500 
CLF 
T-AO 15 20 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
T-AOE 4 25 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
T-AKE 11 20 783000 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
MPF(F) 
LHA(R) 3 20 160000 3 2 N/A N/A N/A 
LMSR 3 24 393000 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
T-AKE 3 20 783000 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
MLP 3 15 0 3 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Command/Support 
T-ARS 4 14 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
AS 2 20 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
T-AGOS 
Victorious 
3 10 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
T-AGOS 
Impeccable 
1 13 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
T-ATF 4 15 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
LCC 2 23 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
JHSV 4 40 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Air Fixed Wing 
C-2A 
Greyhound 
34 N/A 0 N/A N/A 5 260 1000 
Air Rotary Wing 
HH-60 49 N/A 0 N/A N/A 5 160 315 
MH-60 185 N/A 0 N/A N/A 5 160 315 
SH-60 189 N/A 0 N/A N/A 5 160 315 
CH-53K 227 N/A 0 N/A N/A 18 170 110 
V-22A Osprey 200 N/A 0 N/A N/A 17.5 215 350 
Table C.12.1: Shipbuilding Plan 
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C.13 Full Factorial Model 
 LHD LHD LPD LPD LSD-HF LSD-HF LSD-WD LSD-WD TCRAFT 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
3 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
5 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
6 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
7 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
8 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
9 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
11 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
12 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
13 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
14 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
15 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
16 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
17 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 6 
18 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 
19 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 
20 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 6 
21 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 6 
22 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 
23 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 
24 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 6 
25 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 6 
26 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 
27 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 
28 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 
29 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 6 
30 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 
31 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 
32 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 
Table C.13.1: Physical Architecture Full Factorial  
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Figure C.14.1: Solution Space Diagram 
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C.15 Physical Architecture Deterministic Output 
 
Figure C.15.1: Deterministic Output of Partial Factorial 
 




APPENDIX D: CRAFT SPECIFICATIONS 
Seabase 
LHD LPD LSD (HF) 
Velocity (kts) - Transit 17 17 17 
Velocity (kts) - Seabase Ops 7 7 7 
Payload (metric tons) 2460 2300 1120 
Payload (U.S. tons) 2711.69 2535.32 1234.59 
JP5 Fuel Capacity (Gal) 585000 314160 50000 
Refuel Initiation Threshold (%) 30 30 30 
Refuel Completion Threshold (%) 95 95 95 
Refuel Rate (at sea - Gal/hr)  252000 252000 126000 
Replenishment Initiation Threshold (%) 0 0 0 
Replenishment Completion Threshold (%) 100 100 100 
Replenishment Rate (at sea - tons/hr) 210 210 210 
    
Seabase LSD (WI) T-Craft T-AKE 
Velocity (kts) - Transit 17 20 18 
Velocity (kts) – Seabase Ops 7 7 13 
Payload (metric tons) 975 300 6675 
Payload (U.S. tons) 1074.75 330.69 7357.93 
JP5 Fuel Capacity (Gal) 50000 34422 315000 
Refuel Initiation Threshold (%) 30 30 
N/A 
Refuel Completion Threshold (%) 95 95 
Refuel Rate (at sea - Gal/hr)  126000 60000 
Replenishment Initiation Threshold (%) 0 0 
Replenishment Completion Threshold (%) 100 100 
Replenishment Rate (at sea - tons/hr) 210 37.5 
    
SB Connector LCAC LCU T-Craft 
Velocity (kts) 40 8 40 
Payload (U.S. tons) 75 170 300 
Area (sq ft) 1809 2500 5500 
Loading Time (hr) 2 4.5333 8 
Unloading Time (hr) 2 4.5333 8 
JP5 Fuel Capacity (Gal) 5000 N/A 34422 
Refueling Rate (Gal/hr) 60000 N/A 60000 
Range before Refuel (nm) 200 1200 550 
Travelling hours before refuel 5 150 13.75 
Operating hours per day 16 16 16 
    
SB Connector MH53 MV22 SH60 
Velocity (kts) 150 215 160 
Payload (U.S. tons) 18 17.5 3 
Area (sq ft) 225 143.08 N/A 
Loading Time (hr) 0.0167 0.0333 0.0167 
Unloading Time (hr) 0.0167 0.0333 0.0167 
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JP5 Fuel Capacity (Gal) 2277 1448 590 
Refueling Rate (Gal/hr) 60000 60000 60000 
Range before Refuel (nm) 700 950 450 
Travelling hours before refuel 4.666666667 4.418604651 2.8125 
Operating hours per day 8 8 8 
    
FLS to FLSS Transport MH53 MV22 SH60 
Velocity (kts) 150 215 160 
Payload (tons) 18 17.5 3 
Loading Time (hr) 0.0167 0.0333 0.0167 
Unloading Time (hr) 0.0167 0.0333 0.0167 
JP5 Fuel Capacity (Gal) 2277 1448 590 
Refueling Rate (Gal/hr) 60000 
Range before Refuel (nm) 700 950 450 
Travelling hours before refuel 4.666666667 4.418604651 2.8125 
Operating hours per day 8 8 8 




APPENDIX E: STELLA 
E.1: STELLA Enlarged Graphic Representations 
 





Figure E.1.2: Example FLSS STELLA Model Graphic 
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Figure E.1.3: Complete STELLA Node Architecture 
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E.2: STELLA Description 
The following is a detailed description of the system of differential equations STELLA 
was employed to produce and execute.  The segment of the model under consideration for this 
examination is based on the initial criminal element‘s population and the means for its continued 
growth at FLS 1, which is graphically depicted below: 
 
Figure E.2.1: Criminal Element Interactions 
  
The first block established in this subset was the Criminal Population stock.  
Mathematically, this block was defined as a percentage of people that corresponds to Country 
Orange‘s currently estimated population of 50,000 incarcerated criminals out of the entire 
population.  The equation relating this information as it was manually entered into STELLA 
follows:  
 
INIT Criminal_Populaiton = (Total_Sat_Population+Total_Unsat_Population)*0.0003068 
 
 With the stock‘s initial value established, the respective means of inflow and outflow 
must also be determined for the system to be complete.  First, using an action connector, the 
inflow is created by coupling the Total Unsat Population convertor block with the same 
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percentage described above.  The translates to the inflow of criminals being equal to the criminal 
percentage of the dissatisfied population.  As the dissatisfied population increases or decreases 
over time, so does the resulting flow of criminals in or out, respectively.           
 
INFLOWS:  Becoming_Criminal = Total_Unsat_Population*0.0003068 
 
 The criminal stock‘s outflow, Bring to Justice, is dependant only on the associated 
security population‘s value and corresponding policing effectiveness.  The policing effectiveness 
of the security forces was based on Russian troop concentrations of 160 soldiers per 1,000 
civilians while engaged in Chechnya throughout 2003.  The mathematics were manually input 
into STELLA to describe the scaling rate of attrition the police could enforce upon the criminal 
population based on the number of criminals and available security forces.  The arbitrary small 
value of 0.000001 was included so no situation would result in a necessary division by zero. 
 
OUTFLOWS:  Bringing_to_Justice = 
((Security_Onstation*6.25/(Criminal_Populaiton+0.000001))-1)*Security_Onstation 
 
 Like the inflow block of Becoming Criminal, through each iteration of the model‘s run, 
these values were re-calculated to determine the outcomes necessary for feeding back into the 
model for subsequent runs.  While the equations to this point were added manually, STELLA 
handles the repeated update of input information autonomously.  In addition, STELLA‘s true 
utility is its ability to mathematically develop and use the resulting differential equations as they 
are graphically organized by the software‘s user.  The following equation, though based on the 
foregoing user-established inputs, blocks, and connections, was entirely organized by STELLA:        
 
Criminal_Populaiton(t) = Criminal_Populaiton(t - dt) + (Becoming_Criminal -Bringing_to_Justice) * dt 
 
Each integration was completed using the Euler method.  A by-hand example of the Euler 
method was made available courtesy of Prof James Eagle, and is included below: 
 
Figure E.2.2: Euler Method Manual Example 
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 The ‗dt‘ for each STELLA simulation was set as 0.25, or in other words, each integration 
was completed in quarter-day increments for a total of 240 integrations for the criminal 
population stock in the first Forward Logistical Site over the whole 60-day run time, only.  
Including all other stocks, for both resources and populations, throughout all forward logistical 
sites and satellite sites, the total resulting number of integrations is about 84,500 per physical 
architecture.    
 In closing, this section was meant to provide additional insight into STELLA‘s use and 
features.  For a complete list of all physical-architecture specific differential equations in their 
entirety, reference the SEA-17A database and obtain the final STELLA models.  Each of the 
files, which are titled by course of action and physical architecture, will contain the complete 
system of relevant equations under the ‗equations‘ tab as located on the main working desktop of 





APPENDIX F: NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
 
Figure F.1.1: Network Architecture
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APPENDIX G: MODELING ANALYSIS 
Data results from modeling analysis are now excluded from this appendix due to their somewhat 
repetitive nature. The results can be made available via Dr. Eugene Paulo, Naval Postgraduate 
School, upon request.  
 
G.1: Paired T-Test Tables 
PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .000 .000 .001 .021 .034 .000 .009 .951 
2  1 .519 .041 .001 .000 .135 .000 .000 
3   1 .001 .000 .000 .012 .000 .000 
4    1 .019 .001 .497 .000 .001 
5     1 .008 .001 .002 .075 
6      1 .000 .473 .032 
7       1 .000 .000 
8        1 .007 
9         1 
Table G.1: Throughput Analysis Paired T-Test Comparison COA 1 
 
PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .800 .613 .472 .243 .713 .221 .045 .125 
2  1 .455 .265 .256 .935 .194 .022 .067 
3   1 .802 .234 .433 .616 .219 .422 
4    1 .223 .265 .755 .337 .589 
5     1 .252 .217 .206 .216 
6      1 .231 .063 .076 
7       1 .578 .851 
8        1 .635 
9         1 







PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
2  1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
3   1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
4    1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
5     1 .011 .009 .009 .125 
6      1 .000 .899 .000 
7       1 .000 .057 
8        1 .001 
9         1 
Table G.3: Throughput Analysis Paired T-Test Comparison COA 3 
PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
2  1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
3   1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
4    1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
5     1 .488 .051 .008 .015 
6      1 .190 .400 .092 
7       1 .000 .392 
8        1 .000 
9         1 
Table G.4: Throughput Analysis Paired T-Test Comparison COA 4 
 
PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .000 .000 .000 .255 .555 .498 .144 .019 
2  1 .378 .000 .004 .000 .084 .000 .231 
3   1 .000 .003 .000 .076 .000 .196 
4    1 .010 .000 .197 .000 .607 
5     1 .412 .155 .783 .042 
6      1 .374 .361 .035 
7       1 .167 .438 
8        1 .011 
9         1 







PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .000 .000 .895 .000 .428 .001 .267 .000 
2  1 .026 .000 .654 .000 .065 .000 .909 
3   1 .004 .016 .039 .000 .017 .000 
4    1 .000 .432 .000 .348 .000 
5     1 .000 .043 .000 .674 
6      1 .008 .048 .000 
7       1 .000 .049 
8        1 .000 
9         1 
Table G.6: Fixed Demand Analysis Paired T-Test Comparison COA 2 
 
PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .931 .000 .005 .377 .561 .484 .874 .239 
2  1 .003 .005 .585 .618 .390 .737 .170 
3   1 .245 .015 .008 .000 .000 .088 
4    1 .055 .024 .000 .000 .210 
5     1 .914 .147 .330 .612 
6      1 .170 .319 .473 
7       1 .612 .038 
8        1 .022 
9         1 
Table G.7: Fixed Demand Analysis Paired T-Test Comparison COA 3 
 
PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .882 .000 .001 .979 .442 .197 .230 .298 
2  1 .000 .002 .909 .573 .209 .217 .370 
3   1 .017 .000 .001 .000 .000 .001 
4    1 .007 .008 .000 .000 .029 
5     1 .530 .315 .240 .289 
6      1 .047 .038 .679 
7       1 .917 .018 
8        1 .019 
9         1 







PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .014 .002 .191 .001 .006 .001 .001 .005 
2  1 .512 .079 .007 .008 .007 .007 .008 
3   1 .004 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
4    1 .040 .051 .043 .046 .054 
5     1 .286 .634 .666 .151 
6      1 .582 .509 .901 
7       1 .940 .386 
8        1 .367 
9         1 
Table G.9: Security Throughput Analysis Paired T-Test Comparison COA 1 
PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .950 .887 .343 .228 .103 .874 .995 .473 
2  1 .843 .294 .234 .141 .769 .943 .500 
3   1 .242 .237 .202 .964 .881 .372 
4    1 .207 .017 .222 .294 .845 
5     1 .270 .238 .231 .219 
6      1 .281 .172 .013 
7       1 .855 .442 
8        1 .508 
9         1 
Table G.10: Security Throughput Analysis Paired T-Test Comparison COA 2 
 
PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .000 .000 .021 .000 .000 .000 .000 .007 
2  1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .549 
3   1 0 .730 .002 .359 .012 .359 
4    1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
5     1 0 .127 .009 .333 
6      1 .072 .871 .704 
7       1 .132 .421 
8        1 .667 
9         1 







PA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 .000 .000 .038 .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 
2  1 .000 .000 .000 .474 .000 .005 .647 
3   1 .000 .056 .018 .059 .000 .171 
4    1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 
5     1 .045 .850 .013 .337 
6      1 .082 .448 .959 
7       1 .025 .332 
8        1 .729 
9         1 
Table G.12: Security Throughput Analysis Paired T-Test Comparison COA 4 
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G.2 Unusual Observations 
There are a number of unusual observations from the results.  Based on the model and 
available data, we have derived some assumptions on the potential reasons behind these 
observations. However, further analysis and additional sensitivity runs will be required to 
validate the full extent of these assumptions. 
G.2.1 Throughput 
a.) Wider Throughput Variance of PA5 compared to other PAs in COA2  
Model Perspective: From the chart, the Confidence Interval of PA 5 isn‘t as large when 
compared to the absolute throughput (they are still delivering more than 90% as a lower bound). 
Since all of COA 5 finished the fixed demands early, it's a small fluctuation due to the delivery 
algorithm in one or 2 of the runs, with no serious impact on the outcome. 
Data Perspective: Among those with T-Craft, PA5 has the most LCACs (5) compared to 
PA6 (2), PA7 (4), PA8 (3) and PA9 (4).LCU's have less contribution to the delivery due their 
low speed (8 knots vs 40 knots for LCAC), so that might contribute to the variability. For COA2, 
the aircraft cannot really help for the delivery to the Hubs, so the additional LCAC could be a 
contributing factor, though the variability is not that significant relative to the full throughput 
(between 88 to 97%) 
b.) Wider Fixed Demand Completion Variance of PA 5 to 9 compared to PA1 to 4 in 
COA1  
Model Perspective: There is some variation which results in delivery timelines beyond 60 
days. However, in those instances, the full aid has been delivered except for small amounts of 
some supplies, so you don't see that the fixed demands were actually met.  
Data Perspective: Although PA5 to 9 has the T-Craft, the variability only applies to COA 
1, so as in the model assumption, it could be due to some minor issues with COA1, but the 
variability doesn't seem high when compared to the absolute throughout (96 to 112%). 
c.) Larger Security Throughput Variance for PA 2,3 and 4 in COA 1  
Model Perspective: A possible explanation is some random problems in the delivery 
because of LCU's (when they get supplies it sometimes takes them a significantly long time to 
deliver it, and this leads to a bottleneck). This is less likely to happen when T-Crafts are present 
in PA 5 to 9 to handle most of the deliveries. 
Data Perspective:  The LCU's slow speed may not the only factor, as PA2 with no LCUs 
has significantly higher variability (even on the actual throughout - 69 to 91%) than PA1 (93 to 
95%) with 1 LCU or PA3 (87 to 95%) with 1 LCU. In PA1 to 4, it seems there are 0 deliveries 
for security on a random sample (PA 2 - Run 16), even after 60 days (and the full outstanding 
demand is not met yet), only 15% of the HDR supplies are delivered.  
d.) Larger Security Throughput Variance for PA 5 in COA2  
Model Perspective: Similar to observation (1), the variance is only large in comparison, 
so it seems like a random fluctuation. 
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Data Perspective: The same reasoning can be obtained from observation (1). 
G.2.2 Outliers in the Box Plots 
a). Outliers in which the throughput exceeds 100% only happens on PAs with T-Crafts. 
This will happen when one or more T-Crafts are on their way to deliver large amounts of water, 
and during their delivery when WTU's are being delivered, the water is no longer needed, so the 
throughput remains high (compared to the demand)  
b). There could be some bugs in the model though they will not affect the percentage of 
throughput. These could help explain why in some runs the number of days until fixed demand is 
completed delivered extends beyond 60 days (especially in COA1). 
c). The slow ships (e.g. LCU) led to bottlenecks based on our existing delivery algorithm. 
This results in periods in which the model is ineffective, and in some cases might not meet the 
requirements, thus exceeding 60 days for delivery (even only a small portion of the supplies are 
not delivered). These issues can be accounted by the fact that the time required for each to reach 
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APPENDIX H: COST 
H.1 Cost Comparisons 
 












Figure H.1.4: Overall Comparison of Costs Between Architectures and COAs
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H.2 Costing Details 
 
Cost Category Platform 
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Table H.2.3: Surface Connector Annual Average Per Unit Cost
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H.3 COA Surface Connector Costing Details 
COA PA Platform Mean Daily Fuel Burn (gal) Standard Deviation (gal) Cost (FY12$) 
1 
1 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 1699.36 2434.23 $5,884.51 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
2 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 1361.54 2295.97 $4,714.71 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
3 LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 1296.5 2291.52 $4,489.50 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
4 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 1777.14 2384.03 $6,153.85 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
5 LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 470.03 1441.88 $1,627.61 
T-Craft 5662.38 7561.16 $19,607.58 
6 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 723.1 1851.44 $2,503.94 
T-Craft 5824.8 7495.62 $20,170.00 
7 LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 1945.61 2532.44 $6,737.22 
T-Craft 4523.08 7319.82 $15,662.43 
8 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 514.82 1411.78 $1,782.71 
T-Craft 5705.18 7609.57 $19,755.79 
9 LCU 0 0 $0.00 LCAC 1643.86 2566.51 $5,692.33 
T-Craft 4864.33 7486.11 $16,844.11 






PA Platform Mean Daily Fuel Burn (gal) Standard Deviation (gal) Cost (FY12$) 
2 
1 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 668.64 1837.63 $2,315.35 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
2 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 448.27 1615.47 $1,552.26 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
3 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 415.75 1467.65 $1,439.65 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
4 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 848.84 1944.83 $2,939.35 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
5 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 791.69 1916.49 $2,741.45 
T-Craft 4191.3 7375.9 $14,513.55 
6 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 1126.58 2080.62 $3,901.10 
T-Craft 3028.78 6531.02 $10,488.00 
7 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 580.49 1548.6 $2,010.11 
T-Craft 3588.61 6957.45 $12,426.57 
8 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 1011.38 2027.38 $3,502.19 
T-Craft 4704.68 7524.33 $16,291.27 
9 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 657.38 1720.02 $2,276.36 
T-Craft 4282.84 7467.19 $14,830.54 
Table H.3.2: COA 2 Surface Connector Fuel Burn Summary from Simulation Output 
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COA PA Platform Mean Daily Fuel Burn (gal) Standard Deviation (gal) Cost (FY12$) 
3 
1 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 4121.85 3162.17 $14,273.06 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
2 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 4230.76 3209.01 $14,650.19 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
3 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 4136.68 3162.78 $14,324.42 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
4 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 4072.68 3026.45 $14,102.80 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
5 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 2418.63 3046.83 $8,375.19 
T-Craft 4524.99 7367.34 $15,669.05 
6 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 2814.99 3000.04 $9,747.69 
T-Craft 5327.14 7586.87 $18,446.72 
7 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 2997.77 2723.98 $10,380.62 
T-Craft 4093.12 6891.06 $14,173.58 
8 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 2961.08 3075.62 $10,253.57 
T-Craft 5478.17 7722.35 $18,969.70 
9 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 2850.94 3061.64 $9,872.18 
T-Craft 4670.37 7446.72 $16,172.47 




COA PA Platform Mean Daily Fuel Burn (gal) Standard Deviation (gal) Cost (FY12$) 
4 
1 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 4141.49 3104.64 $14,341.07 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
2 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 4197.91 3219.01 $14,536.44 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
3 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 4107.42 3186.67 $14,223.09 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
4 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 4177.91 3073.78 $14,467.19 
T-Craft 0 0 $0.00 
5 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 2322.56 2993.24 $8,042.52 
T-Craft 4614.04 7444.57 $15,977.41 
6 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 2863.78 3040.6 $9,916.64 
T-Craft 5387.74 7663.31 $18,656.56 
7 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 2970.84 2839.84 $10,287.37 
T-Craft 4035.46 6789.51 $13,973.91 
8 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 2828.62 3027.02 $9,794.89 
T-Craft 5393.5 7642.31 $18,676.51 
9 
LCU 0 0 $0.00 
LCAC 2881.76 3046.06 $9,978.90 
T-Craft 4564.06 7337.95 $15,804.34 
 




H.4 Command and Control Costing Data 












1 COMBAT NET RADIO (SINCGARS) $6,500 $1,300 $7,800 95 $741,000 
2 
SATELLITE ANTENNA (THRANE & 
THRANE EXPLORER) 
$4,999 $1,000 $5,999 3 $17,996 
3 SATELLITE PHONES (IRIDIUM 9505A) $1,700 $340 $2,040 95 $193,800 
4 WIFI VOIP PHONE / HEADSETS $200 $40 $240 95 $22,800 
5 LAPTOPS $3,000 $600 $3,600 95 $342,000 
6 DB SERVER $15,000 $3,000 $18,000 1 $18,000 
7 WEB SERVER $15,000 $3,000 $18,000 1 $18,000 
8 DIRECTORY SERVER $15,000 $3,000 $18,000 1 $18,000 
9 FIREWALL $15,000 $3,000 $18,000 1 $18,000 
10 WIMAX STATION $100,000 $20,000 $120,000 6 $720,000 
11 WIMAX RECIEVER $16,000 $3,200 $19,200 95 $1,824,000 
12 ROUTERS $3,000 $600 $3,600 6 $21,600 
13 VPN GATEWAY $7,000 $1,400 $8,400 1 $8,400 
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1 SATELLITE SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE $6,000 $1,200 $7,200 3 $21,600 
2 SATELLITE PHONES SUBSCRIPTION $900 $180 $1,080 95 $102,600 
3 
HARDWARE & SOFTWARE 
MAINTENANCE/LICENSES 
$198,180   $198,180 1 $198,180 
      $322,380 




H.5 Costing Summary 



































1 $35.87 $0.85 $0.35 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $96.58 $110.53 $1.61 $1.84 
2 $35.87 $0.67 $0.28 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $96.33 $110.24 $1.61 $1.84 
3 $35.87 $1.12 $0.27 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $96.77 $110.74 $1.61 $1.85 
4 $35.87 $0.94 $0.37 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $96.69 $110.65 $1.61 $1.84 
5 $35.87 $11.30 $1.27 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $107.95 $123.54 $1.80 $2.06 
6 $35.87 $11.08 $1.36 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $107.82 $123.39 $1.80 $2.06 
7 $35.87 $11.35 $1.34 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $108.07 $123.68 $1.80 $2.06 
8 $35.87 $11.03 $1.29 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $107.71 $123.26 $1.80 $2.05 
9 $35.87 $10.90 $1.35 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $107.63 $123.17 $1.79 $2.05 
COA 2 
1 $35.87 $0.85 $0.14 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $96.37 $110.28 $1.61 $1.84 
2 $35.87 $0.67 $0.09 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $96.14 $110.03 $1.60 $1.83 
3 $35.87 $1.12 $0.09 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $96.58 $110.53 $1.61 $1.84 
4 $35.87 $0.94 $0.18 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $96.50 $110.43 $1.61 $1.84 
5 $35.87 $11.30 $1.04 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $107.72 $123.27 $1.80 $2.05 
6 $35.87 $11.08 $0.86 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $107.32 $122.82 $1.79 $2.05 
7 $35.87 $11.35 $0.87 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $107.59 $123.13 $1.79 $2.05 
8 $35.87 $11.03 $1.19 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $107.60 $123.14 $1.79 $2.05 
9 $35.87 $10.90 $1.03 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $107.31 $122.80 $1.79 $2.05 
COA 3 
1 $35.87 $0.85 $0.86 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $97.09 $111.10 $1.62 $1.85 
2 $35.87 $0.67 $0.88 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $96.93 $110.92 $1.62 $1.85 
3 $35.87 $1.12 $0.86 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $97.36 $111.41 $1.62 $1.86 
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4 $35.87 $0.94 $0.85 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $97.17 $111.20 $1.62 $1.85 
5 $35.87 $11.30 $1.44 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $108.12 $123.74 $1.80 $2.06 
6 $35.87 $11.08 $1.69 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $108.15 $123.77 $1.80 $2.06 
7 $35.87 $11.35 $1.47 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $108.20 $123.82 $1.80 $2.06 
8 $35.87 $11.03 $1.75 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $108.17 $123.79 $1.80 $2.06 
9 $35.87 $10.90 $1.56 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $107.84 $123.41 $1.80 $2.06 
COA 4 
1 $35.87 $0.85 $0.86 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $97.09 $111.11 $1.62 $1.85 
2 $35.87 $0.67 $0.87 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $96.92 $110.92 $1.62 $1.85 
3 $35.87 $1.12 $0.85 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $97.35 $111.41 $1.62 $1.86 
4 $35.87 $0.94 $0.87 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $97.19 $111.22 $1.62 $1.85 
5 $35.87 $11.30 $1.44 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $108.12 $123.73 $1.80 $2.06 
6 $35.87 $11.08 $1.71 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $108.17 $123.79 $1.80 $2.06 
7 $35.87 $11.35 $1.46 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $108.18 $123.80 $1.80 $2.06 
8 $35.87 $11.03 $1.71 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $108.12 $123.73 $1.80 $2.06 
9 $35.87 $10.90 $1.55 $32.94 $22.33 $4.25 $107.83 $123.40 $1.80 $2.06 
Table H.5.1: Overall Cost Summary with FY20 Projection 
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APPENDIX I: RISK 
I.1 Risk Reporting Matrices 
 












Figure I.1.4: Risk Reporting Matrices for COA 4 
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I.2 Risk Factor Calculation 
 
Table I.2.1: Summary of Risk Matrices for COA 1 
 
 




Table I.2.3: Probability of Failure Weighting Factors Application for COA 1 
 




Table I.2.5: Total Schedule and Technical Risk Factors for COA 1 
 
Table I.2.6: Risk Area Weighting for COA 1 
 





Table I.2.8: Summary of Risk Matrices for COA 2 
 
 





Table I.2.10: Probability of Failure Weighting Factors Application for COA 2 
 




Table I.2.12: Total Schedule and Technical Risk Factors for COA 2 
 
Table I.2.13: Risk Area Weighting for COA 2 
 




Table I.2.15: Summary of Risk Matrices for COA 3 
 





Table I.2.17: Probability of Failure Weighting Factors Application for COA 3 
 




Table I.2.19: Total Schedule and Technical Risk Factors for COA 3 
 
Table I.2.20: Risk Area Weighting for COA 3 
 




Table I.2.22: Summary of Risk Matrices for COA 4 
 





Table I.2.24: Probability of Failure Weighting Factors Application for COA 4 
 




Table I.2.26: Total Schedule and Technical Risk Factors for COA 4 
 
Table I.2.27: Risk Area Weighting for COA 4 
 
Table I.2.28: Total Risk Factor for COA 4 
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I.3 Risk Reporting Guidance 
 











APPENDIX J: FURTHER RESEARCH 
The scoping and bounding process of the SEA-17A Regional Stability project tailored the 
team‘s focus to specific functional requirements in order to support immediate Humanitarian 
Assistance.  While the team considered all the functions in the top level hierarchy (Figure 3.5), 
only Security and FHA where selected for research examination because of time constraints.  
Further research into a variety of areas is highly recommended.  This appendix is intended to 
highlight such areas with amplifying information and informative discussion where necessary.  
J.1 Human Decision-Making and Behavior 
In an effort to determine the effects of FHA efforts on the behavior of the population, the 
following list of questions relevant to human decision-making and behavior in Country Orange 
has been generated.   
 What are the primary motivations of Country Orange leaders?  
 How do these motivations coincide with the motivations and drivers of the populace? 
 What are the major disconnects? 
 What are the key impediments to the development of democracy in Country Orange? 
 Which relationships are the most critical for the efficient functioning of the Country 
Orange political system: 
o The North South relationship? 
o The Muslim Christian relationship? 
o The Federal State relationship? 
o Other? 
 What are the nature, sources, and intensity of cleavages among political elites? 
 What are the sources and impact of corruption in the political system?  
 What is necessary to end the theft of oil revenues—estimated to be approximately 
$400 billion since 1960—by corrupt officials (Deane & Harlow, 2008, p. 9)? 
In addition to the above questions, the topics below related to human decision-making and 
behavior are recommended for research. 
J.1.1 Leadership Outlook 
Similar to many powerful individuals, the elites of Country Orange have a desire to gain 
and retain power. There is commonality in ways between the elites and the people relative to the 
interaction of Country Orange with the global community, maintaining Orange as one nation that 




Over the years the political system has evolved and from its independence until 1999 it 
was primarily under military rule. In 1999, 16 years of military rule ended and the roots of 
democracy began to take hold. In Country Orange, democracy is a three-tiered federation with 
one central government, 36 states, and 774 local governments. There have been concerns issued 
over the years that the system is not ideal and still too much of the power remains with the 
central government. Expert opinion is that essentially ―to succeed as a democracy, Country 
Orange needs a viable opposition party‖ (Deane & Harlow, 2008, p. 9). 
J.1.3 Group Interactivity 
The interactions of groups and people within the political system are of the utmost 
importance. It was noted that the ―most important relationship is between the North and the 
South, which is readily apparent in the presidential rotation system‖ (Deane & Harlow, 2008, p. 
9).  The Federal-State relationship is also important in group dynamics and for this analysis. It is 
one of the key avenues through which revenue sharing can be addressed. Revenue sharing is a 
motivating factor in violence and insurgency. This is exemplified, as noted earlier, by the 
relationship between Muslims and Christians (Deane & Harlow, 2008, p. 9).  
The tension between the central and state governments will need to be solved in order to 
avert crisis in the future and improved relations would mean greater stability. The expert opinion 
is that Orange should ―return to True Federalism, which would cut the existing number of states 
in half but would provide each with more autonomy‖ (Deane & Harlow, 2008, p. 9). 
J.1.4  Political Corruption 
Corruption is one of the overarching problems in Orange and has been a part of its entire 
modern history. Increased efforts on the part of citizens and primarily the GOO will again go a 
long way in solving problems before they arise.  
J.2 Social Dynamics 
At the forefront of Orange social relationships is religion. As previously noted in the 
latter part of the 2000s Orange had approximately 70 million Muslims and 70 million Christians. 
Religious violence in Orange historically has not been at a high level, which is often the common 
perception. Power-sharing agreements have minimized religious competition historically. 
However, at the local level, especially in the middle belt region, religious conflicts arise 
periodically (Deane & Harlow, 2008, p. 6). 




 Do Country Orange citizens generally have a shared sense of national identity and 
national cohesion? 
 What are the major competitors to a shared sense of national identity and national 
cohesion?  
 How strong is national cohesion in Country Orange?  
o  What are the major cleavages in Country Orange that impede Country 
Orange‘s integration and development? 
o What are the sources (for example, political, economic, religious, and 
institutional) of these cleavages? 
o What would be necessary to moderate and manage these cleavages? 
 Do the Country Orange government‘s economic policies exacerbate or mitigate the 
intensity of these conflicts? 
o What would be necessary to achieve a cessation of hostilities between the 
Country Orange government and the rebels/criminal gangs? 
o What are the sources and intensity of public support for the rebels/criminal 
gangs in the South? 
o Would the United States or a specific American, be acceptable as a mediator 
in negotiating an armistice and eventual end of hostilities? 
 What role does Islam play in Country Orange? 
o  Are the conflicts in Northern Country Orange essentially religious in nature 
or economic in origin? 
o How does the Country Orange public view potential Al Qaeda-supported 
transnational Jihadism in the North (Deane & Harlow, 2008, p. 8)? 
J.2.1 National Identity  
Given the diversity of the population the citizens of Orange it is immediately noticed that 
it is difficult to even see a true national identity. There is a national identity but it is one rooted in 
a desire to been seen as a regional power player. There is buy-in from the Orange people for a 
strong government, but the irony of it is that they want that strength to focus outside of the 
borders while eliminating suppression and a lack of revenue sharing in country (Deane & 
Harlow, 2008, p. 11).  
J.2.2 Country Orange Southern Hostilities 
Rebel groups have contributed to the difficulties that the GOO has undergone in the 
Southern portion of Orange. Expert opinion generally states that in order to lessen the hostilities 
in the South, the Orange River Delta ―must experience both development and security and must 
do so in tandem‖ (Deane & Harlow, 2008, p. 12). The states within the group‘s analysis were all 
in this southern region and these states‘ populations are some of the poorest and in most cases 
marginalized citizens of Orange. The GOO would curb the violence in the South if a plan for 
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development, security and revenue sharing were implemented. Again though, the consensus 
opinion in 2008 was that this type of strategy did not exist and would take multiple decades to be 
truly successful. The reason why the strategy did not exist was because much of country Orange 
was unaffected by the violence in the south (Deane & Harlow, 2008, p. 12).   
J.3 Country Orange’s Views of the United States 
Orange citizens, much like many in less than ideal circumstances around the world, find 
the opportunities in the United States to be appealing. This positive attitude towards the United 
States seems to be limited to when the military is not involved however (Deane & Harlow, 2008, 
p. 7).  The citizens of Orange are somewhat suspicious of U.S. involvement in the region. The 
United States had considered stationing U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in Orange. In 
November of 2007 the government of Orange flat-out refused this presence, stating concerns 
about losing their own regional influence and becoming targets for terror (Last, 2007).  That 
refusal was a simple yet obvious confirmation of the difficulties that the United States could 
expect in working with Country Orange. Citizens of Orange at all levels are strongly opposed to 
a direct U.S. Military presence in Country Orange. Expert opinion generally states that the best 
approach that the United States can take relative to foreign policy in Orange is to respect 
sovereignty and to treat Country Orange as a partner vice a resource provider (Deane & Harlow, 
2008, p. 7).  
The following are questions relevant to the people of Orange and the United States which 
may aid in research efforts.  
 How do Citizens of Orange view the United States?  
 What is the basis of Country Orange‘s positive and negative perceptions?  
 How can the United States improve popular perceptions of itself abroad? 
 What would Citizens of Orange consider to be essential elements of a ―good‖ U.S. 
policy toward Country Orange? 
 From a Country Orange perspective, what are the key issues in U.S.−Country Orange 
relations (Deane & Harlow, 2008, p. 12)? 
J.3.1 Citizens of Orange’s Positive Views of the United States 
In general, the Citizens of Orange approve of American ideals and the advantages 
enjoyed by American citizens, such as education, the economy and technology. There is a 
general respect for America and a desire to solicit input on various courses of action. 
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J.3.2 Citizens of Orange’s Negative Views of the United States 
In the latter part of the 2000s, negative sentiment in the North was derived primarily from 
opinions on American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. In general, across the country, there 
was also suspicion regarding the reestablishment of AFRICOM.  
J.4 U.S. Policy Issues 
In 2010, a primary concern for the United States was, and still is today, the development 
of national and regional stability in Country Orange. The following is a listing of relevant 
questions for policy makers. Although the focus of the group was the aid/relief effort by the 
Department of Defense, the point is that these concerns are relevant to the efforts necessary to 
mold Orange‘s public opinion and curb insurgent support.  
 Aside from oil, what are the long-term U.S. interests for assisting Country Orange‘s 
development?  
 Would Country Orange development improve (or impede) U.S.−Country Orange 
relations? 
 Beyond oil purchases, what leverage does the United States have for influencing 
Country Orange‘s policies and priorities? 
 What should be the primary goals and objectives of U.S. policy toward Country 
Orange? 
 What should be the primary focus (i.e. political, economic, social, security) for U.S. 
policy toward Country Orange? 
 From a U.S. perspective, what programs, projects, and/or structures could be 
employed as means to improve U.S.−Country Orange relations? 
 What past or current U.S. programs have been most beneficial in assisting Country 
Orange? What were the factors for success? 
 What past or current U.S. programs have been least effective in assisting Country 
Orange? What were the factors for failure? 
 What specific programs should the U.S. government undertake in Country Orange? 
 What are the key impediments to U.S. Government policies and programs for 
assisting future Country Orange development?  
o Is direct and overt U.S. Government assistance a major impediment?  





J.4.1 Long-Term U.S. Interests in Country Orange 
Beyond oil are the issues of National and regional stability. There is a desire to build 
better relationships with Muslim group and given the greater than 70 million living in Country 
Orange, it is an excellent region to strengthen those relationships. The United States will also 
continue to maintain a presence around the world, with Africa being no exception.  
J.5 Stage Three and Social Modeling 
During the third stage of the SEA-17A capstone project, many decisions concerning the 
dynamics of a social system were required.  Most of these decisions and assumptions were based 
on research, historical data, and subject matter expertise. While the options selected to help 
scope and bound the problem were fact or logic based, they did not necessarily yield the only 
correct answers.  In actuality, a myriad of changes could be made to the STELLA physical 
architecture models and the inputs upon which they were based.  These changes could yield 
different, but still perfectly reasonable results.  In other words, making reasonable adjustments 
would probably lead to some insights that may be more or less—not correct—but realistic, and 
not necessarily wrong.  The reason for this is simple:  Social science research and 
experimentation rarely leads to universal truths concerning relationships, changes, motivations, 
and thresholds.  The following suggests potential adjustments, revisions, or complete 
reorganizations of the STELLA infrastructure and its inputs. This will hopefully result in 
additional insight into a population‘s response in a post-disaster/humanitarian aid scenario. 
J.5.1 Unlimited Resource Surplus as Driver 
Currently, each of the STELLA architectures achieves a population flux per logistical site 
by dividing the available surplus (or lack thereof) of each individual resource by the site‘s local 
population after the population‘s consumption per time period has been removed from the 
surplus.  This method logically results in a ratio between the resources available and the 
resources required per cycle, per person.  If all needs are being met, then popular satisfaction will 
increase.  If the needs are not completely being met, the rationale is that each person is receiving 
a fraction of their daily required intake and becomes dissatisfied as a result.   
This architecture is unique because the people, to become dissatisfied, must be faced with 
a negative stock, meaning the rate of delivery of the various goods over time is insufficient to 
meet the population‘s needs.  Once the surplus is negative, it will remain negative until the 
delivery rate is able to exceed the demand, even if the delivery rate becomes equal to the 
demand, which, in reality, should meet the expectations of the people.   
Another issue with this methodology, while it does not occur in the model based on the 
current inputs, is that consistent over-delivery can greatly enhance public satisfaction beyond a 
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point which could be considered reasonable.  Consider a stock of 10 and a need of two.  The 
stock will decrement to eight, and that eight will then be divided by the need, two, to assist in the 
later determination of the  multiple of satisfaction, which would be four and would in turn leave 
the final stock value at 12. As long as the surplus in the stock is growing and the population 
remains constant, the resources per person scheme has no limit in terms of creating more 
satisfaction, even if all resources are zero except one, which would have to be delivered at a 
fantastic and subsequently unrealistic rate.  Conversely, the deficit of resources should impact 
the population‘s flow in a proportionally negative fashion, but this is not the case.   
Delivering zero units of a given resource and subtracting the population‘s need results in 
the new stock value, which will equal that same population need, but negative.  Determining 
satisfaction then requires that this new stock value to be divided by the population‘s need, which 
should result in the goods available per person.  In this case though, it is equal to negative one. 
Since nothing was delivered, each person receives the exact mathematical opposite of what they 
needed.  Carrying this through over time means a tremendous discontinuity in favor of the effects 
of a surplus, which is not accurate in reality.  Consider again the previous example, but as if no 
goods were delivered.  If the resource need remained two units, but zero were delivered in day 
one, the stock would drop to minus two.  Minus two divided by two is equal to just minus one.  
In the next cycle, zero units are delivered, but four are now required, which would be represented 
in the stock as minus four.  Again, minus four divided by the need, two units, results in just a 
minus two that will be used to affect the population‘s negative flow.  Over the course of 60 days, 
the utility of a surplus is tremendous for the population whereas the negative effect felt from 
failing to deliver a particular resources is muted considerably.  As a result, additional 
consideration should be given to the logic employed with STELLA to eliminate this 
proportionality problem.  A mathematical cap or prioritization mechanism able to measure the 
increasing or decreasing marginal utility of goods and services and adjust their effects 
accordingly would be an advisable course of action with this particular idiosyncrasy in mind.    
J.5.2 Flexing Component Attributes 
Many assumptions are made about how this system interacts over time.  Future studies 
should attempt to flex these dynamics by considering different efficiencies for security, 
additional security deployment schemes, or reversing the initial satisfied/dissatisfied population 
distributions at the start of the problem.  While firm solutions to social science problems will 
remain elusive, tinkering with the quantities and qualities of various units interacting in this 
model may prove useful in at least bounding the potential solution space. 
J.5.3 Consider More Data Points and Time 
STELLA provides deterministic solutions based on deterministic inputs.  While the 
information delivered from Stages One and Two was based on stochastic data and run through its 
own models and simulations many times, the final set of numbers fed into each course of 
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action‘s physical architectures in STELLA were based on an average of all the previous 
stochastic data, which could not be randomly varied before, during, or at the conclusion of any 
runs.  Subsequently, STELLA failed to provide a varied set of insights into this analysis.  The 
STELLA output generated was the only output from which conclusions could be drawn.  Since 
STELLA maintains no exceptionally useful and organic tool capable of enhancing the 
randomness of the output, future studies should employ the same data used through Stage One 
and Two and manually update and run each individual set through the STELLA architecture so 
as to capture some randomness in brute-force fashion, and analyze the collective results to 
achieve a deeper insight into this problem.     
J.6 Additional Focus Areas of the SEA-17A Capstone Project 
The following subject areas were considered in the original project plan but eventually 
eliminated due to time and resource constraints.  These items are more technical in nature than 
the previous sections, directly related to the military and DoD, and are recommended for 
exploration/research should another team continue the research completed by SEA-17A. 
J.6.1 Infrastructure Repair 
The 60-Day time frame did not allow the team to consider infrastructure repair as it is 
typically a long term undertaking.  Issues like the type of infrastructure repair, repair priorities, 
military repair/construction capabilities, and civil – military coordination should all be 
investigated as well.  The repair of infrastructure should have an impact on the Host Nation‘s 
ability to deliver aid to the population more effectively.  Ultimately the hope is that this will have 
an even more substantial, positive influence on the population and hopefully ease the burden on 
the Seabase. 
J.6.2 Additional Architectures 
There are many, many possibilities for physical architectures in a Seabased aid delivery 
system.  While the team used a very specific set of architectures, further research should include 
other alternatives and investigate other types of sea to shore connectors.  One particular choke-
point in the project was the LCU as a surface connector due to its extremely slow transit time.  
Eliminating LCU and using only LCAC and T-Craft or another type of connector craft might 
improve throughput. 
J.6.3 Seabase Logistics Support 
The project was isolated to the Seabase and its delivery to shore in a closed system.  The 
assumption was that there was an unlimited supply of goods to the Seabase and that the only 
limitation to how much could be delivered was the cargo capacity of the Seabase and the 
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parameters of the connector craft.  Further research should include the logistics chain to get the 
aid supplies to the Seabase and examine its effect on the MOEs/MOPs and the overall HA effort. 
J.6.4 Commercial Vessel Compatibility 
Currently, none of the Navy‘s vessels are able connect to or be on or offloaded from a 
commercial vessel.  This area of research might investigate how this could be accomplished to 
bring more surface connectors to the scene more quickly. 
J.6.5 Interagency Cooperation 
Follow-on research should address the integration of military organizations with USAID 
and NGOs.  Better understanding of the USAID cluster system and how the military fits into the 
big picture could make the FHA/DR process go more smoothly and better keep in line with the 
President‘s National Security Strategy. 
J.6.6 90-Day Timeline 
A simple investigation of the difference in the population‘s response over 90 days versus 
the team‘s 60-day timeline could be insightful and better show the trend in population attitudes 
over time. 
J.6.7 Varying the Number and Location of FLSs and FLSSs 
Follow-on research could study the effect of increasing the number of Forward Logics 
Sites (FLS) and Forward Logistics Satellite Sites (FLSS).  Also, varying the locations of the sites 
and observing its effects on aid delivery and insurgency would be beneficial. 
J.6.8 Review of Best Practices 
A thorough literature review of disaster lessons learned and common problems combined 
with interviews of subject matter experts and people who were involved in previous FHA 
operations would provide valuable input.  The team was only able to scratch the surface 
regarding historical events due to the project‘s time constraints. 
J.6.9 Design of a “Humanitarian Aid Force” 
The DoD has always viewed Humanitarian Aid as a secondary or even tertiary mission 
for the military.  Further research could examine the creation of a force specifically tailored to 
conduct rapid FHA missions for immediate relief needs. 
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J.6.10 Effect of Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) 
On and off-loading of cargo to and from the T-Craft requires a separate support vessel, 
the MLP.  Further investigation is needed into how the MLP affects aid delivery and cost to 
achieve a more accurate picture of the T-Craft‘s cost-effectiveness and overall performance. 
J.6.11 Examination of Impact/Interaction of Different Factors 
Further analysis should be conducted to determine which factors or interactions had the 
most significant impact on the outcome of the project.  Factors such as craft type, Seabase 
platform, aircraft, refueling rates, availability, load time, and throughput of the four categories 
can be analyzed and compared to find interactions and determine which can be varied to have the 
strongest effect on the overall outcome.
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